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State officials since the 15th amendment extends to both. The exemption under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 of elections for those officials most closely affecting the day-by-day life of local citizens is particularly inadvisable since the disabilities under color of law from which Negroes suffer most deeply are imposed by such officials.

We therefore recommend the addition to S. 1564 of sections similar to those now contained in S. 1517 and H.R. 4552 amending sections 2004 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C., sec. 1971) to eliminate the provisions limiting it to Federal elections.

CONCLUSION

The history of the development of Negro voting rights since the ratification of the 15th amendment in 1870 has been replete with constant efforts, both simple and sophisticated, to circumvent its basic purpose—elimination of distinctions on the grounds of race or color in the right to vote. Sincere efforts by Congress and the Executive to meet these problems through the courts have proven unsuccessful despite the provisions of the 1957, 1960, and 1964 Civil Rights Acts. The record makes clear that administrative procedures are essential to permit rapid and extensive registration of persons heretofore discriminatorily denied the right to vote. We believe that the proposed bill is a clearly constitutional exercise of congressional power under the 15th amendment, and we strongly urge its prompt enactment with the strengthening and clarifying amendments we have suggested.

Respectfully submitted,

Committee on Federal Legislation: Fred N. Fishman, Chairman; Sidney H. Asch; Charles R. Bergoffen; Eastman Birkett; Benjamin F. Crane; Nanette Demblitz; Sheldon H. Eisen; Leonard Epstein; Elliot H. Goodwin; Andrew N. Grass, Jr.; Jerome E. Hyman; Robert M. Kaufman; Ida Klaus; John E. Massengale; Robert B. McKay; John E. Merow; George Minklin; Gerald E. Paley; Mahlon F. Perkins, Jr.; H. David Potter; Arthur I. Rosett; Albert J. Rosenthal; Peter G. Schmlidt; Henry I. Stimson.

Committee on the Bill of Rights: Arnold Bauman, Chairman; Edgar E. Barton; Jane M. Bolin; William J. Butler; Louis A. Craco; Norman Dorsen; Victor M. Earle III; Justin N. Feldman; William G. Fennell; Marvin E. Frankel; Callman Gottesman; Richard D. Kahn; Robert K. Knight; Robert O. Lehman; Robert P. Patterson, Jr.; Amos J. Peaslee, Jr.; Robert Pitofsky; Seymour M. Waldman

APRIL 10, 1965.

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I noted with great interest the debate which was held on the floor of the Senate yesterday with respect to the situation in Vietnam. I believe that the suggestion which was made by the majority leader, the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], and concurred in by other Members of great distinction in the Senate, was a most constructive one.

I should like to add, however, this one point, which I believe is very important to our country. I, like every other Senator, travel widely, particularly in my own State, and in other States as well, and as a result I have a very good idea of what is worrying our people. There are straws in the wind to indicate that there is to be an escalation of our efforts

on the ground in Vietnam. If the Commander in Chief feels that a further commitment is necessary with regard to ground forces in the Vietnamese struggle—paralleling what we are trying to do in the air, with American aircraft actually engaged in bombardment—then, at that point, I believe the issue should again be submitted to Congress and to the country, and Congress should have an opportunity to give a new mandate in that respect.

I point out that the joint resolution which Congress passed on August 7, 1964—which I supported and which I continue to support, as I support the President's actions—"approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."

In the same resolution the President is authorized—if he needs authorization—"to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

That resolution gave the President authority, if he needed any. I urge upon the President that he again ask the advice of Congress if we are to engage in the struggle in Vietnam on yet another level by commitment of an appreciable number of our ground forces in actual combat. I say that because such a commitment is of such a nature and of such importance that Congress should again have the opportunity to pass on it by resolution.

I shall draft a resolution on that subject, if it is needed, though the administration is well able to do it. However, I urge that it be done that way, rather than through unilateral action by the Commander in Chief, if that is the step we contemplate.

CHARLES B. BOLTON, RECIPIENT OF HAWKEN SCHOOL ALUMNI AWARD

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, recently a distinguished citizen of Ohio received the coveted Hawken School Alumni Award for his work in education in various fields. He is Charles B. Bolton, business executive and philanthropist of Cleveland, Ohio. Mr. Bolton considers as tremendously exciting the challenge of today confronting educational establishments, independent, parochial and public. But he regards it as sobering in the realization that the future of this and other countries is at stake.

It is his considered opinion that the present social unrest will be resolved only through education.

Because his acceptance speech sets forth impressive perspective in the fundamentals of the mission of education, I ask unanimous consent that it be placed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Mr. President, members of the alumni, ladies, and friends, many thoughts are racing through my mind as I stand here tonight. Thoughts that are most difficult to put into words. Basically these are a confused mixture of incredibility, surprise, humbleness, and disbelief flavored with the salt of pride and gratitude. To be honored by men, many of whom I have known intimately as friends over a period of 50 years, is something I cannot talk about as I feel an emotion that mere words tend to destroy. I've searched diligently, however, for a simple word or phrase to adequately express my feelings and only one truly does. I use it in its very broadest and all encompassing sense—thank you.

John Newell, our president, has asked that I talk to you about Hawken School as I see it, both today and tomorrow. This I am more than willing to do provided all of you remember these thoughts and opinions are mine alone. They do not necessarily express any official conceptions of or decisions by the board of trustees, but are strictly those of an alumnus who has been fortunate enough to be associated with Hawken in some capacity since its inception.

In thinking of Hawken School today one cannot help but think of the many well-lived yesterdays that made the immediate realities of today and the great dreams of tomorrow even possible. These memories lump together, I'm sure, in your minds as well as in mine, but let me briefly sort them out into three categories; housing, traditions, and individuals.

All of us here tonight are fully aware of the humble facilities available in first one quarter and then a second on Ansel Road that housed the newborn but lusty Hawken, followed by the move to the then new building in Lyndhurst. All three changes in location were implemented by the growth of the student body and were made only after much study and thought by Mr. Hawken and the then small board of trustees. The school resembled an adolescent, growing in great spurts and, as is typical of youth, constantly on the verge of fiscal collapse with only faith and friends as parents to turn to in the struggle toward manhood. These moves were followed by a period of comparative calm during which reorganization and strengthening were stressed. Growth, however, was not to be denied and the Lyndhurst facilities grew in size to be followed, only recently, by the addition of the nucleus of an upper school in Gates Mills. Thus at last Hawken attained a semblance of manhood as far as a physical framework is concerned at the youthful age of 50 years.

What, you may ask, was the moving force behind this growth, the flame under the broiler and the fuel to feed the fire. I believe it was the desire to extend the tradition of excellence in education envisioned by the founders, the concept of fairplay and the desire that each generation introduce its successor to a higher plane of living. These three traditions, you will agree, have formed Hawken's Triangulum Major in the heavens and as such are the constellation that has set the school's course. It is and has been a great and true reference point and guide through sunlight and storm. May it always be so.

Now, for a minute, I want to pay tribute to those rare and devoted men and women who conceived the idea we call Hawken, and also to those who joined the original group in ensuing years, who nurtured it on all fronts, in good times and in bad, who have taken the knocks and the bows and who have made this school loved and respected by not only ourselves but by countless others as well. Time limitations prevent each to be named but no one of them ever requires his name to be mentioned. Each is aware that Hawken

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School stands firmly on the broad foundation built many years ago with the bricks and mortar of true ideals and practical devotion by men not now on the stage but who will never be forgotten. Humbly we thank each of them.

Hawken School today is a macrocosm of the 1915 Ansel Road beginning. As defined in the December 11 edition of the Upper School paper, the affirmative no, in its lead editorial: "The primary concern of the Hawken philosophy is the individual and his relation to society. It is a philosophy not narrowly confined by academic considerations, but based upon a consideration of the student as a future citizen. Inherent in this philosophy is the hope that Hawken can guide the individual toward an awareness of his environment and a sincere concern for the welfare of his fellow men. Hawken is an academic institution devoted to excellence, but perhaps more important it is devoted to instilling in the student certain basic qualities of character so that upon his graduation he may enter into whatever he undertakes, able to make responsible decisions based on a valid evaluation of his situation."

It is increasingly difficult these days to establish and expand an environment to nurture this philosophy of excellence and awareness. One hears on all sides of the tremendous advances by science and the effect they have on the society in which we live. In reality these are broader concepts of basic truths but they tend to effect the confusion in the minds of students toward these truths. Hawken students are no exception. I can honestly say the board of trustees, the headmaster, the faculty, and even the students themselves are constantly striving to maintain the vital balance between the heart and the mind so essential if we are to live up to the philosophy expressed above. How do we attempt this? We continue to rely on the concept of small, intimate teaching units even though each grade may consist of 40 or more individuals. The school, as you know, can take a boy from kindergarten to college, has 563 students and a faculty of over 65. Hawken is the largest independent school in the area and even so the clamor to join the student body has led to a current study reevaluating the upper school program as dictated by our curriculum and finally to the ultimate size of that body. Perhaps too much emphasis is put on admission to college by the pressures of the times and not enough on the development of the student's capacity to its fullest. We are constantly striving to bring more order in all our study programs so that today's students, tomorrow's leaders for whom we are presently responsible, will not regret in their mature years that these studies could have been broader, more intense, and more conclusive. We hope we are succeeding in our efforts today as we continue to use our reference point I call Hawken's triangulum major; but what of tomorrow.

The curriculum and program used at the Lyndhurst campus has resulted in the adoption of a master building plan. I venture to say this will gradually be completed. This plan envisions the centralization of the athletic areas and isolation of the quieter areas. It will lead to an expansion of the campus acreage and the prompt completion of the Edward Godfrey swimming pool and building. To the west of that new building a gymnasium will be built utilizing the southwest wing of classrooms as new locker and shower rooms. This in turn will free up the gym in the old building for use as a fine library and in addition as a lecture hall. The present locker rooms will be reconverted to classrooms while the commons room will once more be used as originally planned. No increase in boy population dictates these changes. The plan is one of refinement based on a continuum of the belief that all

our boys be given a real chance to fully develop inborn, God-given capacities.

I cannot, at this time, be as specific concerning the Gates Mills campus. Our curriculum there as well as its programing must be broadened and refined. This will lead to a determination of student body size and finally to a master building plan. All these facets must be flexible but again they should surround the student with greater opportunities for self-discipline through learning. It is a challenging, exciting future.

In conclusion I want to quote President Mills of Western Reserve University as he expresses our opportunities so well. I am sure he will not mind as his beliefs are mine: "There is in education both permanency and change. The eternal values of the well-furnished and literate mind, the intellectually oriented person, remain the same. The same basic skills of communication, of understanding, of the organization of thought, the approach to problems, and the solution of problems, remain here as they did for me, for my father, for my grandfather. But at the same time, they are within the perspective and the framework of an ever-changing society and world. New knowledge, new concepts, and a sense of new values. Therefore, it is to meld this change and this element of permanency that is the essential task of devising the instruction of the student."

A never-ending challenge lies before us. Let us continue with the help of the Almighty to give these young men every opportunity for self-development and self-discipline coupled with a true desire to continue the stoking of the fires of their own learning. In this fashion, guided by fair play, excellence will prevail and each generation cannot help but introduce its successor to a higher plane of living. Thank you again for this accolade. I shall remember this crown of glory carries with it the thorns of great responsibility and shall always do my utmost to further all our dreams for Hawken. Your presence here tonight touches me deeply. I consider it a great tribute, not so much to myself, but to Hawken School. I shall count on your help as we urge the young generation of today along the road of life and toward the ultimate destiny of man.

U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST— A TRAGIC FAILURE

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in the Washington Post for April 20, 1965, there appeared a news story datelined Cairo to the effect that President Nasser of Egypt had sent President Johnson a personal message through Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot. Reportedly the message asked for an additional \$500 million in U.S. economic aid.

If this report is true, this request represents colossal gall on the part of President Nasser.

Through June 30, 1964, our economic aid to Nasser's Egypt has totaled \$888.9 million in loans, grants, and food.

In the last 2½ years, Nasser's Egypt has wasted over \$2 billion in fighting an aggressive war in Yemen.

Congress has written into law a provision requesting the President to cut off foreign aid to any country found to be an aggressor—which Egypt clearly is.

Repeatedly over the world, Nasser has interfered to thwart U.S. foreign policy.

Congress has written into law a requirement that the final \$27.5 million worth of food under the Egyptian agreement expiring in June not be shipped

unless the President finds that such shipment is "in the interest of the United States."

Nasser has told the United States to take its aid and jump in the sea.

In the face of this sorry record, President Nasser's reported request for an additional \$500 million in U.S. economic aid shows an unbelievable misreading of sentiment in the United States by those who have been advising President Johnson who are in communication with President Nasser, and who have carried out this costly, harmful appeasement policy for over a decade.

From 1952 to the present time—under three different administrations—both Republican and Democratic—U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has been vacillating, weak, and ineffectual.

The lack on the part of the United States of sound policies, firmly bedded in moral principles aimed at bringing about lasting peace in the Middle East, has contributed greatly to the tinderbox situation existing there today.

U.S. appeasement, time and time and time again during those years, of the dictator of Egypt, President Nasser, has led to almost unbelievable arrogance on his part, ever-widening aggressions against his neighbors, and a growing closeness to communism, making his actions more and more resemble those of any other Russian satellite.

I was in Egypt over 2 years ago on a study mission for the Senate Committee on Government Operations to observe the administration of the U.S. foreign aid program in that country.

Upon my return I filed a report with the Senate Committee on Government Operations in which I made certain observations with respect to happenings in the Middle East that are as pertinent today as they were when the report was filed on October 1, 1963. The report running to 472 printed pages has been published as a Senate document.

I pointed out that it was Colonel Nasser, in 1956, who gave the Russian Communists their first foothold in the Middle East—the fulfillment of a dream that went back to the czars. I warned that the police state being built by President Nasser was modeled after that built in Communist Russia, socially, economically, and politically, making it easy for a Communist takeover. But most importantly, I noted with alarm that "militarily Egypt is completely dependent on Soviet bloc countries. Colonel Nasser has maneuvered himself into a position of being completely dependent on Communist Russia for a continued flow of arms and parts. Should that flow be cut off, Egypt is militarily unarmed." And no one knows this better than President Nasser of Egypt.

Both before and after my report, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has been hinged on the continued appeasement of President Nasser with the result that he has become bolder and bolder and his demands greater and greater.

When Israel proclaimed its independence and its birth as a nation on May 14, 1948, President Harry Truman, to his everlasting credit and over the opposition of his Secretary of State and many

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of the advisers in the Department of State, recognized the new State of Israel the very same day.

If we judge by outward appearances, the State Department advisers then and thereafter reluctantly went along with President Truman's decision.

When Colonel Nasser came to power in 1952, the advisers in the State Department seized upon him as the strong man in the Middle East and by catering to his whims sought to build on that image.

The appeasement of Colonel Nasser has continued from that date to this.

At about the time I was in Egypt, in February 1963, the State Department's justification for its policy of appeasement was based on the following points, quoting from material set forth in my report:

Nasser now is trying to reestablish the United Arab links with the West, particularly in Europe.

His recent wooing of East Germany, his permitting the burning of the Kennedy Memorial Library in Cairo last November, his shooting down of an unarmed Texas Oil plane over Alexandria, with the deaths of the American pilot and copilot—to mention but a few incidents—hardly seems like "trying to reestablish links with the West."

Another justification given by the State Department for its appeasement of President Nasser was:

He and his country have done a complete turnabout in the Congo—from being one of the chief supporters of the late Patrice Lumumba and his leftist successor, Antoine Gizenga, to joining ranks behind the United Nations in its current efforts for Congo unity.

But who is now supplying the Congo rebels with Russian arms? President Nasser of Egypt—the dictator supported to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. foreign assistance while he denounces us as he did, for example, in a speech made at Port Said as recently as December 23, 1964, in the following words:

Can we possibly recognize Tshombe as the representative of the Congolese people? Tshombe is a murderer. If America and Belgium had installed Tshombe as a premier, he is then a premier in the pay of America and Belgium, and we cannot under any circumstances recognize him as a premier representing the Congolese people * * * Tshombe is an agent serving the interests of America and Belgium in the Congo.

Another reason advanced in the early part of 1963 by the State Department in justification of its policy of appeasing President Nasser was:

Nasser has played down his country's Arab holy war with Israel, proposed to his colleagues a while back that the issue be put in the icebox, and, for his pains has been accused by Syria of "subversion."

This again is but another example of how the Department of State has time and time again made an incorrect assessment of the situation in the Middle East and of President Nasser's intentions in that part of the world.

Nasser and his Arab allies have repeatedly announced it to be their policy—despite the State Department's "head in the sand attitude"—to drive Israel "into the sea."

The State Department's alleging that its policy of appeasing President Nasser is based on the fact that he has now become "soft on Israel" does not jibe with the facts.

President Nasser called the first Arab unity summit meeting in Cairo a year ago to take steps to resist Israel's moves to withdraw water from Lake Tiberias. The Arab countries, assembled at President Nasser's call, agreed on a united front and set up a unified army command. They also established a Palestinian political body, headquartered in Jerusalem, with the objective of carrying the case to the United Nations for recognition as a government-in-exile. But more importantly, the conference agreed to divert the headwaters of the Jordan in Lebanon and Syria. Work on this project has begun. It is not a project—as admitted by Egypt and its allies—having a worthy irrigation objective. The Arab nations could have achieved such an objective by adhering to the Johnston plan. The Johnston plan was evolved by the late Eric Johnston at the request of President Eisenhower and provides for the equitable distribution of the waters of the Jordan River between Israel and the Arab nations. The problem is basically simple. The Jordan River contains only a limited amount of water. In that area of the world, water is vital. There simply is not enough water for all the nations that need it. The Johnston plan simply provided for dividing the available waters of the Jordan River among the nations equitably and on the basis of their needs.

But the Arab nations have announced that they will not adhere to the Johnston plan. What they want to do is keep the Jordan's water from irrigating Israeli soil. This is truly a "dog-in-the-manger" attitude.

With President Nasser taking a leading part in each and every one of these moves against Israel—all designed to destroy that country—it is difficult to follow the Department of State's estimation of the situation that President Nasser has put the Israel issue "on ice."

Another reason advanced by the Department of State in justification of its policy of appeasing President Nasser is:

Nasser personally kept a strict silence a few months ago when it became known that the United States was going to sell Hawk missiles to Israel to help that country defend itself. In former years, this would have been the occasion for a major anti-U.S. campaign.

Recent events have again proven how wrong the State Department has again been.

For some time now, it has been common knowledge that Israel was being supplied by West Germany with U.S. arms. I shall return at a later point in my remarks to the unhappy and dangerous arms race in the Middle East. At this point, I wish to dwell upon President Nasser's recent actions with respect to the arms received by Israel from West Germany.

Using his tried and true blackmail techniques—techniques which have been perfected through constant use during the past years—President Nasser chose the time and place to become outraged at

the very thought that Israel is being given arms by West Germany, conveniently forgetting the vast amounts of aid Egypt has been receiving from the same source, both in money and technical assistance, including German scientists of the Nazi stripe busily perfecting missiles for President Nasser's Egypt. President Nasser, in his outrage, also conveniently overlooked the tremendous quantity of Communist arms received by him over the years—arms which were the very reason why Israel, for its own defense, had to make arms arrangements with West Germany.

As part of his blackmail plot, President Nasser invited Ulbricht, of East Germany, to visit Cairo. West Germany, in a reaction entirely unbecoming a sophisticated world power, panicked and stopped further arms aid to Israel.

The whole sorry story is set forth in a factual editorial in the Washington Daily News for March 17, 1965, entitled "Who Won." One sentence from the editorial should be quoted at this point:

United States: Gained bad case of jitters for fear Egypt-Israel-German triangle might lead to Arab-Israel war with desert water as the excuse.

In great haste, the United States sent our roving Ambassador, Mr. Harriman, to Israel for secret and urgent talks with the heads of that government.

I am not privy to the purposes and objectives of Ambassador Harriman's trip or to what was discussed or what was agreed to by both sides. But some of the rumors and reports coming back from Tel Aviv are most disturbing.

According to the London Times for March 3, 1965:

The divergence of views was principally over an American demand that the Eshkol government renounce the use or the threat of military action.

However, the New York Times for March 4 reported:

Mr. Harriman, however was said not to have laid down any condition of nonintervention for Israel's obtaining American military assistance. The Israel officials, in turn, were said to have made it clear that they viewed the arms race and the Jordan River problem as separate issues.

I hope the New York Times article is correct and that we—the United States—did not try to use Nasser's blackmail against West Germany as the occasion to pressure Israel to give up its right of self-defense. That, no country can give up. That, no country should be asked to give up.

After all, there was an agreement between West Germany and Israel—an agreement to which the United States apparently had acceded—for supplying a certain quantity of arms to Israel. These arms are needed by Israel because of the quantity of arms received by Egypt from the Communist bloc.

For the United States to attempt to appease Egypt again by agreeing to Egypt's blackmail would indeed be intolerable.

The key to the situation in the Middle East is the safety and independence of the State of Israel. U.S. vital interests in that area of the world are inextricably

bound up with the continued safety of that nation.

Consider the State of Israel.

Born in strife and turmoil, nurtured in adversity, Israel, in the relatively few years of its freedom, has been capable of phenomenal economic growth in a climate of democracy unique in that dictatorship-ridden area of unstable governments, even though it has been surrounded at its land borders by hostile nations sworn to destroy it.

Even though those nations have been having an on-again, off-again romance with Communist nations—with Nasser's romance as constant and persistent as it could be—Israel has steadfastly aligned itself with the West.

If the Arab nations in the Middle East had not, through all these long years, been consumed by hatred—fanned in good measure by President Nasser of Egypt, but had instead taken Israel as a model of a democratic government interested in the economic and social advancement of its people and had followed in Israel's footsteps, the Middle East would have been today a far more stable and economically advanced region.

The American people have given without stint of their tax dollars for the economic development of that area. At the conclusion of my remarks I shall set forth a table showing just how many millions have been poured into that region. However, what galls the American people particularly is when President Nasser uses those American tax dollars to wage a bitter, bloody war of aggression in Yemen, which to date has cost him over \$2 billion; to pressure Libya to force the United States to remove its Wheelus Air Base from that country; to foment strife in Algeria, Cyprus, the Congo, and wherever else President Nasser sees an opportunity to thwart the policies of the United States and its Western allies.

The time is long since past for the United States to change its policies in the Middle East, to stop aiding Nasser wage war in that area, and to take positive measures to bring abiding peace to that long-troubled region.

The Congress is well ahead of the Department of State in urging that these positive steps to curb aggression in the Middle East be taken.

In 1963 there was added to the Foreign Assistance Act an amendment proposed by me which provided:

No assistance shall be provided under this or any other act, and no sales shall be made under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, to any country which the President determines is engaging in or preparing for aggressive military efforts directed against—

- (1) The United States,
- (2) any country receiving assistance under this or any other act, or
- (3) any country to which sales are made under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, until the President determines that such military efforts or preparations have ceased and he reports to the Congress that he has received assurances satisfactory to him that such military efforts or preparations will not be renewed. This restriction may not be waived pursuant to any authority contained in this act.

That amendment was adopted in this body by a vote of 65 to 13—indicating clearly the sentiments of this body.

That it was clearly aimed at Egypt—as well as Indonesia—was made perfectly clear during the floor debate at the time.

The then majority whip and now Vice President HUMPHREY interpreted the language of the amendment as follows:

There appears to be little doubt that Nasser was responsible for the attack on Yemen, and I favor cutting off our aid to Egypt. From the available evidence it would appear that Nasser is guilty, and let us say that he is. We know perfectly well what he [Nasser] has been doing in Yemen and in Algeria and we know perfectly well about his constant meddling in the Middle East governments in many, many instances which include Iraq and Syria; and we could name many more of them.

Despite this clear directive from the Congress—and my amendment is still the law of the land—no finding has been made by the President of the United States that President Nasser is waging an aggressive war in Yemen or preparing for aggression against Israel or aiding aggression in Cyprus, as was disclosed just recently that Communist missiles were being furnished the Greek Cypriots by President Nasser. Still our foreign aid to Egypt continues.

Earlier this year the Congress, feeling that some further action should be taken, amended the Supplemental Appropriation Act to provide that no further Public Law 480 shipments should be made to Egypt unless the President found that doing so would be in the interest of the United States. So far I have not been informed that the President has made such a finding. It is difficult to see how, if there should be any reliance upon the facts, the President can make such a finding.

How can the President find the following actions by the dictator of Egypt to be in the interest of the United States:

Pressure on Libya to force the United States to close our air base there;

Provision of Communist arms to the Congolese rebels, even while they were slaughtering innocent whites and Negroes and indulging in cannibalism;

Waging war in Yemen with 50,000 troops for 2½ years at a cost of over \$2 billion to date;

Hurling constant anti-Western propaganda into the Aden area;

Constant undermining of our prestige in Africa;

Supplying Communist missiles to the Greek Cypriots;

Continuing a barrage of anti-American propaganda in the Egyptian-controlled press and on the Egyptian-controlled radio;

Recognizing East Germany and pressuring the other Arab nations to do likewise;

Taking the leadership in seeking to divert the headwaters of the Jordan from peaceful uses.

These are but random samplings of Nasser's anti-American actions in recent times. The intensification of these anti-American actions is ominous. Having "gotten away with it" in the past,

with the United States continuing to supply his vital food needs despite repeated abuse, President Nasser has gotten bolder and bolder.

But worse than that—his "getting away with it" emboldens other nations—friendly to the United States—to attempt the same tactics.

Jordan is a typical example of a nation which has become colder to the United States and more closely aligned with Egypt as it sees enmity rewarded.

Our hasty recognition of the Egyptian puppet government in Yemen and our continued support of Egypt in its aggressions there proved for all the world to see that for a nation to thumb its nose at the United States was profitable.

The old method of securing more and more foreign assistance was to make overtures first to the East and then to the West—playing one against the other.

Something new has been added. Burn an American library, storm the American Embassy—American taxpayers dollars will still continue to flow.

One of the most disturbing and critical situations in the Middle East is the threatened diversion of the waters of the Jordan. Water is the lifeblood of the desert parched state of Israel. Diversion of the headwaters of the Jordan will be as much an act of aggressive warfare against Israel, even though accomplished on Lebanese and Syrian soil, as though Arab troops physically invaded the land of Israel. It is an attempt to make Israel take the first militant move while the Arabs claim they are not militarily engaged, and to make Israel appear the aggressor.

The time to prevent this disastrous event is now—not when the waters are so close to being diverted that Israel must take military steps to prevent the diversion.

Let us not mistake the times. History is repeating itself. The fateful days and events of 1956 are with us again. Then—but I hope not now—we waited until it was too late—we waited until the border raids onto Israeli soil became intolerable, until the seizure of the Suez Canal cut the lifeline of France, Britain, and Israel, and until their armies marched to hold further depredations.

This time not only are we failing to act, we are actually furnishing Nasser with the wherewithal to continue his aggressive attacks.

Self-defense is an inherent right of national sovereignty. During its entire history, the United States has asserted and defended this right, exercising it even though its own territory was not invaded. Hit and run raids on defenseless villages, the intensification of the economic boycott, and now, the diversion of water vitally needed for irrigation, can rightfully be treated as acts of aggression warranting forceful retaliation. This the United States should recognize and take adequate and forceful steps to prevent.

Unfortunately—as in 1956—the Middle East advisers in the Department of State still seem to believe that, with respect to Nasser, we should appease his aggressions while telling the aggrieved party—the

State of Israel—to turn the other cheek. Such a bankrupt policy can, as it has, but lead to further aggression on the part of other nations.

The time to slow down the quickened arms race in the Middle East is now, not when all the countries have squandered the wealth so sorely needed for their economic development on ever more sophisticated weapons of destruction.

We have contributed as much to the arms race in that area of the world as any other nation. We have a moral obligation to stop it.

The facts are simple. In 1956 Nasser turned to Russia for weapons. Lacking sufficient foreign exchange to pay the Russians for the weapons he desired, he offered to trade the Russians cotton for weapons. That left Nasser short of foreign exchange to buy food to feed the people of Egypt. Nasser turned to the United States, which sold him the needed food in exchange for Egyptian pounds, the expenditure of which in Egypt Nasser controls.

With his weapons obtained by barter—weapons which have become better and better—Nasser, with his continued threats to drive Israel into the sea, became more and more of a menace to Israel and to the peace of the Middle East. Israel, therefore, had to divert foreign exchange sorely needed for its own economic development to the purchase of arms to match the ones traded to Nasser by Communist Russia.

These are the simple elements of the arms race in the Middle East—an arms race made possible in great measure because of U.S. foreign aid.

There are three steps which the United States can and should take immediately to lessen tensions in the Middle East.

First, the President of the United States should offer his good offices to end the declared war in the Middle East. The fact remains that the Arab States declared war against Israel at that nation's birth. That declaration of war is still in existence. It is a running sore in that area, the cause of much bitterness and the cause of much friction. Israel is not at war with the Arab States. However, the Arab States continue to remain in a state of war with respect to Israel. I do not urge the diplomatic recognition by the Arab States of the State of Israel, but only a rescission of the declaration of war.

Second, the United States should immediately enter into a mutual defense pact with Israel, along the lines of the mutual defense pact the United States maintains with Taiwan and the Philippines. This move alone would lessen the need of Israel for ever-increased expenditures for costlier and costlier weapons.

Third, if the United States accedes to Libya's request and removes the Wheelus Air Force Base from Libya—it should relocate the base in Israel with Israel's assent, as an indication of its firm resolve to back up instantly the pledge given in its mutual defense treaty with Israel.

It should go without saying that I presuppose that as a condition precedent there will be the immediate enforcement of the antiaggressor amendment of the

Foreign Assistance Act against Egypt and those joining Egypt in these continued preparations for aggression.

Since Nasser came to power almost 13 years ago, many in this body have prophesied that firm action in dealing with Nasser's aggressive intentions were needed if the peace was to be kept.

On June 4, 1956, the Senator who was known as the conscience of the Senate, the late, great Senator Herbert H. Lehman, speaking on this floor at the time our government was very foolishly shipping tanks to Saudi Arabia, said:

Peace will not come (to the Middle East) as long as there is on one side blind hate and a will to kill and destroy. Peace must be based on security and respect for legitimate hopes and ideals of a noble democratic nation.

I subscribe to those sentiments. They are as valid today as they were the day they were uttered—a few short months before Israel, France, and England marched their troops into Egypt to keep open the Suez Canal and to stop the hit and run raids across Israel's borders.

We must act now to assure "security and respect for the legitimate hopes and ideals of a noble democratic state." Tomorrow may be too late.

I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks the editorial "Who Won" from the Washington Daily News of March 17, 1965, the articles from the London Times March 3, 1965, and the New York Times for March 4, 1965, and a table I have had prepared showing the amount of U.S. foreign assistance given or loaned to the nations in the Middle East.

There being no objection, the editorial, articles and table were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Daily News, Mar. 17, 1965]

WHO WON?

The Mideast game isn't over yet, but let's take a look at the score:

West Germany: Lost face around the world when she let Egypt's Dictator Nasser stampede her into cutting off arms shipments to Israel. Regained some face by cutting off \$250 million economic aid to Nasser—but German industries engaged in Egypt under that aid program will suffer. Gained back more face when she hit at Nasser by offering diplomatic recognition to Israel. But stands to lose diplomatic relations with Egypt and a half dozen other Arab States. Arabs also expected to recognize Communist East Germany in retaliation. This means West Germany must junk the Hallstein Doctrine, which sought to isolate Communist East Germany from rest of world. And Germany has jeopardized the safety of hundreds of West Germans working in Egypt.

Egypt: Gained \$100 million in economic aid from East Germany, but lost \$250 million aid from West Germany. Lost face when several Arab States failed to follow Nasser's demand that all Arab States break off with West Germany. Humiliation of Israel-West Germany diplomatic exchange may mean some weakening of Nasser's personal dominance in Arab world.

Israel: Gained diplomatic recognition from West Germany, which she has always wanted. Lost out on delivery of \$16 million in arms—but she may get this anyway, when the Mideast pot simmers down a bit.

United States: Gained bad case of jitters for fear Egypt-Israel-German triangle might

lead to Arab-Israel war with desert water as the excuse. Breathing a bit easier now but still keeping oxygen tent handy.

East Germany: The real winner. For a measly \$100 million in credits to Egypt, East Germany is on verge of breaking out of her isolation and getting recognition of half dozen Arab States; other nations may follow suit in recognizing Moscow puppet regime.

[From the London Times, Mar. 3, 1965]

ISRAEL REFUSES TO RENOUNCE USE OF ARMED FORCE—NO AGREEMENT IN TALKS WITH UNITED STATES

Talks between the United States and Israel here have ended disappointingly, and all that Mr. Averell Harriman, President Johnson's special envoy, could say this morning as he flew to Kabul was: "The Government of Israel is fully aware of the views of the U.S. Government, and I am now able to report to the President on the view of the Government of Israel."

The divergence of views was principally over an American demand that the Eshkol government renounce the use or the threat of military action to deter the Arabs from diverting the sources of the Jordan River rising in Lebanon and Syria before they reach the intake of the Israel national water carrier. The Americans claim they cannot meet Israel's demands for direct and overt military supplies in an atmosphere inflamed by Israel's implied threats of war.

Mr. Harriman's nebulous statement and the failure of an expected joint statement to materialize demonstrated that the 5 days of talks ended without agreement. Negotiations are being continued by diplomatic channels.

SUGGESTION DERIDED

The Americans are inclined to concede that if West Germany indeed reneges on her undertakings to deliver American-made tanks, and if Soviet arms shipments to Egypt upset the arms balance, circumstances will have been created which permit the United States to become Israel's supplier of defensive weapons. However, they attach requirements, including assurances that American arms should not jeopardize the security of her pro-Western Arab neighbors, Jordan and Lebanon. The United States is also arming Jordan and Saudi Arabia and wants Israel to show understanding of her position.

The American argument that the Arab river diversions may be for local irrigation purposes within the framework of the American-sponsored regional plan for the division of the waters is derided here and Mr. Eshkol is reported to have firmly rejected the suggestion that Israel undertake not to react until the Arab diversions exceed their allotted quotas.

The U.S. advice to Israel to rely less on her own might, bluff, and bluster and more on American diplomatic assurances has also been poorly received; American diplomatic support of Israel's case has not ended the Egyptian blockade of Israel shipping by the Suez Canal. Nor is the proposal that the Security Council adjudicate considered practical here in view of the systematic veto of any pro-Israel resolution by the Soviet Union.

NEW WEAPONS

The Syrians have begun work near Banias Springs at a slow pace and the Lebanese have not started at all. Opinion here is that the Arabs may be dragging their feet in order to adjust the timing of the completion of the project to coincide with the completion of military preparations, including the return of Egyptian troops now pinned down in Yemen, the strengthening of the Jordan and Lebanese armies and Egypt's absorption of new weapons, including ground-to-ground rockets.

Accordingly, some Israelis have said the timing of a probable military showdown should not be left to the Arabs. In fact the

leveling of the canal route to Syria is at present only half a mile from the Israel border and could be easily disrupted by a few competent snipers. Some influential Israelis advocate action now while Israel has military advantages.

The Americans have been appalled by talk of preventive action. Officials said the Israelis had been asking too much, expecting military aid to enable them to take care of themselves, commitments by the United States to support them in case of an attack, together with freedom of unhampered military action when they see fit.

[From the New York Times, Mar. 4, 1965]

UNITED STATES TO WEIGH SALE OF ARMS TO ISRAEL—HIGH-LEVEL TALKS EXPECTED SOON—WASHINGTON POLICY IS APPARENTLY SHIFTING

(By John W. Finney)

WASHINGTON, March 3.—The United States, seemingly modifying its Middle East arms policy, has agreed to discuss with Israel the possibility of supplying American weapons to offset Soviet arms shipments to Arab States.

High-ranking Israeli officials including possibly Foreign Minister Golda Meir, are expected here shortly, according to diplomatic sources to discuss the purchase of American arms.

The discussions will be an outgrowth of talks that Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman had during the last week with Israeli officials in Tel Aviv. Since Mr. Harriman's departure from Israel on Monday, some State Department and White House advisers have remained behind in Tel Aviv to continue the talks, which will lay the basis for the higher level discussions here within the next few weeks.

A TACIT ACCEPTANCE

Ostensibly the Harriman mission was prompted by the diplomatic and military confusion brought about by West Germany's termination of its \$80 million arms deal with Israel. But the talks went far beyond the immediate problems created by Bonn's action and included the more complicated issue of how to provide Israel with an assured supply of modern arms in the coming years.

According to diplomatic sources, there was at least a tacit acceptance by Mr. Harriman of a contention by Israel that the cutoff of the West German arms shipments pointed up Israel's need to find new sources of weapons to maintain a military balance with the Arab States.

Mr. Harriman was reported to have expressed concern about possible Israel military intervention if some of the Arab States went ahead with plans for diverting the headwaters of the Jordan River.

Mr. Harriman, however, was said not to have laid down any condition of nonintervention as a prerequisite for Israel's obtaining American military assistance. The Israeli officials, in turn, were said to have made it clear that they viewed the arms race and the Jordan River problem as separate issues.

The problem to be discussed in the forthcoming talks transcends immediate Israel demands for the arms undelivered by West Germany. Bonn responding to threats by the United Arab Republic to recognize East Germany, terminated the arms shipments when 80 percent completed. Among the weapons undelivered were some American-made M-48 tanks that West Germany was shipping to Israel with the U.S. approval and encouragement.

ASSURED SUPPLY SOUGHT

While the Israelis made it clear that they wanted the undelivered arms, they also emphasized that a more important consideration was finding an assured source of weapons over the next several years to counter continuing Soviet arms shipments to the

United Arab Republic and other Arab States.

This is raising for the Johnson administration the difficult question whether the United States is willing to modify or abandon its policy of not being a direct supplier of arms to Israel.

The United States has provided limited amounts of arms to certain Arab States, such as tanks to Jordan and jet fighters to Saudi Arabia. The State Department confirmed today that the United States was discussing with Jordan a "general request" for arms but refused to comment on the details.

Largely because of a desire not to alienate the Arab nations, the United States has consistently refused to supply arms to Israel. The lone exception occurred 2 years ago when the United States agreed to sell Israel some Hawk antiaircraft missiles on the ground they were purely defensive weapons.

The administration's position has been that Israel should look to Western European sources for her arms, and at times, as in the West German deal. Washington has cooperated behind the scenes in obtaining European weapons for Israel. With the diplomatic difficulties encountered by West Germany in its arms deal, Israel obviously is going to have increasing difficulty in obtaining arms in Europe and therefore is turning to the United States.

The State Department was maintaining strict secrecy about the overtures from Israel. But the fact that the administration was willing to discuss arms purchases with Israel officials was an indication that the United States was moving away from its past policy.

While refusing to comment on the Israel situation in particular, a Department spokesman said the administration's policy in general in the Middle East was in "seeing a balance is maintained" in armaments.

The general appraisal of American officials is that Israel currently has a military balance with, if not superiority over, her Arab neighbors. The contention being advanced by Israel and generally accepted by American officials, however, is that this balance is likely to be upset in the next few years by continuing Soviet arms shipments to Arab nations, especially the United Arab Republic.

Total U.S. aid received through June 30, 1964

[In millions of U.S. dollars]

Algeria.....	\$149.3
Iran.....	798.4
Iraq.....	46.3
Israel.....	996.8
Jordan.....	431.5
Lebanon.....	78.9
Morocco.....	451.0
Saudi Arabia.....	46.6
Sudan.....	81.4
Syria.....	81.9
Tunisia.....	397.0
United Arab Republic (Egypt).....	943.1
Yemen.....	34.6

Total..... 4,536.8

Source: "U.S. Oversea Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1964," special report prepared for the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

"MAN AND FOOD"—ADDRESS BY VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, Vice President HUBERT HUMPHREY recently presented to the National Farmers Union Convention an address entitled "Man and Food." In the course of that address, the distinguished Vice President delivered one of the most comprehensive and commendable statements on American farm policy made by the present administration.

The Vice President is not content to extol the blessings which have provided

America with the greatest agricultural ability and abundance in the history of mankind, nor is he content to extol the virtue of our extension of the hand that helps the less developed nations of the world where hunger is a constant companion and the dry wellspring of hope. "Man and Food" is a brilliant statement, not alone of where American agriculture has been, but of where it is going; not alone of the contributions which agriculture has made to our own and to several nations of the world, but of the unlimited horizon looming before agriculture in a world of burgeoning population, increasing urbanization, and rapid mechanization.

"Man and Food" promises, above all else, hope to the man who has given so much to the hopeless and hungry of the world—the small farmer. "Man and Food" declares in unmistakable terms this administration's determination to lift the haze of impending economic disaster which has begun to hang heavily and ominously over the rural community.

I welcome "Man and Food" as one of the finest farm statements of recent years. I commend it to the attention of my distinguished colleagues, and request unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MAN AND FOOD

(Speech by Vice President HUBERT H. HUMPHREY at the National Farmers Union Convention, Mar. 15, 1965)

I have looked forward to this meeting for some time. It is an opportunity for me to renew old friendships, to relive old and happy experiences, and to learn from the men and women of America's farms.

I also want to pay tribute to you who are providing leadership in the creation of an efficient and productive agriculture. This is basic to the security and strength of this Nation—and to the free world.

This land is blessed among all others, and you help to make it so.

Here there has been developed the most efficient agricultural plant in all history, and you help to make it so.

Our great agricultural capabilities have abolished for us the twin fears of hunger and famine, and you help to make it so.

The day when the soil was mined, water taken for granted, and the forests were despoiled, is past. Exploitation of the soil has yielded to conservation. The people now know how to take care of nature's bounty, and you help to make it so.

The American consumer now is enjoying food at the lowest cost of any people in the world in terms of human effort expended, and you help to make it so.

The miracle of American agricultural efficiency is leaving its imprint in every area of the world, and you help to make it so.

We now are exporting at a \$6 billion annual rate and you help to make it so.

Agriculture is our greatest dollar earner in foreign trade today, and you help to make it so.

Food is power. Abundance—and the ability to produce abundance—is one of our most valuable assets of strength in the world today.

Without that asset, our entire economy would be crippled. Without that asset, we could not have moved tremendous quantities of food and fiber under the food for peace

April 22, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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"I'm Joe so-and-so with such-and-such a company; who are you?" the lobbyist said one day to a youthful-looking house member.

"I'm Bob Traxler, Democratic floor leader in the house," replied Representative J. Robert Traxler, 33, of Bay City. "Where the devil have you been the last 2 years?"

The preponderance of freshmen in a setting where votes spell power has a few times inspired words of rebellion against party leaders, especially after sundown and a few draughts of heady cheer.

It's anybody's guess whether a weighty or emotional issue—perhaps an income tax, mental health spending, Romney's politicking, or some touchy minor issue—might suddenly fan smoldering coals into flames of insurrection.

Nobody is betting now that this will happen. And if revolt broke out, it likely would be short lived.

One significant alteration already well begun would have met stern resistance from established order a few years ago.

This was the decision of the new house speaker, Representative Joseph Kowalski, of Detroit, and other Democratic leaders to reshape the legislature's operation with Congress as a model.

First, this means rejection of the "public ounge" aspect of the legislation as a kind of oversized two-room schoolhouse on parents' light.

In this setting, lawmakers were arranged much of the time in neat rows, making convenient targets for hovering lobbyists and other pressure-generators, with only a few committee rooms and lavatories as handy places of refuge.

The new regime set wheels turning to give each senate and house member a respectable off-the-floor operating base and some presence to privacy.

Each soon will have his own desk, telephone, filing cabinet and reasonable access to stenographic service—and in tasteful and heery surroundings.

This meant a flushing out of bureaucrats from cluttered and usually dingy quarters on three floors of the capitol. It required roughly a quarter-million dollars in painting, carpeting, wiring, new furnishings and carpentry.

Legislative officers and Lt. Gov. William G. Williken got private suites. Romney likewise was emancipated from cramped quarters that have shackled Governors since the administration 40 years ago of Alex Groesbeck, who in less complicated times got along with a staff of five.

Since mid-March Romney's 29 aids and clerical helpers have enjoyed just about double the square footage formerly occupied—excluding windowless balcony space first used by Governor Williams and sometimes called "the black hole."

The new capitol layout, unsurprising to most visitors, has evoked gasps from some legislators who were accustomed to getting postage stamps doled out a few at a time and waiting days to have a few letters typed.

Legislators' new off-the-floor hide-outs also make it tougher for the 200-odd registered lobbyists to track them down.

Strict new rules barring lobbyists from the house and senate chambers for considerable periods have relieved lawmakers of some of the gauntlet-running ordeal they used to face in adjoining corridors.

To stop a bill in committee is no longer the shooting-fish-in-the-barrel exercise it is said to be for certain of the capitol's most seasoned and talented lobbyists.

In other moves that reflect patterns in Congress, the house majority has set up a policy committee, beefed up the house staff by about 50 percent (92 employees compared with 60 a few years ago) and sought to

strengthen research, analysis, public relations, bill drafting, and other services.

Don Hoenshell, a veteran Detroit and Lansing newsmen, was hired at \$17,500 a year to energize this operation through a greatly enlarged and revitalized legislative service bureau.

Under the new constitution, the legislature now directs a legislative auditing unit. This new watchdog agency in time might function like the General Accounting Office of Congress.

There is evidence that lawmakers more and more think of carving out legislative careers comparable to those of veterans in congress.

A surprising sign of the time, and a probable herald of the future, is the description of 19 house members as professional legislators in biographies submitted to the house clerk. It was almost unheard of before.

The phenomenon assuredly reflects the higher pay and richer pension prospects. But likely even more, it represents a provision in the 1963 constitution that prevents State legislators from clinging to jobs they formerly doubled at in township, county, or city governments.

Legislative internes, young college graduates paid 50 percent by Ford Foundation grants and assigned to assist house and senate leaders, are another fresh element in the legislative scene.

As for the infusion of youth in lawmaker ranks, the key factor is the \$12,500 salary and expense allowance. A young man on the way up—lawyers, particularly—now can afford the valuable experience of legislative service without crippling financial penalty.

The average age in the senate is down to 43.6 years from the 55 average of 1959-60, with 15 of the 37 senators in their thirties, 12 more in their forties, and only 4 beyond 60. Five years ago 5 of the then 34 senators were past 70 and 11 others beyond 60. Only 4 were under 40.

Fred I. Chase, who retired recently after more than four decades as senate secretary, recalled that "in the old days serving in the legislature was mostly an honorary position."

"We had bank presidents, retired judges and others with substantial incomes," he said. "I can recall seeing senators match quarters for each other's paychecks. The \$3-a-day salary then didn't amount to a spit in your eye for those fellows."

After the composition of the legislature began to change materially in the 1950's, the money-grind exacted a painful price of many lawmakers, especially those from the faraway Upper Peninsula.

Many a veteran remembers the stringencies of the deadlocked 1959 legislature that met from January until nearly Christmas. That was when the overall pay was at \$5,000.

"I had to borrow \$2,000 to make ends meet that year," said Representative F. Charles Raap, Democrat, of Muskegon, a machine operator at Continental Motors Corp. with three children. "It took me 2 years to pay it back."

"We voted a pay increase (to \$6,250 a year) at the end of the session and I was defeated for reelection," Raap said. "Considering my debts then, it probably was a blessing in disguise."

At the higher pay level, Raap expects to devote full time to legislative work, concentrating on mental health as chairman of the House Mental Health Committee.

Many other legislators see their office as becoming a year-round job.

Representative Russell H. Strange, Republican, of Mount Pleasant, said interest in Lansing activities was more and more a full-time * * * on the upswing among his constituents. He said he was getting more mail than ever in his 9 years in the House, more calls at home and more invitations to speak in his district.

"Part of it," he said, "is because State government is entering into peoples' lives more than ever before."

Traxler, among others, foresees lengthening sessions from the 4-to-5 months meetings of the past attuned to the seasonal rhythms of the farm.

"I think we'll be for practical purposes a year-round legislature before long," he said. "Eight months, rather than 5, will be the usual thing."

THE UNITED STATES AND A LATIN AMERICAN COMMON MARKET

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, a few days ago the presidents of all Latin American nations received a 30-page report proposing the establishment of a Latin American Common Market. The report was prepared by Dr. Carlos Santamaria, Chairman of the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress; Dr. Felipe Herrera, President of the Inter-American Development Bank; Jose Mayobre, Executive Director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America; and Raul Prebisch, Secretary General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. The fact that this proposal has been made by four distinguished leaders of Inter-American thought is highly significant, but the support of public opinion and political support at the highest levels in Latin America are greatly needed.

I strongly urge the political leaders of the hemisphere to translate this idea of a Latin American Common Market into the reality of a mass market of some 220 million people, with a combined gross national product of between \$70 and \$80 billion.

It is also appropriate, however, to remind all those working toward this inestimable goal that hemispheric unity is vital to its success, and that provisions must be made for the eventual inclusion in such a market of the United States and Canada, the largest markets of all. There is no place in the Americas for any exclusive concept of the economic unification of the hemisphere. Without North America, success of such a venture is dubious, at best. But there is no need to court failure, as public opinion in North America is very sympathetic to these ideas.

To those of our neighbors in Latin America who see their course as being economic unification of Latin America alone, which would then do business with Europe and North America as potential competitors, one with the other, it should be pointed out that this arrangement will not provide the best opportunity for success for any of the parties involved. The economic unity of the Americas is the logical course; and it should be broadened to include Canada, bringing it into full association with Latin America, to assure that the experience of the European Common Market is paralleled, so as to give the greatest strength economically to all the Americas, and make it as greatly an improved trading partner for Europe as the EEC has proved to be to itself and the rest of the world.

Accordingly, the Latin American Common Market proposed in today's report

should be the first step toward the ultimate objective of a Western Hemisphere free trade area, aiding the growth of the private sector in the constitutional Republics of the Americas, and maintaining a place for Cuba, when that nation again becomes free and democratic.

I ask unanimous consent that an editorial published in today's New York Times which deals with the same point be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Apr. 22, 1965]

LATIN COMMON MARKET?

Latin America is being urged to give immediate consideration to a bold concept—a continental common market. An integration plan has been drawn up by four of Latin America's most distinguished economists. They ask each government to approve establishment of a Latin American parliament and of an "institutional mechanism" for an economic union.

Their proposals go far beyond the vague desire for a common market expressed in the charter of the Alliance for Progress. They have revived in new and realistic form the old dream of unifying the continent that had possessed Simon Bolivar. Latin America's four "wise men" have drawn up a program that includes a timetable for lowering tariffs and plans for industrial cooperation and for a payments union.

This program is based on the plan adopted and carried out with such success by the European Economic Community. Its authors are under no illusion that a Latin American Common Market can proceed at anything like the same pace or produce as significant results; but they are confident that it is possible to find workable solutions and that the important thing is to make a start.

At this stage the planners are seeking the participation of neither the United States nor other industrial nations. They think it essential that Latin America take the first steps on its own, recognizing that it will require spirit and enthusiasm as well as sound policies to surmount the obstacles of integration. Indeed, progress toward economic union depends on first overcoming the inertia and the opposition of vested interests that have kept the countries of Latin America in watertight compartments.

While the United States is not directly involved, it can still make a contribution by encouraging the efforts of the planners. They need Washington's support—material and moral—in helping make their dream come true.

RESPONSIBILITIES AND COMMITMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, I invite the attention of Senators to two editorials, one from the Nashville Tennessean and the other from the Philadelphia Inquirer. I believe that these editorials are very much worth bringing to the attention of a wider circle of those interested in our responsibilities and commitments in southeast Asia.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Nashville Tennessean,
Apr. 13, 1965]

PRESIDENT'S ASIA PLAN MAY BRING RESULTS YET

North Vietnam, in abnormally bitter language, has rejected President Johnson's offer

to enter into unconditional discussions to end the fighting in South Vietnam.

The Communist regime's official newspaper in Hanoi reacted to the President's proposal with one of the most abusive attacks against Mr. Johnson and this country that have yet come out of the Communist propaganda mill.

The intensity of the attack suggests that the President's proposal for a development program for southeast Asia might have received a more favorable response in that region than the Communists care to admit.

Any proposal that raises the hope of peace and more abundant living in an area that has been torn by war for many years is bound to attract some wishful attention, even among the weary Vietcong.

Thus it is not surprising that Mr. Johnson's proposal should be met by a Communist propaganda attack of unprecedented bitterness. Only by a twisted verbal assault can the Communist leaders in South Vietnam sell Mr. Johnson's peace proposal as insincere and as a toast to peace that "smells of poison gas." Only by misrepresenting what the President said can the Reds make a genuine aid program, "bait" offered by "stupid pirates."

There are dangers for the United States in Vietnam. But the reaction to the President's speech—violent in tone, as it was—Isn't necessarily dangerous. It makes it clear that Mr. Johnson's ideas and alternatives to war carried some appeal for southeast Asia. That is why the Communist response was so severe.

Hanoi's rejection statement should not be taken as all bluff. The tenseness of the situation in southeast Asia has not diminished. But neither does the tough statement rule out any possibility of future peace talks on terms acceptable to this country.

The State Department, while declaring that President Johnson's offer of peace talks will be kept "on the table," pointedly noted that Hanoi's statement, although harshly worked, was not a rejection of anything. It may be significant that Hanoi has not yet responded to an appeal by 17 nonaligned nations for a start on peace talks without preconditions.

If and when Hanoi is ready to talk about peace in Vietnam, the Communist leaders obviously would prefer that the negotiations grew out of the 17-nation proposal, instead of appearing to result directly from any move on the part of the United States, or any suggestion by President Johnson.

For the present the United States is on the initiative. President Johnson has offered to talk peace. At the same time bombing attacks continue in the North. The principal problem that remains is whether Hanoi is really desirous of peace. For the present it seems that only increasing pressure by American planes and South Vietnamese fighters can determine that.

[From the Philadelphia Inquirer,
Apr. 19, 1965]

OUTRAGE OVER VIETNAM

President Johnson's Easter reiteration of America's willingness to start Vietnamese peace talks at once and without preconditions was remarkable in many respects. It was a moving and thoughtful summation of the tragic situation.

But one aspect of the statement seemed to us of special significance under the circumstances—a weekend that saw Moscow threatening (again) to send "volunteers" and thousands of U.S. students milling around the vacant White House, probably well intentioned but offering their country no more useful advice than to turntail and run, leaving millions of Vietnamese to merciless exploitation by communism.

The President said:

"I understand the feelings of those who regret that we must undertake air attacks to share those feelings.

"But the compassion of this country, the world, must go out to the men and women and children who are killed and crippled by the Vietcong every day in South Vietnam.

"The outrage of this country, and the world, must be visited on those who explode their bombs in cities and villages, rip the bodies of the helpless * * *"

It is probably worth noting that the 1945 Moscow declaration was elaborately hedged with conditions. Those "volunteers" may be sent "if" the U.S. "aggression" intensifies "if" it proved a "necessity," and "if" an appeal from North Vietnam were received. Soviets do not appear to be anxious to stop the conflagration, and there is abundant reason. They know what an all-out war their own soil is like. They had one, perpetrated by Adolf Hitler.

And if, even in Moscow, the President's calm and rational approach to the Vietnam impasse is having some effect, it can at least be hoped that it also is reducing the threat for conquest in Hanoi and Peiping.

For it is plain enough, to those who do not delude themselves, that this "dirty war" of terror by night in the rice paddy is one started by Communists and must be stopped by Communists. The President is doing everything possible from the side, unhelpt by thousands of misled jungle underminers who, in another age, might have "done business with Hitler," and he deserves America's gratitude and support.

A redirection of loudly vocal "outlets" over Vietnam to the proper object, the big pajama mob in the jungle, led and to be by the Communists, would be a proper step.

BARN AND SKYSCRAPERS—INSEPARABLE

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, Mr. B. Camp, one of California's most respected agricultural leaders, recently made a speech to the Santa Ana Chamber of Commerce. His remarks are a significant analysis of our Nation's agricultural economy; and I ask unanimous consent that his remarks be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BARN AND SKYSCRAPERS—INSEPARABLE

(Talk by W. B. Camp, farmer, Bakerville, Calif., at the quarterly general meeting of the Santa Ana Chamber of Commerce, Santa Ana, Calif.)

Recently I read a statement attributed to an enterprising produce man who said: "I can't do today's job with yesterday's methods and be in business tomorrow."

In other words: "There is nothing so constant as change." This is particularly true in American agriculture. The story is the same whether it be north, south, east or west are in the middle of an agricultural revolution all over America.

Today, less than 8 percent of our people live in the country. Less than half of them depend upon farm income for a livelihood for themselves and their families.

This shrinking farm population has a sign of strength, rather than weakness, the inevitable consequence of rapidly expanding agricultural efficiency.

In spite of this dwindling farm population, farming remains our biggest industry. About 40 percent of all workers in America are employed directly or indirectly by agriculture. Investment in farming was \$214 billion in 1962. That's about 1

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separately functioning, independently operated judicial organization.

In 1958, the board of supervisors in Imperial County, at the request of Judge Elmer W. Heald, supported by the bar and civic organizations, appropriated sufficient funds to employ a marriage counselor and a clerical staff. The counselor came to Los Angeles and studied our procedures for several weeks before actually commencing the conciliation court operations.

The program immediately proved successful. In fact, so successful that the board of supervisors had a bill introduced at the 1959 session of the legislature to make the conciliation court permanent.

Since 1958 seven counties in California have established conciliation courts—Imperial, San Mateo, San Bernardino, Sacramento, San Diego, Alameda, and most recently, San Luis Obispo. Three Western States—Arizona, Montana, and Oregon—have passed conciliation court acts modeled on the California act, and all have successfully operating conciliation courts in major cities. The counselors for these new courts have spent several weeks in an indoctrination course in Los Angeles in order that procedures are uniform. An annual conference of conciliation courts, attended by judges and marriage counselors, was first held in 1963 and has become an annual event.

I know there are those cynical souls who will deprecate the court engaging in such activities and will brush off the importance of reconciling couples with the customary defeatist expression, "So what?"; but the 18,000 children in Los Angeles County who have been restored to their parents in a united home during the past 7 years bear eloquent witness to the importance of the court of conciliation.

Today the legal profession and the judiciary have expressed the belief, through their official organizations, that the customary adversary nature and proceedings of the ordinary civil law suit be reduced to a minimum in domestic relations matters. Conciliation court proceedings are by nature non-adversary, and every reconciled couple is an enthusiastic booster for the Court and the legal profession. Even couples who are not reconciled are appreciative of the conciliation court's contributions toward amicably solving controversial questions of custody visitation rights, and even in settling property rights which are incorporated in a property settlement agreement.

It is an interesting commentary that during the past 7 years it has been the legal profession in other California counties and States that has spearheaded the movement to create a conciliation court.

However, what is most gratifying, rewarding, and indicative of the real success of conciliation court proceedings is exemplified in the thousands of letters we receive from reconciled couples who report to us 1 year after their reconciliation. Let me conclude by reading you a typical letter taken from our files:

"We are happy to report on this first anniversary of our visit to your conciliation court that we are happily together with our three children. Each of us has done his best to keep the promises we made in the wonderful reconciliation agreement we both signed.

"We shudder to think of what untold unhappiness would have befallen each of us and our lovely children had we followed the line of least resistance with a Judge eventually uttering the fateful words, 'Divorce granted.'"

THE MESS IN VIETNAM—X

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, it is becoming increasingly evident that, with respect to the undeclared war in Vietnam, the war hawks advising the President are desperately seeking not only

to change the future course of history to one of unbelievable carnage and destruction but are also seeking to rewrite the immutable facts of the historical past.

In a totalitarian nation such as the Soviet Union it is fairly easy—at least within the confines of its own borders—to play at "make as though it never was" by chiseling off the names of former leaders from public edifices, by obliterating the tombs of those leaders, and by rewriting history books so that it appears as though those leaders never existed.

In a democracy such as ours, which zealously guards its hard-won freedoms of speech and press, that same game cannot be played as easily or as successfully.

But it can be tried.

And, with respect to the facts on our involvement in Vietnam, it has been and is being tried.

This was cogently pointed out by the noted columnist, Mr. Walter Lippmann, in his column in the Washington Post on April 20, 1965, entitled "Unbuttoned Diplomacy." Said Mr. Lippmann, in part:

A cardinal weakness of our diplomatic position today is the President's statement at Baltimore that "the first reality is that North Vietnam has attacked the independent nation of South Vietnam." This was not our original position. It has been called the first reality only in the most recent phase of the war, the phase which began in February. Our present position is contrary to the indubitable essentials of the Geneva Agreements of 1954, that North and South Vietnam are not two nations but two zones of one nation.

This attempt to rewrite history was also pointed out vividly by Hans J. Morganthau, Michelson Distinguished Service professor of political science and modern history at the University of Chicago, in a brilliant article in the New York Times on April 18, 1965, entitled "We Are Deluding Ourselves in Vietnam." Professor Morganthau, who also serves as consultant to the State and Defense Departments, states in part:

Until the end of last February, the Government of the United States started from the assumption that the war in South Vietnam was a civil war, aided and abetted—but not created—from abroad, and spokesmen for the Government have made time and again the point that the key to winning the war was political and not military and was to be found in South Vietnam itself. It was supposed to lie in transforming the indifference or hostility of the great mass of the South Vietnamese people into positive loyalty to the government * * *

The United States has recognized that it is failing in South Vietnam. But it has drawn from this recognition of failure a most astounding conclusion.

The United States has decided to change the character of the war by unilateral declaration from a South Vietnamese civil war to a war of foreign aggression. Aggression from the north: "The Record of North Vietnam's Campaign To Conquer South Vietnam" is the title of a white paper published by the Department of State on the last day of February 1965. While normally foreign and military policy is based upon intelligence—that is, the objective assessment of facts—the process is here reversed: A new policy has been decided upon, and intelligence must provide the facts to justify it.

The United States, stymied in South Vietnam and on the verge of defeat, decided to

carry the war to North Vietnam not so much in order to retrieve the fortunes of war as to lay the groundwork for "negotiations from strength." In order to justify the new policy, it was necessary to prove that North Vietnam is the real enemy. It is the white paper's purpose to present that proof.

My able and distinguished colleague from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], in a penetrating article in the Saturday Evening Post for April 24, 1965, entitled "We Should Negotiate a Settlement in Vietnam" also commented on the "double think" process of the war hawks in attempting to change the character of our involvement in Vietnam by characterizing events in a manner contrary to the facts: Senator CHURCH states in part:

We only deceive ourselves when we pretend that the struggle in Vietnam is not a civil war. The two parts of Vietnam don't represent two different peoples, with separate identities. Vietnam is a partitioned country in the grip of a continuing revolution. That the Government of North Vietnam has deeply involved itself in support, or even direction, of the rebellion the South doesn't make the war any less a civil war. The fighting is still between Vietnamese. The issue is still that of determining what groups of Vietnamese shall govern the country.

Given freedom of speech and press, the true facts will ultimately reach the people.

Two excellent books, recently published, by two Pulitzer Prize winning authors seek to set the record straight on the events in Vietnam which have led the United States to the dangerous crisis it now confronts.

The first book, by Malcolm M. Browne, is entitled "The New Face of War" and is published by Bobbs-Merrill.

The second book, by David Halberstam, is entitled "The Making of a Quagmire" is published by Random House.

Both books should be required reading for all those who wish to acquire the requisite background to understand the fast-moving events in Vietnam.

The noted writer, I. F. Stone, writing in the New York Review for April 22, 1965, reviewed both these books in an article showing his clear grasp of events in southeast Asia. As part of his review, Mr. Stone stated:

What makes these books so timely, their message so urgent, is that they show the Vietnamese war in that aspect which is most fundamental for our own people—as a challenge to freedom of information and therefore freedom of decision. They appear at a time when all the errors on which they throw light are being intensified. Instead of correcting policy in the light of the record, the light itself is being shut down. Access to news sources in Vietnam and in Washington is being limited, censorship in the field is becoming more severe. Diem is dead but what might be termed Diemism has become the basic policy of the American Government. For years our best advisers, military and civilian, tried desperately to make him understand that the war was a political problem which could only be solved in South Vietnam.

More and more people in the United States are beginning to be aware that the facts of history are immutable and cannot be changed to suit the purposes of any nation—big or small.

In a splendid editorial in this morning's New York Times the case is made

for the "Descalation" of the war in Vietnam.

Just as our able and distinguished majority leader [Mr. Mansfield] yesterday stated that the time had come for "some blunt words on Vietnam," the New York Times calls upon the people of the United States to face the true facts. The editorial states in part:

Nothing is more important for Americans today than to face these hard truths before it is too late. And it is vital that the channels of communication, of opinion, and of dissent be kept open—on the floor of Congress, in the press, in the country at large—in the face of a growing tendency to ridicule or to denounce the opposition and to demand unswerving support of further escalation in the name of patriotism.

Bitterness and emotionalism are increasingly entering the discussions on Vietnam in the United States. This is a deplorable development, and so is the polarization of opinion in every country and between blocs of countries. It is as if the battlelines were being drawn all over the world—but for a major war that need not and must not take place.

In the same vein, Mr. Arthur Krock in today's New York Times stated that "the Senate today responsibly fulfilled the role assigned to it by the Constitution to 'advise' the President on foreign affairs." That discussion on the U.S. dilemma in Vietnam must continue not only on the floor of the Senate but throughout the country.

That dilemma was underscored by Walter Lippmann in his column in this morning's Washington Post when he said:

In my view the President is in grave trouble. He is in grave trouble because he has not taken to heart the historic fact that the role of the Western white man as a ruler in Asia was ended forever in the Second World War. Against the Japanese the Western white powers were unable to defend their colonies and protectorates in Asia. That put an end to the white man's domination in Asia which had begun in the 15th century.

Mr. Lippmann then proceeded to demolish the Secretary of State Dulles' so-called domino theory by pointing out that escalation of the war in Vietnam has brought about a falling of the dominoes—but a falling away of the dominoes from support of the U.S. position.

It is time for the war hawks advising the President to change their ostrichlike heads in the sand postures and face the facts as they really are, rather than what they would like them to be or to have been.

I ask unanimous consent that the article by Walter Lippmann appearing in the Washington Post of Tuesday, April 20, 1965, entitled "Unbuttoned Diplomacy," the article in the New York Times of Sunday, April 18, 1965, by Hans J. Morgenthau, entitled "We Are Deluding Ourselves in Vietnam," the article by Senator FRANK CHURCH appearing in the Saturday Evening Post of April 24, 1965, entitled "We Should Negotiate a Settlement in Vietnam," the article by I. F. Stone appearing in the New York Review of Thursday, April 22, 1965, entitled "Vietnam: An Exercise in Self-Delusion," the editorial from the New York Times of Thursday, April 22, 1965, entitled

"Descalation Needed," the article appearing in the New York Times of April 22, 1965, by Arthur Krock entitled "In the Nation: The Senate on Vietnam," and the article appearing in the Washington Post of Thursday, April 22, 1965, by Walter Lippmann, entitled "The Falling Dominoes," be inserted in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Apr. 20, 1965]

UNBUTTONED DIPLOMACY
(By Walter Lippmann)

In the wake of President Johnson's Baltimore speech of April 7 and of the appeal of the 17 unaligned countries, which preceded it by about a week, discussions looking toward an eventually negotiated settlement have actually been underway. Some of the discussion has been public and has consisted of exchanges of statements by Washington and Hanoi; some of the discussion is private through the various intermediaries who are concerned to prevent the spread of the war.

A curious, yet important, fact about the public discussion is that Washington and Hanoi start from the same legal basis. The President on March 25 declared that "we seek no more than a return to the essentials of the (Geneva) agreements of 1954." On April 13 Premier Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam made a policy declaration which said that Hanoi's fundamental war aim is the carrying out of the Geneva Agreements of 1954.

If both sides were in fact prepared to abide by and to enforce the Geneva agreements, a strong legal basis for a settlement would exist. But the fact is that neither we nor they are willing to settle for the Geneva agreements.

These agreements stipulate that North and South Vietnam are not two separate nations but two temporary zones of the same nation, and that 2 years after the armistice which demarcated the two zones, "the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity, and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot." As Hanoi has never held anything resembling a free election in North Vietnam, there is little reason to believe that it is prepared to have free elections in both zones of Vietnam. As for the United States, while our Government endorsed the Geneva agreements, and especially the provision for free elections, it opposed free elections when it realized that Ho Chi Minh would win them. General Eisenhower states this frankly in his memoirs. Since that time we have insisted that South Vietnam is an independent nation.

And so, in spite of the apparent agreement on the "essentials of the agreements of 1954," neither side has as yet adopted a credible and genuine negotiating position. This country, at least, should do so. Our policy since February has been to attack, to make war upon, North Vietnam in order to compel it to negotiate a settlement that we approve. Therefore, it matters a great deal that we adopt a negotiating position which we are able to defend clearly and openly.

A cardinal weakness of our diplomatic position today is the President's statement at Baltimore that "the first reality is that North Vietnam has attacked the independent nation of South Vietnam." This was not our original position. It has been called the first reality only in the most recent phase of the war, the phase which began in February.

Our present position is contrary to indubitable "essentials" of the Geneva agreements of 1954, that North and South Vietnam are not two nations but two zones of one nation.

It is argued by some, though not yet by the State Department explicitly, that the 1954 agreements have been overtaken by history and that de facto, as things have actually been for 10 years, there are now two separate and independent nations. But if this is our official position, how then does the State Department explain why we ignore the charter of the United Nations, especially articles 39 and 51, and declared on our own say-so that North Vietnam was the aggressor against an independent state? Had we gone to the Security Council for such a determination, we would, of course, have collided with a Soviet veto. But we would at least have proved that we believed what we were saying and perhaps we might have gotten a few votes to support us.

As a matter of fact, the argument that we are now using, that the two Vietnams are independent because they have been separated for 10 years, is a very embarrassing principle for the State Department to rely on. It would mean, for example, that there are two independent German states because Germany has been partitioned for 10 years.

I am well aware that to be concerned about our legal and moral position is regarded by the new school of surrealists as unworthy of a proud and tough nation. But I think we have something to be very much concerned about when we look about us and see how we are drifting into an icy isolation.

On the continent of Asia there are besides Red China four major Asian powers, the Soviet Union and Japan in the north, Pakistan and India in the south. With the possible, though only apparent, exception of Japan, we are embroiled with all the powers of Asia. The bitter truth of the matter is that we can search the globe and look in vain for true and active supporters of our policy.

That is how successfully the State Department has planned our diplomatic policy and has argued the American case.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, Apr. 13, 1965]

WE ARE DELUDING OURSELVES IN VIETNAM
(By Hans J. Morgenthau)

(NOTE.—We have let ourselves become engaged in a war we find we cannot win, says one expert, who declares there is only one way out—"Out.")

The address which President Johnson delivered on April 7 at Johns Hopkins University is important for two reasons. On the one hand, the President has shown for the first time a way out of the impasse in which we find ourselves in Vietnam. By agreeing to negotiations without preconditions he has opened the door to negotiations which those preconditions had made impossible from the outset.

By proposing a project for the economic development of southeast Asia—with North Vietnam a beneficiary and the Soviet Union a supporter—he has implicitly recognized the variety of national interests in the Communist world and the need for varied American responses tailored to those interests. By asking "that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way," he has left all possibilities open for the future evolution of relations between North and South Vietnam.

On the other hand, the President reiterated the intellectual assumptions and policy proposals which brought us to an impasse and which make it impossible to extricate ourselves. The President has linked our involvement in Vietnam with our war of independence and has proclaimed the freedom of all nations as the goal of our foreign

policy. He has started from the assumption that there are two Vietnamese nations, one of which has attacked the other, and he sees that attack as an integral part of the unlimited Chinese aggression. Consistent with this assumption, the President is willing to negotiate with China and North Vietnam but not with the Vietcong.

Yet we cannot have it both ways. We cannot at the same time embrace these false assumptions and pursue new sound policies. Thus we are faced with a real dilemma. This dilemma is by no means of the President's making.

We are militarily engaged in Vietnam by virtue of a basic principle of our foreign policy that was implicit in the Truman doctrine of 1947 and was put into practice by John Foster Dulles from 1954 onward. This principle is the military containment of communism. Containment had its origins in Europe; Dulles applied it to the Middle East and Asia through a series of bilateral and multilateral alliances. Yet what was an outstanding success in Europe turned out to be a dismal failure elsewhere. The reasons for that failure are twofold.

First, the threat that faced the nations of Western Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War was primarily military. It was the threat of the Red Army marching westward. Behind the line of military demarcation of 1945 which the policy of containment declared to be the westernmost limit of the Soviet Empire, there was an ancient civilization, only temporarily weak and able to maintain itself against the threat of Communist subversion.

The situation is different in the Middle East and Asia. The threat there is not primarily military but political in nature. Weak governments and societies provide opportunities for Communist subversion. Military containment is irrelevant to that threat and may even be counterproductive. Thus the Baghdad Pact did not protect Egypt from Soviet influence and SEATO has had no bearing on Chinese influence in Indonesia and Pakistan.

Second, and more important, even if China were threatening her neighbors primarily by military means, it would be impossible to contain her by erecting a military wall at the periphery of her empire. For China is, even in her present underdeveloped state, the dominant power in Asia. She is this by virtue of the quality and quantity of her population, her geographic position, her civilization, her past power remembered, and her future power anticipated. Anybody who has traveled in Asia with his eyes and ears open must have been impressed by the enormous impact which the resurgence of China has made upon all manner of men, regardless of class and political conviction, from Japan to Pakistan.

The issue China poses is political and cultural predominance. The United States can no more contain Chinese influence in Asia by arming South Vietnam and Thailand than China could contain American influence in the Western Hemisphere by arming, say, Nicaragua and Costa Rica.

If we are convinced that we cannot live with a China predominant on the mainland of Asia, then we must strike at the heart of Chinese power—that is, rather than try to contain the power of China, we must try to destroy that power itself. Thus there is logic on the side of that small group of Americans who are convinced that war between the United States and China is inevitable and that the earlier that war comes, the better will be the chances for the United States to win it.

Yet, while logic is on their side, practical judgment is against them. For while China is obviously no match for the United States in overall power, China is largely immune to

the specific types of power in which the superiority of the United States consists—that is, nuclear, air, and naval power. Certainly, the United States has the power to destroy the nuclear installations and the major industrial and population centers of China, but this destruction would not defeat China; it would only set her development back. To be defeated, China has to be conquered.

Physical conquest would require the deployment of millions of American soldiers on the mainland of Asia. No American military leader has ever advocated a course of action so fraught with incalculable risks, so uncertain of outcome, requiring sacrifices so out of proportion to the interests at stake and the benefits to be expected. President Eisenhower declared on February 10, 1954, that he "could conceive of no greater tragedy than for the United States to become involved in an all-out war in Indochina." General MacArthur, in the congressional hearings concerning his dismissal and in personal conversation with President Kennedy, emphatically warned against sending American foot soldiers to the Asian mainland to fight China.

If we do not want to set ourselves goals which cannot be attained with the means we are willing to employ, we must learn to accommodate ourselves to the predominance of China on the Asian mainland. It is instructive to note that those Asian nations which have done so—such as Burma and Cambodia—live peacefully in the shadow of the Chinese giant.

This *modus vivendi*, composed of legal independence and various degrees of actual dependence, has indeed been for more than a millennium the persistent pattern of Chinese predominance on the mainland of Asia. The military conquest of Tibet is the sole exception to that pattern. The military operations at the Indian border do not diverge from it, since their purpose was the establishment of a frontier disputed by both sides.

On the other hand, those Asian nations which have allowed themselves to be transformed into outposts of American military power—such as Laos a few years ago, South Vietnam and Thailand—have become the actual or prospective victims of Communist aggression and subversion. Thus it appears that peripheral military containment is counterproductive. Challenged at its periphery by American military power at its weakest—that is, by the proxy of client-states—China or its proxies respond with locally superior military and political power.

In specific terms, accommodation means four things: (1) recognition of the political and cultural predominance of China on the mainland of Asia as a fact of life; (2) liquidation of the peripheral military containment of China; (3) strengthening of the uncommitted nations of Asia by nonmilitary means; (4) assessment of Communist governments in Asia in terms not of Communist doctrine but of their relation to the interests and power of the United States.

In the light of these principles, the alternative to our present policies in Vietnam would be this: a face-saving agreement which would allow us to disengage ourselves militarily in stages spaced in time; restoration of the status quo of the Geneva Agreement of 1954, with special emphasis upon all-Vietnamese elections, cooperation with the Soviet Union in support of a Titoist all-Vietnamese Government, which would be likely to emerge from such elections.

This last point is crucial, for our present policies not only drive Hanoi into the waiting arms of Peiping, but also make it very difficult for Moscow to pursue an independent policy. Our interests in southeast Asia are identical with those of the Soviet Union: to prevent the expansion of the military power of China. But while our present pol-

icies invite that expansion, so do they make it impossible for the Soviet Union to join us in preventing it. If we were to reconcile ourselves to the establishment of a Titoist government in all of Vietnam, the Soviet Union could successfully compete with China in claiming credit for it and surreptitiously cooperate with us in maintaining it.

Testing the President's proposals by these standards, one realizes how far they go in meeting them. These proposals do not preclude a return to the Geneva Agreement and even assume the existence of a Titoist government in North Vietnam. Nor do they preclude the establishment of a Titoist government for all of Vietnam, provided the people of South Vietnam have freely agreed to it. They also envision the active participation of the Soviet Union in establishing and maintaining a new balance of power in southeast Asia. On the other hand, the President has flatly rejected a withdrawal "under the cloak of a meaningless agreement." The controlling word is obviously "meaningless," and only the future can tell whether we shall consider any face-saving agreement as "meaningless" regardless of its political context.

However, we are under a psychological compulsion to continue our military presence in South Vietnam as part of the peripheral military containment of China. We have been emboldened in this course of action by the identification of the enemy as "Communist," seeing in every Communist party and regime an extension of hostile Russian or Chinese power. This identification was justified 20 or 15 years ago when communism still had a monolithic character. Here, as elsewhere, our modes of thought and action have been rendered obsolete by new developments.

It is ironic that this simple juxtaposition of "communism" and "free world" was erected by John Foster Dulles's crusading moralism into the guiding principle of American foreign policy at a time when the national communism of Yugoslavia, the neutralism of the third world and the incipient split between the Soviet Union and China were rendering that juxtaposition invalid.

Today, it is belaboring the obvious to say that we are faced not with one monolithic communism whose uniform hostility must be countered with equally uniform hostility, but with a number of different communisms whose hostilities, determined by different national interests, vary. In fact, the United States encounters today less hostility from Tito, who is a Communist, than from De Gaulle, who is not.

We can today distinguish four different types of communism in view of the kind and degree of hostility to the United States they represent: a communism identified with the Soviet Union—e.g., Poland; a communism identified with China—e.g., Albania; a communism that straddles the fence between the Soviet Union and China—e.g., Rumania, and independent communism—e.g., Yugoslavia. Each of these communisms must be dealt with in terms of the bearing its foreign policy has upon the interests of the United States in a concrete instance.

It would, of course, be absurd to suggest that the officials responsible for the conduct of American foreign policy are unaware of these distinctions and of the demands they make for discriminating subtlety. Yet it is an obvious fact of experience that these officials are incapable of living up to these demands when they deal with Vietnam.

Thus they maneuver themselves into a position which is antirevolutionary per se and which requires military opposition to revolution wherever it is found in Asia, regardless of how it affects the interests—and how susceptible it is to the power—of the

United States. There is a historic precedent for this kind of policy: Metternich's military opposition to liberalism after the Napoleonic Wars, which collapsed in 1848. For better or for worse, we live again in an age of revolution. It is the task of statesmanship not to oppose what cannot be opposed with a chance of success, but to bend it to one's own interests. This is what the President is trying to do with his proposal for the economic development of southeast Asia.

Why do we support the Saigon government in the civil war against the Vietcong? Because the Saigon government is free and the Vietcong are Communist. By containing Vietnamese communism, we assume that we are really containing the communism of China.

Yet this assumption is at odds with the historic experience of a millennium and is unsupported by contemporary evidence. China is the hereditary enemy of Vietnam, and Ho Chi Minh will become the leader of a Chinese satellite only if the U.S. forces him to become one.

Furthermore, Ho Chi Minh, like Tito and unlike the Communist governments of the other states of Eastern Europe, came to power not by courtesy of another Communist nation's victorious army but at the head of a victorious army of his own. He is, then, a natural candidate to become an Asian Tito, and the question we must answer is: How adversely would a Titoist Ho Chi Minh, governing all of Vietnam, affect the interests of the United States? The answer can only be: not at all. One can even maintain the proposition that, far from affecting adversely the interests of the United States, it would be in the interest of the United States if the western periphery of China were ringed by a chain of independent states, though they would, of course, in their policies take due account of the predominance of their powerful neighbor.

The roots of the Vietnamese civil war go back to the very beginning of South Vietnam as an independent state. When President Ngo Dinh Diem took office in 1954, he presided not over a state but over one-half of a country arbitrarily and, in the intentions of all concerned, temporarily severed from the other half. He was generally regarded as a caretaker who would establish the rudiments of an administration until the country was united by nationwide elections to be held in 1956 in accordance with the Geneva accords.

Diem was confronted at home with a number of private armies which were politically, religiously or criminally oriented. To the general surprise, he subdued one after another and created what looked like a viable government. Yet in the process of creating it, he also laid the foundations for the present civil war. He ruthlessly suppressed all opposition, established concentration camps, organized a brutal secret police, closed newspapers and rigged elections. These policies inevitably led to a polarization of the politics of South Vietnam—on one side, Diem's family surrounded by a praetorian guard; on the other, the Vietnamese people, backed by the Communists, declaring themselves liberators from foreign domination and internal oppression.

Thus, the possibility of civil war was inherent in the very nature of the Diem regime. It became inevitable after Diem refused to agree to all-Vietnamese elections and, in the face of mounting popular alienation, accentuated the tyrannical aspects of his regime. The South Vietnamese who cherished freedom could not help but oppose him. Threatened by the secret police, they went either abroad or underground where the Communists were waiting for them.

Until the end of last February, the Government of the United States started from the assumption that the war in South Vietnam was a civil war, aided and abetted—but

not created—from abroad, and spokesmen for the Government have made time and again the point that the key to winning the war was political and not military and was to be found in South Vietnam itself. It was supposed to lie in transforming the indifference or hostility of the great mass of the South Vietnamese people into positive loyalty to the Government.

To that end, a new theory of warfare called "counter insurgency" was put into practice. Strategic hamlets were established, massive propaganda campaigns were embarked upon, social and economic measures were at least sporadically taken. But all was to no avail. The mass of the population remained indifferent, if not hostile, and large units of the army ran away or went over to the enemy.

The reasons for this failure are of general significance, for they stem from a deeply ingrained habit of the American mind. We like to think of social problems as technically self-sufficient and susceptible of simple, clear-cut solutions. We tend to think of foreign aid as a kind of self-sufficient, technical economic enterprise subject to the laws of economics and divorced from politics, and of war as a similarly self-sufficient, technical enterprise, to be won as quickly, as cheaply, as thoroughly as possible and divorced from the foreign policy that preceded and is to follow it. Thus our military theoreticians and practitioners conceive of counterinsurgency as though it were just another branch of warfare like artillery or chemical warfare, to be taught in special schools and applied with technical proficiency wherever the occasion arises.

This view derives of course from a complete misconception of the nature of civil war. People fight and die in civil wars because they have a faith which appears to them worth fighting and dying for, and they can be opposed with a chance of success only by people who have at least as strong a faith.

Magsaysay could subdue the Huk rebellion in the Philippines because his charisma, proven in action aroused a faith superior to that of his opponents. In South Vietnam there is nothing to oppose the faith of the Vietcong and, in consequence, the Saigon Government and we are losing the civil war.

A guerrilla war cannot be won without the active support of the indigenous population, short of the physical extermination of that population. Germany was at least consistent when, during the Second World War, faced with unmanageable guerrilla warfare throughout occupied Europe, she tried to master the situation through a deliberate policy of extermination. The French tried "counterinsurgency" in Algeria and failed; 400,000 French troops fought the guerrillas in Indochina for nine years and failed.

The United States has recognized that it is failing in South Vietnam. But it has drawn from this recognition of failure a most astounding conclusion.

The United States has decided to change the character of the war by unilateral declaration from a South Vietnamese civil war to a war of "foreign aggression." "Aggression from the North: The Record of North Vietnam's campaign to conquer South Vietnam" is the title of a white paper published by the Department of State on the last day of February 1965. While normally foreign and military policy is based upon intelligence—that is, the objective assessment of facts—the process is here reversed: A new policy has been decided upon, and intelligence must provide the facts to justify it.

The United States, stymied in South Vietnam and on the verge of defeat, decided to carry the war to North Vietnam not so much in order to retrieve the fortunes of war as to lay the groundwork for "negotiations from strength." In order to justify that new policy, it was necessary to prove that North

Vietnam is the real enemy. It is the white paper's purpose to present that proof.

Let it be said right away that the white paper is a dismal failure. The discrepancy between its assertions and the factual evidence adduced to support them borders on the grotesque. It does nothing to disprove, and tends even to confirm, what until the end of February had been official American doctrine: that the main body of the Vietcong is composed of South Vietnamese and that 80 to 90 percent of their weapons are of American origin.

This document is most disturbing in that it provides a particularly glaring instance of the tendency to conduct foreign and military policy not on their own merits, but as exercises in public relations. The Government fashions an imaginary world that pleases it, and then comes to believe in the reality of that world and acts as though it were real.

It is for this reason that public officials are so resentful of the reporters assigned to Vietnam and have tried to shut them off from the sources of news and even to silence them. They resent the confrontation of their policies with the facts. Yet the facts are what they are, and they take terrible vengeance on those who disregard them.

However, the white paper is but the latest instance of a delusory tendency which has led American policy in Vietnam astray in other respects. We call the American troops in Vietnam advisers and have assigned them by and large to advisory functions, and we have limited the activities of the marines who have now landed in Vietnam to guarding American installations. We have done this for reasons of public relations, in order to spare ourselves the odium of open belligerency.

There is an ominous similarity between this technique and that applied to the expedition in the Bay of Pigs. We wanted to overthrow Castro, but for reasons of public relations we did not want to do it ourselves. So it was not done at all, and our prestige was damaged far beyond what it would have suffered had we worked openly and single-mindedly for the goal we had set ourselves.

Our very presence in Vietnam is in a sense dictated by considerations of public relations; we are afraid lest our prestige would suffer were we to retreat from an untenable position.

One may ask whether we have gained prestige by being involved in a civil war on the mainland of Asia and by being unable to win it. Would we gain more by being unable to extricate ourselves from it, and by expanding it unilaterally into an international war? Is French prestige lower today than it was 11 years ago when France was fighting in Indochina, or 5 years ago when she was fighting in Algeria? Does not a great power gain prestige by mustering the wisdom and courage necessary to liquidate a losing enterprise? In other words, is it not the mark of greatness, in circumstances such as these, to be able to afford to be indifferent to one's prestige?

The peripheral military containment of China, the indiscriminate crusade against communism, counterinsurgency as a technically self-sufficient new branch of warfare, the conception of foreign and military policy as a branch of public relations—they are all misconceptions that conjure up terrible dangers for those who base their policies on them.

One can only hope and pray that the vaunted pragmatism and commonsense of the American mind—of which the President's new proposals may well be a manifestation—will act as a corrective upon those misconceptions before they lead us from the blind alley in which we find ourselves today to the rim of the abyss. Beyond the present crisis, however, one must hope that the confrontation between these misconceptions and

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reality will teach us a long-overdue lesson—to rid ourselves of these misconceptions altogether.

[From the Saturday Evening Post, Apr. 24, 1965]

WE SHOULD NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT IN VIETNAM

(By Senator FRANK CHURCH)

Our struggle in South Vietnam has reached a point where neither side can achieve a conclusive military decision, and the only visible prospect for a solution is to be found at the conference table. But there is so much Washington talk about stepping up the war that it threatens to engulf all rational discussion of the crisis we face—almost as if peace were something to be avoided.

The war hawks are putting on the heat. Anyone who disagrees with them is accused of "running up a white flag." Debate is discouraged; dissent is condemned as endangering the country. Any talk of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam is equated with Munich; any prospect of an eventual American withdrawal is likened to Dunkirk.

Yet everyone senses that peace in Vietnam can only be restored through a political settlement, and that the United States neither wishes nor expects to keep a foothold in southeast Asia. Accordingly, I believe we should try to break the diplomatic deadlock (First you withdraw, then we will talk) that finds both sides, in effect, demanding the surrender of the other as the price for negotiations. I disagree with the prevailing doctrine that now is not the time to parley. The longer we wait, the harder it will become to achieve a satisfactory solution.

Opposing any negotiations, the war hawks contend that we Americans must first have it out with the Communists in Vietnam. They see the struggle there, which has thus far been mostly confined to the Vietnamese, as one of suddenly portentous importance. Hanson Baldwin, military editor for the New York Times, declares that we should ready ourselves to send a million Americans into battle. He writes: "We must fight a war to prevent an irreparable defeat. . . . Vietnam is a nasty place to fight. But . . . there is no 'good' place to die. And it is far better to fight in Vietnam—on China's doorstep—than fight some years hence in Hawaii, on our own frontiers."

Such trumpetings substitute sound for sanity. We may have invested prestige in Vietnam, but by no stretch of imagination does this struggle threaten the life of our country.

We conquered the Pacific in the Second World War. It is our moat, the broadest on earth, from the Golden Gate to the very shores of China. With unchallenged naval and aerial supremacy, we dominate it, patrol it and defend it. There is no way for the landlocked forces of Asia to drive us from the Pacific. The elephant cannot drive the whale from the sea, nor the eagle from the sky. Our presence in the Far East is not anchored to Vietnam.

I believe that the containment of a hostile China is a proper goal for American policy. To avoid Chinese conquest of her neighbors, we fought in Korea, and we have solemnly pledged ourselves to defend Taiwan. The weakness of the Chinese-expansion argument, as it relates to Vietnam, is that China has thus far displayed no wish to invade southeast Asia. To date, Chinese troops have not been fighting in Vietnam. Moreover, China hasn't yet moved a cadre of "advisers" into North Vietnam, that begins to compare, in numbers of men or in the amount of aid given, to the American presence in the South. The best way to keep China out of Vietnam is to settle the war there. An escalation of the war northward, if it continues unabated, is the most likely way to draw Chinese armies down, thus creating the very calamity our policy should be designed to avert.

However, a new definition of containment has emerged to justify the deepening involvement of the United States in the fighting in southeast Asia. Our presence there, it is said, is not to furnish a shield against an anticipated Chinese invasion, but rather to counteract the spread of Chinese influence. If this is our purpose, it is a vain one indeed.

China is the giant of Asia, unshackled and determined to reclaim her prerogatives as the dominant power of the mainland. In the natural course of events, we can no more expect to deny China her influence in southeast Asia, the region immediately beneath her, than China could expect to deny the United States our influence in Central America.

No outpost bristling with bayonets—least of all one held in South Vietnam by American occupation forces—is going to stem the spread of Chinese influence in Asia. If we cannot live in a world where the Chinese exert influence in Indochina, then we had better forget Vietnam and commence now to destroy and dismember China, something no other nation in history has ever managed to do.

But since the conquest of China is not an American ambition, we should stop fooling ourselves with talk that our involvement in Vietnam can somehow bring an end to the spread of Chinese influence in Asia. In fact, the evidence is just the other way around. Because of the extent of our intervention in South Vietnam, the Peiping government is able to pose as the champion of Asia for the Asians, defying the United States in the name of resisting the return of Western imperialism. Chou En-lai had reason to rub his hands with glee when he said recently to a foreign visitor: "Once we worried about southeast Asia. We don't anymore. The Americans are rapidly solving our problems for us."

Although we cannot immunize southeast Asia from Chinese influence, the restoration of peace to this war weary region offers the little countries of Indochina their best hope for remaining independent. They would, of necessity, establish friendly ties with China, staying scrupulously neutral and unaligned, but they need not become the vassal states that a spreading war, drawing Chinese armies in, would surely make them. This even applies to North Vietnam, where nationalist feeling against China is deep, and where Ho Chi Minh does not yet take his orders from Peiping. Clearly, if we seek to restrict Chinese hegemony in southeast Asia, a settlement in Vietnam is essential.

Those who urge the contrary course—a Korean-type war in Indochina—often argue that South Vietnam has become the testing ground of a new and vicious form of Communist aggression, the guerrilla war. They contend that the Vietcong rebels, though perhaps not the pawns of Peiping, are at least the agents of Hanoi; that indirect aggression by infiltration is being practiced by the North against the South; and that we Americans must see to it that the guerrillas are driven out, or such wars of subversion will spread.

I grant this seems a compelling argument, but it won't stand up under close analysis. Communist guerrilla wars didn't begin in Vietnam and won't end there, regardless of the outcome of this particular struggle. American muscle, sufficiently used, may hold the 17th parallel against infiltrators from the north, but our bayonets will not stop—they could even spread—Communist agitation within other Asian countries. A government may be checked by force, but not an idea. There is no way to fence off an ideology.

Indeed, Communist-inspired guerrilla wars have always jumped over boundary lines. They have erupted in scattered, far-flung places around the globe, wherever adverse conditions within a given country permit Communist subversion to take root. The threatened governments put down such guerrilla uprisings in the Philippines, Malaya,

Burma, and Greece. The decision for Saigon hangs in the balance.

This is a time of ferment. Some of these guerrilla revolts will succeed; others will fail. The outcome, in each case, will depend upon the character of the government challenged, and the willingness of the people to rally behind it. That some governments won't prove equal to the test is no reason for us to panic. The other governments in southeast Asia are not so many dominoes in a row. They differ, one from another, in popular support and in capacity to resist Communist subversion. We all hope Saigon will prevail, but the argument that "as goes South Vietnam, so goes all of southeast Asia," is predicated more upon fear than fact. Communism isn't going to take over the world; it is much too poor a system for that.

Whether Saigon can meet the test remains to be seen. Until now, it has been losing its war, not for lack of arms, but for lack of internal cohesion. The Vietcong grow stronger, not because they are better supplied but because they are united in their will to fight. This spirit cannot be imported from without. The weakness in South Vietnam emanates from Saigon itself, where we, as foreigners, are powerless to pacify the spoiling factions. Only the Vietnamese can furnish a solution.

This brings us back to the central question: Why did we intervene in South Vietnam? President Eisenhower, who committed us there, expressed the reason, and his successors, Kennedy and Johnson, have faithfully repeated it. We went in, upon the invitation of Saigon (10 governments ago), to give aid and advice to the Vietnamese who were fighting the Vietcong rebels. We can give arms, money, food, training and equipment, which is all we committed ourselves to do, but we cannot, as a foreign nation, win the war. Ultimately, a civil war has to be decided by the people of the country concerned.

We only deceive ourselves when we pretend that the struggle in Vietnam is not a civil war. The two parts of Vietnam don't represent two different peoples, with separate identities. Vietnam is a partitioned country in the grip of a continuing revolution. That the government of North Vietnam has deeply involved itself in support, or even direction, of the rebellion in the south doesn't make the war any less a civil war. The fighting is still between Vietnamese. The issue is still that of determining what groups of Vietnamese shall govern the country.

It is true, of course, that foreign powers are interested in the outcome of this struggle, China favoring Hanoi, the United States backing Saigon. But, again, the involvement of outside countries, even when it takes the form of limited intervention, doesn't change the essential character of the war.

With the war in Vietnam at a point where neither side can achieve a conclusive military decision, some kind of political settlement has to be worked out. I cannot furnish a precise blueprint for a peaceful settlement. No one can at this point. But I can indicate, in general terms, a form of settlement that lies in that middle ground that both sides must seek out if a negotiated settlement is to be reached. The timing of any settlement must, of course, be left to the President. He alone can know whether or when Hanoi appears willing to bargain.

As for the United States, we can always deal at the conference table from a strength that rests not upon the softness of Saigon but upon our own possession of the sea and air. Therefore I believe we must demonstrate that we cannot be driven out of Indochina, and that we won't bow to a Communist-dictated peace. Our recent bombings should make it clear to Hanoi that we will not quit under fire, or withdraw, or submit to coercion.

At the same time we should make it equally clear that we are prepared to negotiate on honorable terms. The judicious use of both the arrows and the olive branch, clutched by the American eagle in the Presidential seal, represents our best hope for avoiding a Korean-type war on the Asian mainland. We should indicate our willingness to interpose a neutral buffer zone in Indochina, consisting of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. Such a zone need not create a power vacuum for Chinese armies to fill. This is a more likely result, in the absence of such an agreement, of an expanded war. The integrity of the neutralized region against invasion from without could be guaranteed by the signatories to the agreement. Thus the military might of the United States would remain a deterrent to Chinese encroachment from the north, which is—or ought to be—our primary purpose in southeast Asia anyway. During its transitional phase such an agreement could be policed by special forces of an international commission, set up to preside over a ceasefire while political arrangements are worked out by the people of each country.

Admittedly, this involves the unavoidable risk that pro-Communist elements may come to prevail, but the war itself—which sees Western forces increasingly pitted against Asians—has become the breeding ground of steadily growing political support for the Communist cause. As Prince Sihanouk, Cambodia's royalist ruler, has pointed out, the risk of Communist ascendancy after a settlement grows larger every day the war is prolonged. If this estimate is correct, and there is mounting evidence to support it, then the time to negotiate is now, while the anti-Communist elements in Indochina still possess authority.

Now is the time, while the jungles and rice fields still belong to the Vietnamese, to strive for an end to the war. Hanoi has reason to bargain, for she covets her independence and has cause to fear China. The same holds true for Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. Even the Soviet Union has incentive to work for a settlement that will foreclose a Chinese occupation of southeast Asia. These propitious conditions, all of which work in our favor, are likely to be the first casualties of a widening war.

[From the New York Review, Apr. 22, 1965]

VIETNAM: AN EXERCISE IN SELF-DELUSION

"The New Face of War," by Malcolm W. Browne; Bobbs-Merrill, 284 pages, \$5.

"The Making of a Quagmire," by David Halberstam; Random House, 312 pages, \$4.95.

(By I. F. Stone)

The morning I sat down to write this review, the Washington Post (March 25) carried the news that Malcolm W. Browne had been arrested and held for 2 hours by South Vietnamese Air Force officers at the big U.S. air and missile base at Da Nang. The incident is symbol and symptom of the steady degeneration in the conduct of the Vietnamese war. These two books by two newspapermen who won Pulitzer Prizes last year for their coverage of the war, Browne for the Associated Press, David Halberstam for the New York Times, record the agony of trying to report the war truthfully against the opposition of the higher-ups, military and civilian. The books appear just as the war is entering a new stage when honest reporting is more essential than ever, but now restriction and censorship are applied to black it out. Da Nang, the main base from which the war is being escalated to the North, was officially declared "off limits" the day before Browne's arrest and newsmen were told they could not enter without a pass obtainable only in Saigon, 385 miles to the south. "Newsmen," the dispatch on Browne's arrest, "doubted such a pass existed." The incident occurred only a few

days after the highest information officer at the Pentagon claimed that its policy on coverage of the war was "complete candor."

What makes these books so timely, their message so urgent, is that they show the Vietnamese war in that aspect which is most fundamental for our own people—as a challenge to freedom of information and therefore freedom of decision. They appear at a time when all the errors on which they throw light are being intensified. Instead of correcting policy in the light of the record, the light itself is being shut down. Access to news sources in Vietnam and in Washington is being limited, censorship in the field is becoming more severe. Diem is dead but what might be termed Diemism has become the basic policy of the American Government. For years our best advisers, military and civilian, tried desperately to make him understand that the war was a political problem which could only be solved in South Vietnam. Three years ago the head of the U.S. mission spoke of the war as a battle for the "hearts and minds" of the people, and primarily the villagers, whose disaffection had made the rebellion possible against superior forces and equipment. To win that battle it was then proposed to spend \$200 million to bolster the Vietnamese economy and raise living standards. Though much of this money seems to have been frittered away, it was at least recognized that the military effort was only one aspect of the problem. Now we have adopted Diem's simple-minded theory that the war is merely a product of Communist conspiracy, that it is purely an invasion and not a rebellion or a civil war, and that all would be well—in Secretary Rusk's fatuous phrase—if only the North let its neighbors alone. This is the theory of the white paper and this is the excuse for bombing North Vietnam.

While the war expands, the theory on which it proceeds has narrowed. Washington's "party line" on the war has been shrunk to rid it of those annoying complexities imposed by contact with reality. The change becomes evident if one compares the white paper of 1965 with the Blue Book of 1961. The Blue Book was issued by the Kennedy administration to explain its decision to step up the scale of our aid and the number of our "military advisers" in South Vietnam. The white paper was issued by the Johnson administration to prepare the public mind to accept its decision to bomb the North and risk a wider war. The change of policy required that rewriting of history we find so amusing when we watch it being done on the other side.

Four years ago the Blue Book told us that the basic pattern of Vietcong activity was "not new, of course." It said this followed the tactics applied and the theories worked out by Mao Tse-tung in China. It said much the same methods were used "in Malaya, in Greece, in the Philippines, in Cuba, and in Laos." If there is "anything peculiar to the Vietnam situation," the Blue Book said, "it is that the country is divided and one-half provides a safe sanctuary from which subversion in the other half is supported with both personnel and materiel." This implied a conflict which was doubly a civil war, first between the two halves of a divided country and then between the government and Communist-led guerrillas in one-half of that country.

The white paper disagrees. It abandons complexity to make possible simple-minded slogans and policy. It declares the conflict "a new kind of war * * * a totally new brand of aggression * * * not another Greece * * * not another Malaya * * * not another Philippines * * * Above all * * * not a spontaneous and local rebellion against the established government." "The fundamental difference," the white paper says, is that in Vietnam "a Communist government has set out deliberately to conquer a sov-

ereign people in a neighboring state." This implies that there is no popular discontent in the south to be allayed, no need to negotiate with the rebels. The war is merely a case of international aggression and the aggressor is to be punished by bombardment until he agrees to call off the invasion. The rebellion can be shut off, all this implies, as if by spigot from Hanoi. The truth about the war has been tailored to suit the Air Force faith in "victory by airpower." This was Goldwater's theory and this has become Johnson's policy.

Browne's book sheds some sharp light on the white paper's thesis. The white paper says the war is "inspired, directed, supplied and controlled" by Hanoi. But Browne reports that "intelligence experts feel less than 10 percent and probably more like 2 percent of the Vietcong's stock of modern weapons is Communist made." He also reports that "only a small part of Vietcong increase in strength has resulted from infiltration of North Vietnamese Communist troops into South Vietnam." An astringent examination of the white paper and its supporting appendixes will show that it really proves little more than this, despite the sweeping headline impressions it was intended to generate. Browne also tells us that "Western intelligence experts believe the proportion of Communists (in the National Liberation Front) is probably extremely small." He describes it as "a true 'front' organization appealing for the support of every social class." Browne declares the Front a "creature" of the Vietnamese Communist Party and says it has "strong but subtle ties" to the Hanoi regime. For many Vietnamese, nevertheless "the Front is exactly what it purports to be—the people's struggle for independence." This is what our best advisers tried to tell Diem. This is what our bureaucracy now refuses to see rather than admit past error and defeat, preferring to gamble on a wider war.

The really terrible message in these books is not that the bureaucrats have tried to deceive the public but that they have insisted on deceiving themselves. The Vietnamese war has been an exercise in self-delusion. David Halberstam tells us in "The Making of a Quagmire," that when the first Buddhist burned himself to death, Ngo Dinh Diem was convinced that this act had been staged by an American television team. The Buddhist crisis, as Halberstam describes it, "was to encompass all the problems of the government: its inability to rule its own people; the failure of the American mission to influence Diem * * * Observing the government during those 4 months was like watching a government trying to commit suicide." The stubborn insistence of the South Vietnamese dictator on insulating himself from reality spread into our own Government. The most important revelation these two books make is the unwillingness of the higher-ups in Saigon and Washington to hear the truth from their subordinates in the field.

South Vietnam swarmed with spies, but apparently they were only listened to when they reported what their paymasters wanted to hear. Halberstam says that at one time Diem had 13 different secret police organizations. Browne provides a vivid picture of how our own intelligence agencies proliferated. The CIA, Special Forces, the Aid mission, the Army, the Provost Marshal, the Navy, and the U.S. Embassy each had its own operatives. But they were not, in Browne's words, "one big happy family." On the contrary they "very often closely concealed" their findings from other agencies "because of the danger that the competitors may pirate the material and report it to headquarters first, getting the credit."

All of this fierce application of free enterprise to the collection of information seems to have been of little use because of a top level political decision. "Ever since Viet-

name independence" (i.e., 1954), Browne reveals, "American intelligence officials had relied on the Vietnamese intelligence system for most of their information." This was "because of Diem's touchiness about American spooks wandering around on their own." In the interest of preserving harmony, "somehow the intelligence reports always had it that the war was going well." We circulated faithfully in orbit around our own satellite. Diem's men told him what he wanted to hear, and ours passed on what he wanted us to believe, Halberstam confirms this. In those final months before Diem's overthrow, "CIA agents were telling me that their superiors in Vietnam were still so optimistic that they were not taking the turmoil and unrest very seriously." John Richardson, then CIA chief in Vietnam, displayed a kind of infatuation with Diem's brother Nhu and his wife. Halberstam describes a lunch with Richardson in 1962, shortly after the New York Times sent him to Saigon, in which the CIA chief dismissed Nhu's notorious anti-American remarks as simply those of "a proud Asian." As for the tigerish Mme. Nhu, Richardson thought her "sometimes a little emotional, but that was typical of women who entered politics—look at Mrs. Roosevelt."

A persistent Panglossianism marked our entire bureaucracy up to and including the White House. General Harkins, our military commander in South Vietnam, said "I am an optimist and I am not going to allow my staff to be pessimistic." Halberstam describes a briefing at his command post after the battle of Ap Bac in January 1963, the kind of setpiece battle for which our military had long hoped and which they first described as a victory though it turned out to be a disastrous defeat. With "the government troops so completely disorganized that they would not even carry out their own dead," "a province chief shelling his own men" and the enemy long gone," General Harkins told the press a trap was about to be sprung on the enemy.

The enemy was the press. When the facts about Ap Bac could no longer be concealed, headquarters became angry "not with the system" that brought defeat, Halberstam writes, nor with the Vietnamese commanders responsible for it "but with the American reporters who wrote about it." Admiral Harry Felt, commander of all U.S. forces in the Pacific, gave classic expression to the bureaucratic attitude toward the press when he was angered by a question from Browne. "Why don't you get on the team?" the admiral demanded.

When Halberstam, Browne, and Neil Sheehan, then with the UPI, visited the Mekong Delta in the summer of 1963 and saw for themselves the deterioration of the war, their reward for reporting it was a campaign of denigration. Rusk criticized Halberstam at a press conference. President Kennedy suggested to the publisher of the New York Times that Halberstam be transferred to some other assignment, a suggestion Mr. Arthur Hays Sulzberger, to his credit, rejected. The bureaucracy counterattacked through Joe Alsop, who insidiously compared the reporters on the scene to those who a generation earlier had called the Chinese Communists agrarian reformers. The New York Journal-American wrote that Halberstam was soft on communism. A friend in the State Department told Halberstam, "It's a damn good thing you never belonged to any leftwing groups or anything like that because they were really looking for stuff like that." Victor Krulak, the Pentagon's top specialist on guerrilla warfare, was vehement in his criticism of the press: "Richard Tregaskis and Maggie Higgins had found that the war was being won, but a bunch

of young cubs who kept writing about the political side were defeatists." The official attitude was epitomized by Lyndon Johnson, then Vice President, on his way back from Saigon in 1961. He had laid the flattery on with a shovel, calling Diem the Churchill of Asia. Halberstam reports that when a reporter on the plane tried to tell Johnson something of Diem's faults, Johnson responded, "Don't tell me about Diem. He's all we've got out there." A brink is a dangerous place on which to prefer not to see where you're going.

The hostile attitude toward honest reporting is made the more shocking because reporters like Halberstam and Browne, as their conclusions reveal, were critics not of the war itself but only of the ineffective way in which it was conducted. The force, for which they spoke, the sources on which they depended, were not dissident Vietnamese but junior American officers. Their books disclose little contact with the Vietnamese. The battle between the press and the bureaucracy arose because the newspapermen refused to report that the war was being won, but there was not too much reporting of why it was being lost.

For Halberstam the war was a lark, a wonderful assignment for a young reporter; his pages reflect his zest and are full of graphic reportage, though also marked by some egregious errors, such as locating Dienbienphu in Laos and attributing the origin of the agrovilles to the French whereas they really sprang from Nhu's mystical authoritarianism. For Browne the war was less romantic. The life of a wire service reporter on call 24 hours a day in so tense a situation is no picnic. His book is written in flat agency prose. Both men acquitted themselves honorably, in the best tradition of American journalism, which is always to be skeptical of any official statement. But both books are marked by that characteristic intemperance on the moment; the idea that the past may help explain the present appears only rarely. There is no time for study, and American editors do not encourage that type of journalism in depth which distinguishes *Le Monde* or the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*.

This defect is most damaging in reporting on the origins of the revolt against Diem. The average American newspaper reader got the impression that this was brought about by esoteric and long-distance means, by Communist plotters activated from Hanoi to engage in that mysterious process referred to in our press as "subversion." This is the closest modern equivalent to witchcraft. Halberstam's account of the origins is better than Browne's, but the real roots of discontent are touched on only peripherally. We get a glimpse of them in Halberstam's report that General Taylor after his first mission in 1960 recommended "broadening the base of the government, taking non-Ngo anti-Communist elements into the Government; making the National Assembly more than a rubber stamp; easing some of the tight restrictions on the local press." The prescription was for a little of that democracy we were supposed to be defending, but Diem would not take the medicine. The accumulation of grievances, the establishment of concentration camps for political opponents of all kinds, the exploitation and abuse of the villages, the oppression of the intellectuals, the appeal of the 18 notables in 1960, and the attempted military coup that year, "the long standing abuses" which finally led to the revolt, are not spelled out as they should be and would be if U.S. reporters had more contact with the Vietnamese. In a flash of insight Halberstam writes:

"The best account is by the French historian, Philippe Devillers in 'North Vietnam Today' (Praeger, 1962), edited by P. J. Honey.

Also, though we knew more about Vietnam and the aspirations of the Vietnamese than most official Americans, we were to some degree limited by our nationality. We were there, after all, to cover the war; this was our primary focus and inevitably we judged events through the war's progress or lack of it. We entered the pagodas only after the Buddhist crisis had broken out; we wrote of Nguyen Tuong Tam, the country's most distinguished writer and novelist, only after he had committed suicide—and then only because his death had political connotations; we were aware of the aspirations of the peasants because they were the barometer of the Government's failure and the war's progress, not because we were on the side of the population and against their rulers.

This accounts for how poorly these reporters understood the central problem of land reform, how few realized that from the standpoint of the peasants, particularly in the Delta, Diem's land reform policy like his hated agrovilles and our equally unpopular strategic hamlets seemed to be mechanisms for reinstating the rights of the landlords who had fled during the long war against the French. Diem's downfall, and the rebellion's success, were largely due to the fact that he tried to do what even the Bourbons in France after the Revolution were too wise to attempt. He tried to turn back the clock of the revolutionary land seizures in the name of land reform many peasants found themselves being asked to pay rent or compensation for land they had long considered their own.

This lack of contact with the Vietnamese people, and this fellow feeling for the junior officers who were sure they could win the war if only HQ were different, also accounts for the weak way both books fizzle out when the authors try to supply some conclusions. Both oppose negotiation and neutralization. Halberstam is indignant with the indifference to Vietnam he encountered on his return home. He believes Vietnam "a legitimate part" of "our global commitment." He feels "we cannot abandon our efforts to help these people no matter how ungrateful they may seem." For the "ungrateful" majority, the American presence had only succeeded in polarizing the politics of the country between authoritarian Communists and authoritarian anti-Communists; the former at least have the virtue of being supported by native forces. The anti-Communist minority was grateful, of course, and feared that with American withdrawal they would be treated as mercilessly by the National Liberation Front as Diem had treated veterans of Vietnam after 1954, although a specific provision of the Geneva agreement forbade persecution of those who had fought against the French. The files of the International Control Commission from 1955 onward were full of complaints that ex-Vietminh had been thrown into concentration camps or executed without charge or trial. In any eventual settlement in Vietnam, the future of minorities must certainly be a matter for concern, but the notion that we have a mandate from heaven to impose on an unwilling people what we think is good for them will strike few Asians or Africans as an object lesson in democracy. Browne's feeble ending is even worse. "Perhaps in the end," he writes, echoing the clichés of the counter-insurgency experts at Fort Bragg, "America will find it can put Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Giap to work for it, without embracing communism itself."

This was the delusion of French military men like Colonel Lacheroy and Colonel Trinquier, who returned from Indochina thinking they could apply Communist ideas in reverse to the "pacification" of Algeria. When frustrated, they tried to turn their borrowed techniques of conspiracy and assassination against De Gaulle and the French Republic. To apply Communist methods in

¹See the vivid account in his preface to Jules Roy's agonized and eloquent "The Battle of Dienbienphu," Harper, \$6.95.

reverse, the favorite formula of our "counter-insurgency" experts, does not make them any less unpalatable or dangerous to a free society. The basic tactic confuses the effect with the cause. To see "wars of liberation," the Pentagon's dominant nightmare, simply as a reflection of conspiracy, to overlook the social and economic roots which make them possible, to prescribe counterconspiracy as the cure, is not only likely to insure failure but it tends to shut off debate on peaceful alternatives. Here the growing tendency of the Johnson administration to make it seem disloyal to question the omniscience of the Presidency is reinforced by the natural tendency of the Pentagon to see doubts about resort to force as unpatriotic. There is the danger here of a new McCarthyism as the administration and the military move toward wider war rather than admit earlier mistakes.

[From the New York Times, Apr. 22, 1965]

"DESCALATION" NEEDED

The war in Vietnam is to be "stepped up," Washington now says. In other words, the U.S. Government is going to continue to bomb, send in more Americans, spend more and commit more lives, money, destructiveness and power—and take more risk. In return, the hope is that Hanoi will act to curb the Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam, if it can, and will refrain from sending in more men and arms and orders to the south. The hope also is that Peiping and Moscow will hold off from their own particular methods of escalation.

Those who have all along feared that the course the war has been taking since early February would force the United States into an ever greater commitment, leading to ever greater danger to Asia and to the world, are unhappily being proved true prophets. Once a war begins, forces take over which seem beyond control. In Vietnam, on both sides, one step is leading—as if inexorably—to another and then another. Continuance of the present process by the opposing forces could lead to catastrophe.

Nothing is more important for Americans today than to face these hard truths before it is too late. And it is vital that the channels of communication, of opinion and of dissent be kept open—on the floor of Congress, in the press, in the country at large—in the face of a growing tendency to ridicule or to denounce the opposition and to demand unswerving support of further escalation in the name of patriotism.

Bitterness and emotionalism are increasingly entering the discussions on Vietnam in the United States. This is a deplorable development, and so is the polarization of opinion in every country and between blocs of countries. It is as if the battle lines were being drawn all over the world—but for a major war that need not and must not take place.

President Johnson's offer of "unconditional discussions" was a splendid move on the diplomatic-political front, in the effort to achieve a peaceful solution of the quarrel. While it deserved a far better response from the other side than it has yet received, it did mark, as we have previously noted, a beginning to an interchange among the combatants—subtle and indirect, but nevertheless a beginning.

But the continued bombing of North Vietnam makes progress toward a peaceful settlement—however far off it must necessarily be—more difficult rather than less, harder rather than easier. We think that as a followup to the President's fine declaration in Baltimore, a "deescalation" of the war is needed, rather than the escalation that we now see imminent.

It is at least worth the effort to see whether a scaling down of the bombing might not evoke a corresponding scaling down of North Vietnamese aggression in South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese incidents in the south

are easily measurable; if a diminution of American bombing of the north should lead to a diminution in the rate of incidents in the south, a major step would thereby be signaled toward the "unconditional discussions" offered by the President.

Of course there might be no such response at all; and if there were not, the bombing would be resumed. But at least a "deescalation" such as we suggest would afford the opportunity to the other side of making a gesture toward peace without losing face. It might lead, ultimately, to a cease-fire and a truce.

President Johnson launched a very tentative but real peace offensive at Johns Hopkins. He has not yet given this policy enough time but the continued bombing has tended to cast some doubt on the sincerity the United States desire for negotiations.

This is clearly a moment of crisis—for Vietnam, for the United States, and for the world. Less bombing, not more, offers some hope of peace—without any weakness of American resolution. By taking such an attitude the United States would show strength as well as wisdom.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, Apr. 22, 1965]

IN THE NATION: THE SENATE ON VIETNAM (By Arthur Krock)

WASHINGTON, April 21.—On the initiative of its majority leader, MIKE MANSFIELD, the Senate today responsibly fulfilled the role assigned to it by the Constitution to advise the President on foreign affairs.

Senator FULBRIGHT who, in his official capacity as chairman of the committee on which the Senate relies for guidance on these questions, has been subjected to unwarranted abuse for stating as a mere hypothesis that "the prospects for discussions" looking to peace in southeast Asia "might be enhanced by a temporary cessation" by the United States of the military actions it is steadily escalating in the Vietnams. But, except for specific endorsement of what FULBRIGHT plainly identified as only a speculation, all the Senate speeches today were directed at the same objective, which MANSFIELD expressed as follows:

APPLYING GENEVA PRINCIPLE

It is of the utmost importance that the question of how to apply the principle of the Geneva agreement of 1954 be faced as soon as possible. * * * The longer this confrontation is put off, the more the people of North and South Vietnam pay for the delay, and the more the likelihood that the present limited conflict will spread into a general war in Asia.

His reference was to a proposal that the Geneva Conference be reconvened on the limited basis of producing an international guarantee of the neutrality of Vietnam's neighbor, Cambodia. "The need for a confrontation," he said, "on [this] situation in which none [the United States, Communist China and the two Vietnams] is involved so directly may indeed be a preliminary to a separate and second confrontation on Vietnam in which the involvement of all is direct." And though MANSFIELD extolled the President as one who has "grasped the problem fully," citing his call for "unconditional discussions with the object of restoring a decent and honorable peace," it was evident from remarks by Senators who praised MANSFIELD's observations that they detected in these their own doubts of the wisdom of escalating U.S. military attacks on North Vietnam while there is the slightest possibility of progress in the secret negotiations for reconvening a Geneva Conference on Cambodia.

"While the talk goes on," said MANSFIELD, "the bloodshed also goes on. And the bleeding is not being done in the capitals of the world. It is being done in the rice fields and

the jungles of Vietnam" whose "peasants, in all probability, want peace and a minimum of contact with distant Saigon and distant Hanoi—not to speak of places of which they have scarcely heard about—Peiping, Moscow, or Washington. This called attention to the officially inconvenient fact that the conflict is in part a civil war.

CONFLICTING VIEWS

Taking this from the majority leader as his cue, Senator AIKEN protested that "it is difficult to see (except as an act of braggadocio) what U.S. military leaders are trying to accomplish when they send 200 planes to destroy one little bridge. But on the same day that the Senate was voicing its disturbance over the policy of military escalation, Secretary of Defense McNamara was announcing its wide expansion, as agreed on at the Honolulu conference this week. This conflict of attitudes is the inevitable product of the involvement into which the U.S. Government has drifted in Vietnam.

The Senate today reflected its alarmed conviction that the time is overdue for ending the war in southeast Asia, hopefully through the back door of guaranteed neutrality of Cambodia. But it has no magic formula for reconvening a Geneva conference, now that the U.S.S.R., which proposed this, has set preconditions it is aware the United States cannot possibly accept. And the close Presidential relations of some of the sources of the hysterical attacks on Senator FULBRIGHT for speculating that a temporary halt of U.S. military actions against North Vietnam might be the best way to discover whether the aggressors are open to a reasonable and honorable settlement, suggest that this idea has no future in the administration.

TO RESTORE PEACE

President Johnson has more information than the Senate can possibly have for the alarm which MANSFIELD and others expressed on the floor. But the sole meaning to be read into Secretary McNamara's announcement on the same day is that continued escalation of the Vietnam war on a steadily rising scale is our only policy for the restoration of peace in southeast Asia.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Apr. 22, 1965]

THE FALLING DOMINOES (By Walter Lippmann)

Why is it, it is time to ask, that our position in Asia has declined so sharply though we are widening and intensifying the war in Vietnam?

According to the so-called domino theory, the United States would lose the respect and support of the peoples of Asia if, in confronting Chinese communism, it showed itself to be a paper tiger, and refrained from military action. For three months, since February, we have applied this theory ever more vigorously. And what are the results? Quite contrary to what was predicted: today the United States is not only isolated, but increasingly opposed, by every major power in Asia.

With the exception of Japan, which has a government but not a people who support our policy, all the Asian powers are against us on this issue, not only China and Indonesia, but the Soviet Union, India, and Pakistan. The crucial fact is that although the Asian powers are by no means at peace with one another, what they do have in common is an increasingly vociferous opposition to the escalated war we have been waging since February. India and Pakistan, India and China, China and the Soviet Union are quarrelling to the point of war with one another. But they are united in condemning our February war.

The administration should put this fact in its pipe and smoke it. It should ponder the fact that there exists such general Asian

opposition to our war in Asia. The President's advisers can take some comfort, but mighty little, from the fact that allied with us is the Thailand government in Bangkok, which is independent though weak, the government in Seoul, which we subsidize, the government in Taipei, which we protect, the government in Saigon, which governs something less than half of South Vietnam. Pondering the matter, we must, alas, put into the other scale the ominous, rising anti-Americanism in the Philippines.

The dominoes are indeed falling, and they are falling away from us.

What is the root of all this swelling anti-Americanism among the Asians? It is that they regard our war in Vietnam as a war by a rich, powerful, white, Western nation against a weak and poor Asian nation, a war by white men from the West against non-white men in Asia. We can talk until the cows come home about how we are fighting for the freedom of the South Vietnamese. But to the Asian peoples it is obviously and primarily an American war against an Asian people.

In my view the President is in grave trouble. He is in grave trouble because he has not taken to heart the historic fact that the role of the Western white man as a ruler in Asia was ended forever in the Second World War. Against the Japanese the Western white powers were unable to defend their colonies and protectorates in Asia. That put an end to the white man's domination in Asia which had begun in the 15th century.

Since then, despite our ultimate victory over the Japanese Empire, the paramount rule has been that Asians will have to be ruled by Asians, and that the Western white powers can never work out a new relationship with the Asian peoples except as they find a basis of political equality and nonintervention on which economic and cultural exchanges can develop.

This great historic fact is an exceedingly difficult one for many westerners to digest and accept. It is as hard for them to accept this new relationship with Asia as it is for many a southerner in this country to accept the desegregation of schools and public accommodations. The Asia hands who still instinctively think of Asia in prewar terms are haunted by Rudyard Kipling and the white man's burden and the assumption that East of Suez are the lesser breeds without the law.

Until we purge ourselves of these old pre-conceptions and prejudices, we shall not be able to deal with Asian problems, and we shall find ourselves as we are today in Vietnam, in what the German poet described as the unending pursuit of the ever-fleeting object of desire. We shall find ourselves widely rejected by the very people we are professing to save.

Until this purge takes place, we shall go on drifting into trouble. For us the problem in Asia is primarily a problem in our understanding of historic reality. In our view of Asia there will have to be a fundamental change akin to the illumination, which has come so recently here at home, that the American Negro must become a full, not a second class, citizen.

The day will come when the same kind of illumination of the facts of life is granted to the makers of our policy in Asia.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Chair lay before the Senate the unfinished business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which is S. 1564.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 1564) to enforce the 15th amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Delaware [Mr. WILLIAMS] numbered 82, to the committee substitute.

Under the precedents of the Senate, in such a case, the substitute, for the purpose of amendment, is regarded as original text. Any amendment proposed thereto is therefore in the first degree, and any amendment to such amendment is in the second degree, and not open to amendment.

Any amendment to the original text of the bill, or any amendment to such an amendment, would have precedence over the committee substitute or any amendment thereto.

In the event the committee amendment is agreed to, no further amendment is in order.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I can see the Continental Congress in session 199 years ago. It was June. It was considering a resolution by Richard Henry Lee, of Virginia. The purport of the resolution was that the Colonies are and of right should be free and independent States. That resolution was referred to a committee consisting of Jefferson, Adams, Franklin, Roger Sherman, and Robert Livingston. Jefferson undertook the task of formulating a declaration to carry out the sense of that resolution. What he wrote and what was approved was the Declaration of Independence.

How significant it is as a world document and how highly it is esteemed in the American tradition can be noted from the care that has been lavished upon its preservation. First, it was kept in the archives of the State Department. When the British invaded our Capital in 1812, it was removed to Virginia. When it was returned to Washington, it was kept in the Patent Office. Later it was placed in the Library of Congress. Today, it reposes in the National Archives in a glass case, bound in bronze and sealed in helium that light, dampness, or insects will not mar it.

One especial sentiment in that document is appropriate to this occasion. After asserting that man is endowed with certain inalienable, God-given rights, Jefferson then wrote:

Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

What a strange, amazing concept in a world of kings, czars, and emperors who

had fastened upon mankind the belief that they rule by divine mandate. Was this a whimsy from the pen of the great Virginian? Was it a mockery or did it have purpose. How well we know that it did have purpose for it became the very foundation of the system of government which the Constitution makers promulgated in Philadelphia 11 years later. In his own way, Abraham Lincoln reaffirmed it at Gettysburg fourscore and 7 years later when he expressed the prayerful hope that government of the people, for the people, and by the people would not perish from the earth.

How then shall there be government by the people if some of the people cannot speak? How obtain the consent of the governed when a segment of those governed cannot express themselves?

How strange that nearly two centuries after Thomas Jefferson wrote those words into the Declaration of Independence, assuring to the governed a reasonable chance to consent or dissent, the problem still vexes the National Government.

Can there be any doubt that this is the problem before us?

Men are taxed but not permitted to pass upon those who impose such taxes. Can this be the consent of the governed?

Men are compelled to render military service but not permitted to pass upon those who decree such service. Is that the consent of the governed?

Men are fined and imprisoned under laws dealing with crime and social infractions but not permitted to pass upon the authors of such laws. Is this the consent of the governed?

Men are compelled to send their children to schools which are supported with their taxes but not permitted to pass upon those who make the laws and issue the regulations under which their children are educated. Is this the consent of the governed?

Men pay for a variety of services such as gas, electricity, telephone service, railroad fares, airplane fares, the rates for which are predicated upon laws enacted by men whom they are not permitted to select. Is this the consent of the governed?

Bloody strife and a century of history have brought no solution to the problem. The final fulfillment of the basic concept set forth in the Declaration of Independence has not been achieved. And now, 100 years to the month after civil strife came to an end, we seek a solution which overrides emotion and sentimentality, prejudice, and politics and which will provide a fair and equitable solution.

This is the fourth civil rights measure to come before Congress in the last 8 years. The act of 1957 provided the right to go to court and to secure the aid of the Attorney General in providing injunctive relief where voting rights were denied. It also created the Civil Rights Commission with subpoena power to make investigations in this field and report to the Congress. The act of 1960 enlarged the powers of the Attorney General to investigate and find a pattern or practice under which voting rights were denied and then file suit so that a court could issue an order showing that the plaintiff in the suit was qualified to vote.

Then came the Civil Rights Act of 1964 under which three-judge courts could deal with voting rights actions. But discrimination in the matter of voting rights has continued and the data and information collected by the Civil Rights Commission and the Department of Justice makes it quite clear that additional legislation is needed if the unequivocal mandate in the 15th amendment to the Constitution of the United States is to be enforced and made effective and if the Declaration of Independence is to be made truly meaningful.

Mr. President, that is a preliminary statement. It does not undertake to deal with any analysis of the bill that is before the Senate. That will come later. But I believe that it is necessary to lay down a philosophical predicate that is the inspiration for the endeavor that is before us at the present time. The story could be multiplied ad infinitum. One could deliver a long dissertation, going back to an unsolved problem in the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution picked the year 1808 in which to continue the importation of persons. Parenthetically, the Constitution does not use the word "slaves" or the word "slavery," but it speaks about the continued importation of persons until 1808, and provides that such importation shall not be denied until that time. The only limitation on that trade was that there could be imposed a \$10 capitation tax. So importation continued.

At long last, after 50 years and a bloody strife, that institution came to an end, and those people were here. The question was how to deal with them realistically and recognize the fact that they were human beings. They were people with souls, and they were entitled to equality if the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution meant anything whatsoever.

After that strife came the 13th amendment abolishing the hideous institution that had grown up in our country.

Then in 1868 came the 14th amendment, with a further expansion of rights, privileges, and immunities.

Then came the 15th amendment in 1870. That amendment dealt very specially with citizens of the United States. That is what we are concerned with at the present time. The amendment stated that the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be abridged or denied by the United States or any State on account of race or color. That is as short, as explicit, and as clear as the English language could make it.

The authors of the amendment went further. They said that the Congress shall have power by appropriate legislation to enforce the amendment.

It is on the basis of that authority that we proceed with the measure that is now before the Senate.

Mr. President, this has been no easy chore. It has been one of the most difficult, intricate, and abstruse subjects with which I have contact in all of my legislative career. I am not insensible of those requirements by way of the qualification for electors that appears in article I of the Constitution. But I am

not insensible either to the mandate in the 15th amendment and how it shall be consummated and made effective.

It has taken a long time, under the peculiar procedure that has inhibited some of our action, even to file a document, which I presume I cannot call a "report." It is entitled "Joint Statement of Individual Views of Mr. DODD, Mr. HART, Mr. LONG of Missouri, Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts, Mr. BAYH, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. TYDINGS, Mr. DIRKSEN, Mr. HRUSKA, Mr. FONG, Mr. SCOTT, and Mr. JAVITS of the Committee on the Judiciary, supporting the adoption of Senate 1564, the Voting Rights Act of 1965."

I wish to pay testimony not only to the members of my staff, who are gracing the Senate Chamber today, but also to the staff of the majority leader and the staff of the Attorney General, because they worked until the hour of 11:58 last night, 2 minutes before the deadline that was set for the filing of this report. It is an excellent piece of work. Perhaps in the interest of accuracy I had better strike that word "report" and say "the filing of this document." It is an excellent piece of work. Some time later I intend to read a good deal of the document into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, because many hours and weeks of endeavor have gone into the document; and it deserves wider currency than a report or a document usually receives.

So at that point, I shall yield the floor. At a subsequent period, I shall begin to deal with an analysis of the bill and how we expect to remedy the difficulty that confronts us.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Illinois yield for questions?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield for questions.

Mr. ERVIN. The bill contains a provision which condemns without judicial trial the States of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia, and 34 counties in North Carolina; does it not?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes; if the Senator will modify his language.

First, I do not believe it condemns the States. It takes account of a condition that has existed in those States.

Second, I do not for a moment admit that the bill is punitive. Surely I do not admit that it is a bill of attainder, a point that was made before the full committee.

Mr. ERVIN. I presume that the Senator from Illinois will admit that the States that I have designated and the 34 counties of North Carolina are brought within the provisions of the bill without being given any judicial trial to determine whether they are violating the provisions of the 15th amendment.

Mr. DIRKSEN. We are seeking by the bill to remedy a condition that exists in those States, or that we believe exists with respect to citizens of the United States. It is not a question of providing a judicial trial for various States where that condition exists. We go to the heart of the problem and seek to supply a remedy that we think is constitutional and is nonpunitive.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. I do not believe we should allow the Record to stand with the statement of the Senator from North Carolina that the bill condemns the States without a judicial trial. The fact is that the States can go into court in the District of Columbia. The bill so provides and establishes procedures by which they must take themselves out from under the provisions of the law. Therefore, there is a legal avenue through which they can act. The Senator from North Carolina has consistently reiterated that there is no opportunity for the States to go into court. I cannot agree with him. The fact is that the States must motivate, rather than that the United States must motivate, which has been the cause of the breakdown under the present law.

Mr. ERVIN. I ask the Senator from Illinois if he does not know that under section 4 of the bill those States and counties cannot go into a court in the District of Columbia and rebut the presumption arising against them by showing that they are not engaged in violation of the 15th amendment.

Mr. DIRKSEN. The bill provides the method for the States to cleanse themselves of any taint, if they believe that the finger of taint has been placed upon them.

Mr. ERVIN. I ask the Senator from Illinois if the bill does not shut every courthouse door in America against the States I have enumerated and the 34 counties of North Carolina, except the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia?

Mr. DIRKSEN. My distinguished friend has used the expression "shut every courthouse door" in the land except the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The device of the court of the District of Columbia has been used in a great many other statutes. It is neither a restraint nor an infamous device that we resort to in connection with the bill to give a State an opportunity to make a test case in court.

Mr. ERVIN. The Senator from Illinois seems to be reluctant to give a direct answer to a direct question. I asked if under the bill the sovereign States of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia, and 34 counties of North Carolina are denied the right to go into any court, anywhere on the face of the earth, to defend themselves against the assumption or presumption, except the court of the District of Columbia.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It is true up to that limited point, but no further.

Mr. ERVIN. If they go into the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, they cannot escape the consequences of the act by showing that they are not engaged in denying any person the right to vote on account of race or color in violation of the 15th amendment.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I shall take up that matter a little later. I do not wish to become involved in a prolonged discussion of that point with the distinguished Senator from North Carolina. We shall get around to it later for a fuller analysis.

613 for a 4-month period, with all the additional policemen on foot patrol. By the end of the test period, felonies were down 55 percent; robberies down 70 percent; burglaries down 65 percent; street "muggings" down 90 percent. At the same time, case clearance improved by 75 percent. The heat went on, and the bottom fell out of the crime rate.

The big trump card of the progun debaters is that the second amendment to the Constitution flatly states, "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." At least 35 State constitutions have similar guarantees.

Actually, our rights predate the Constitution. Ancient common law holds that a man may arm himself and fight to defend his castle and its inhabitants and contents.

Students of human rights insist that there is another, still more important, right involved. It is the "right to revolution." Before you flinch at that harsh term, remember that every democratic government on earth was born of armed revolution after tyranny. Revolution is the last resort of an oppressed people, and firearms are primary tools of revolution. If our Government turned tyrannical tomorrow, armed Americans would surely try to do something about it. But not if they had no guns because a registration system had permitted the tyrant to find and confiscate them. Every modern dictator has disarmed his subjects that way.

This fear of confiscation, and the knowledge that a bureaucrat with the power to issue a permit will also have the power to deny one, are the big progun arguments against permits and registration, and legitimate ones. (It is ironic that, in the absence of a national registration system, a hypothetical tyrant—or invader—would probably use the membership files of the organizations most opposed to gun registration.)

Should we have a strong Federal law controlling the sale and registration of all firearms?

J. Edgar Hoover, though a leader in the fight to reduce availability of firearms, especially handguns, says no. He flatly asserts: "The numerous ramifications of gun control are so varied and complex that regulatory measures must be at State and local levels."

But Mr. Hoover goes on to say that "the public has a right to expect that the distributor and the purchaser of weapons, so readily and easily concealed as handguns, meet certain regulations and qualifications."

So the argument finally boils down to one of handgun control. Few, if any, of the responsible antigun people have any intention of taking away your deer rifle or duck gun, or of making you register it. Even New York has no restrictions on shoulder guns, which is why the Sullivan law has withstood hundreds of attacks on constitutional grounds.

Unfortunately, not all of the antigun people are either responsible or well informed. One well-meaning sociologist proposed that all guns should be kept in a public repository, and checked out like library books for specific purposes and periods. He also suggests that the gun owner be required to wear some distinctive article of clothing while going armed.

Some subversives work quietly with the antigun people toward their ideal—a disarmed or disarmable population unable to oppose their kind of revolution. They are most dangerous in that they are unidentified infiltrators in more well-meaning groups.

A few protectionists have taken the antigun side in the hope that closer gun control will reduce the hunting that they do not believe in. However, most informed protectionists are beginning to understand that legal, controlled hunting is not only desirable, but necessary, to the management of our wildlife community today.

Finally, this must be said: It is doubtful that a single one of the 300 new bills for gun

control could have prevented the assassination of President Kennedy. Secret Service agents agree privately, and reluctantly, that there is no sure way to stop a killer who will use a long gun or who is willing to trade his life for the life of his victim. The only way to keep the President safe would be to keep him constantly in a bulletproof, bombproof shelter. President Kennedy would have scoffed at such a suggestion, and President Johnson already has. Mental defectives, of course, should be given treatment, kept under surveillance, and denied firearms of any kind. But again, it is a case of regulating the person, not the gun.

Out of all these arguments on firearms problems and rights, these truths appear to us, and are our policy:

We believe laws should prohibit sale of firearms to felons, drug addicts, habitual drunkards, juveniles, and mental incompetents. We believe laws should invoke strict penalties against the possession of firearms by criminals and irresponsible persons. We believe laws should permit responsible, law-abiding adults to own and use firearms for legal purposes. We believe laws should not require law-abiding adult citizens to register shotguns and rifles (Federal statutes already require manufacturers and dealers to keep records on the sale of handguns, rifles, and shotguns). We believe laws should not grant authority to any jurisdiction, police or otherwise, at any government level, to prohibit the purchase or ownership of firearms by law-abiding and responsible citizens.

Statement by Meany on Vietnam Policy

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. WILLIAM G. BRAY

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 13, 1965

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Speaker, the following statement by George Meany, which appeared in the AFL-CIO News of April 17, 1965, reiterates organized labor's firm stand in opposition to aggression and effectively refutes those who call for peace at any price:

STATEMENT BY MEANY ON VIETNAM POLICY

In his address of April 7, President Johnson offered to open the door to unconditional discussions on the crisis in Vietnam. Those who have been urging our Government to appease the Communist aggressors against the Vietnamese people have seized upon the word "unconditional" to conclude that our country's policy toward the conflict in Vietnam is now being basically changed. They would interpret the President's address to mean that we are now ready to appease the aggressors.

Organized labor in our country has steadfastly opposed appeasement of all aggressors—Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and Khrushchev alike. In continuation of this policy we have time and again supported President Johnson's firm rejection of all proposals to appease the aggressors against the people of South Vietnam.

Fortunately, the course outlined by the President, the national aims spelled out in his address, his determination to help the South Vietnam people maintain their independence—all these clearly add up to anything but appeasement, anything but waver-ing or weakening in America's commitment to freedom for South Vietnam.

Those who strive and struggle for peace will be greatly encouraged by President Johnson once again making it clear to all

Communist aggressors that "we will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of meaningless agreement."

American labor welcomes President Johnson's reaffirmation of America's determination to achieve through diplomatic and economic as well as military measures "an independent South Vietnam securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationship to all others, free from outside interference."

This forceful reiteration of the basic aim of our Nation's policy in southeast Asia should eliminate all doubts as to American military action having any other objective than to provide a firm foundation for the peace, freedom, and economic development of this war-torn region.

We are confident that the people of North Vietnam, if permitted, would gladly accept President Johnson's proposal that they join with their neighbors in a great effort to improve their conditions of life and work rather than continue to suffer and sacrifice in a terrible military conflict which can never be of any advantage to them. Any rejection of this generous American offer can only aggravate their misery and suffering. This is the cruel fate which befell the people of the captive nations of Europe when their masters in Moscow prevented their benefiting from the Marshall plan aid.

The people of South Vietnam, Berlin, and every other area in the shadow or terror of Communist aggression can draw encouragement and strength from the President's timely assurance that the United States "will always oppose the effort of one nation to conquer another nation." We share the President's realization that this course must be pursued "because our own security is at stake."

We also welcome the President's emphasizing that "the central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied" and that, in Vietnam or in any other part of the world where our country bears an international responsibility, "we fight because we must fight, if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny. And only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure."

Wisconsin Senate Passed Resolution on Western District Judgeship

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 15, 1965

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent, I include Wisconsin Senate Resolution 18, relating to the vacancy in the Federal judgeship for the western district of Wisconsin, in the appendix of the Record at this point:

SENATE RESOLUTION 18

Resolution relating to the vacancy in the Federal judgeship for the western district of Wisconsin

Whereas except for a brief interim appointment, the Federal court for the western district of Wisconsin has been without a judge since January 13, 1963; and

Whereas this unreasonable delay deprives the citizens of the western district of Wisconsin of due process of law in the Federal courts; and

Whereas there are any number of qualified candidates for the position: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the senate, That President Lyndon B. Johnson is hereby advised of the concern of the citizens of Wisconsin over the vacancy in the western district of Wisconsin; and, be it further

Resolved, That the citizens of Wisconsin speaking through their elected representatives, the Wisconsin State Senate, urge President Johnson to fill the vacancy without further delay.

PATRICK CLUY,
President of the Senate,
WILLIAM P. NUGENT,
Chief Clerk of the Senate.

Historic School Bill

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 19, 1965

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Speaker, the historic Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 will benefit all Americans. It will also benefit our children and our children's children. I call to the attention of Members of the House the following editorial on this landmark legislation from a recent issue of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette:

HISTORIC SCHOOL BILL

Of all the legislation that has been enacted by Congress since Lyndon Johnson became President—and there has been a considerable body of it—none more plainly bears his personal imprint than the Federal aid-to-education bill which cleared the final legislative hurdle in the Senate last Friday.

As the first successful product of nearly 20 years of effort in Congress to provide broad Federal support for public schools, the new measure is a testimonial to the remarkable political generalship of Mr. Johnson. While passage of the bill was undoubtedly aided by the heavy Democratic majorities in both Houses, skilled leadership from the White House was clearly helpful in enabling the measure to weather House floor debate with only a minor revision and Senate floor debate with not a comma changed.

This demonstration of political virtuosity does not mean, however, that the legislation is without fault. Its various provisions for public aid to parochial school students raise important questions among sincere people as to whether the constitutional barrier between church and state is being breached. And the bill contains no clearcut method of getting these questions squarely before the Supreme Court. In order to avoid a paralyzing battle among proponents of various views, the language of the measure was intentionally made fuzzy—a technique which may give rise to additional problems, although the hope is that these may be met by amendments next year.

Whatever its shortcomings, the aid to education measure is of momentous social significance. Though it is aimed primarily at upgrading the education of children of low-income families, funds from the act will be channeled into an estimated 94 percent of the Nation's 26,000 school districts. Though the first year's \$1.3 billion authorization for building construction, teacher salaries, instructional materials, special education, and other projects, will amount to a fairly small fraction of the total annual outlay for public education, future Federal allocations are expected to rise, reaching \$2.4 billion a year by 1968. This infusion of Federal support can hardly fail to have an uplifting effect

on overcrowded and underequipped public educational facilities, not only directly raising their quality but hopefully also generating new support at local and State levels, from which the bulk of financing will still have to come.

Some inferences as to the role of Federal aid in Pennsylvania may be drawn by comparing the anticipated allocations under the new statute with present State and local school expenditures. Total public spending for elementary and secondary education in Pennsylvania now runs to more than \$900 million a year. About \$62 million in Federal aid statewide will be added to this. The Pittsburgh school district's annual budget is some \$40 million. Pittsburgh's share of Federal aid will be a roughly estimated \$3 million.

Since regulations for the distribution of funds under the new law have not yet been drawn, no one can yet say whether Federal dollars for schools in poverty-stricken areas will enable the Pittsburgh School District and others to readjust their budgets so as to spend more for other needs. But Pittsburgh Superintendent Sidney P. Marland hopes there will be an across-the-board gain for education. Pittsburgh schools need whatever help they can get to achieve their long-term objectives of (1) building 20 new schools under a 5-year \$50 million construction program, (2) hiring 600 new teachers to help reduce class sizes eventually to a desirable 25 or 27 pupils, (3) improving vocational and counseling services.

To the extent that the historic Federal aid statute can help Pittsburgh and other hard-pressed districts to achieve such goals, it will indeed be contributing to what President Johnson has visualized as the Great Society.

Opinion in the Capital

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. EDNA F. KELLY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 22, 1965

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Speaker, the night of Sunday, March 28, 1965, was a most noteworthy occasion.

On that night, the Honorable MARGARET CHASE SMITH gave a dinner party to a dear friend and colleague, Congresswoman FRANCES BOLTON.

I was so proud to have been included in this intimate group of family and friends. FRANCES is a most remarkable person and a valiant woman and I am happy to be privileged to insert in the Record the transcript of an interview between these two great public servants.

The interview follows:

OPINION IN THE CAPITAL

(Produced by Florence Lowe)

(A Metropolitan Television Broadcasting Production (WTTG, Washington, D.C.) March 28, 1965)

Guests: Senator MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Republican, of Maine, and Representative FRANCES BOLTON, Republican, of Ohio.

Reporter: Mark Evans, vice president in charge of public affairs for Metromedia, Inc.

This program will also be broadcast on:

TV: WNEW, New York, N.Y.; WTVF, Decatur, Ill.; WTVH, Peoria, Ill.; WTTG, Washington, D.C.; KTTV, Los Angeles, Calif.; KMBC, Kansas City, Mo.; Eastern Educational Network (13 stations).

Radio: WIP, Philadelphia, Pa.; WHK, Cleveland, Ohio; KMBC, Kansas City, Mo.;

WNEW, New York, N.Y.; Armed Forces Radio Network.

Mr. EVANS. In the 87th Congress, there were 20 women, 2 in the Senate and 18 in the House of Representatives. Now, in the 89th Congress, there are still 2 lady Senators, but only 10 women in the House of Representatives. Representative BOLTON, how do you account for this?

Mrs. BOLTON. Oh, the men.

Mr. EVANS. What's your opinion, Senator MARGARET CHASE SMITH?

Mrs. SMITH. Oh, I think one reason is, that there aren't enough qualified women who run for office.

Mr. EVANS. Metromedia's "Opinion in the Capital" is honoring Representative FRANCES BOLTON on her silver anniversary in the Congress of the United States. Senator MARGARET CHASE SMITH is our special guest to pay tribute to her long-time friend.

Representative BOLTON, I detected a little bit of sarcasm in there when you said the men are responsible for the lack of women.

Mrs. BOLTON. Well, you see what the men did. They gerrymandered various districts on the Democratic side. They didn't do that on our side.

Mr. EVANS. Did they gerrymander women out?

Mrs. BOLTON. They gerrymandered women out, which I thought was too bad * * * they were fine women.

Mrs. SMITH. But, where were the women while they were doing this?

Mrs. BOLTON. Well, they were only Democrats mind you, I wouldn't know just where they were.

Mr. EVANS. I think there should be a very fine distinction drawn here. There is a very great difference between politicians who are women and women in politics.

Mrs. BOLTON. Oh, that's interesting.

Mr. EVANS. I certainly think you are both women in politics. You're women first but I wonder why neither of you have ever married again.

Mrs. BOLTON. I thought one marriage was enough.

Mr. EVANS. Well, you had a very good one then?

Mrs. BOLTON. I had a very good one.

Mr. EVANS. Margaret, have you ever thought of this?

Mrs. SMITH. Yes, indeed, I thought of it very seriously, back along—I haven't lately, I've been too busy. I haven't had many offers.

Mr. EVANS. Well, I'm sure this may provoke some. Are there problems in this? Being in politics and leading this kind of life that would lead to another marriage?

Mrs. SMITH. I don't think there are too many problems. I don't know any reason why a woman couldn't be married and serve in public office as well as a man in public office being married. I think men and women work together, whichever way it is.

Mr. EVANS. Both of you came in, and this is probably a very cruel thing to say, but you both came in the back door of politics. Your husbands were in politics and you inherited the kingdom and have held them admirably since.

Mrs. BOLTON. But remember, we had to be elected to it.

Mr. EVANS. I know that, subsequently.

Mrs. BOLTON. That's not just inheriting it. Mr. EVANS. No, I agree, but originally you inherited it.

Mrs. BOLTON. Yes. No, oh no. We had to be elected.

Mr. EVANS. I thought you had to be appointed.

Mrs. BOLTON. No, no. No appointments in Ohio.

Mrs. SMITH. The Senate vacancies are filled by appointments in some States. But, the House is always by election, and we were both elected. I must say I think FRANCES had a tough election and campaign the first time. I'm sure that I did.

of scarcity the existing uses of Colorado River water in Arizona and in California to the extent of 4.4 million acre-feet would be given priority. Some people in California urged that my amendment terminate after 25 years. Their theory was that Congress would provide California with additional water within such a period of time. But that is a bad theory. Anyway, if Congress were to do so, no harm would result from my amendment. Contrarywise, if Congress failed to do so, only one State would suffer if the waters in the river diminished. Our water agencies objected to a 25-year guarantee. So did I. I suggested that it was like selling a man a life insurance policy which provided that the policy would lapse if the insured individual were to die.

The truth is that it is becoming increasingly difficult to enact giant water projects. And I must frankly say that there are people in Washington, in and out of Congress, who are somewhat averse to passing any legislation helpful to our State. They are blind to the fact that our State's population increases 600,000 a year. They pooh-pooh the fact that tens of thousands of our school children attend school only half days because of a lack of facilities.

At any rate, there is a growing danger of shortage in the river. Some day, and not too far in the future, the Pacific Southwest is going to require the importation of supplemental water from some surplus northern source in order to unshackle our otherwise inevitable future growth. And it is going to take the best exertions of all the States involved, and not just California, to enact the necessary Federal statutes. All the Colorado River States share this problem in varying degrees. And it will be far better, and the chances of legislative success will be far greater, if the States work together effectively rather than be ready to pounce at each other's throats.

Where there is a risk, common to two States or more, should not the risk be shared? If there is danger to two people or to two States, why should one alone face it. Should they not stand together to repel it? That is the position of your southern California water agencies, a position which I wholeheartedly accepted from the beginning.

Several weeks ago in Washington, Secretary of the Interior Udall called a meeting attended by Governor Brown, of California, Governor Goddard, of Arizona, Senators HAYDEN and FANNIN, of Arizona; and myself. My California colleague, Senator MURPHY, was unavoidably absent but his views and mine are the same, and I spoke for both of us. We discussed the obvious need for additional water supply to both our States. I am glad to say it was agreed that, at long last, Arizona and California should join forces as good comrades and friends, and that we should together seek the means by which to avoid a shortage of water in the river in the years and generations ahead. We generally recognized that existing uses of Colorado River water in both Arizona and California ought to receive protection over new uses which would come into existence, when, for example, the \$1 billion central Arizona project would be built, as we knew it must and should be built.

As a result of that meeting, legal representatives of those in attendance and of our water agencies met to draft a bill.

Here (I wish to pay tribute to a great water lawyer, Northcutt Ely, whose experience, whose skill, and whose indefatigable energy have been of enormous benefit to our cause. He has performed valiant service to our State. He was the leader in drafting the present bill, and his advice has been of immeasurable assistance to all of us who have labored to find a fair and equitable answer

to a long and bitter struggle. I must, too, give thanks to your own Bob Will whose fidelity to this cause has been constant, and whose help has been invaluable.

The guarantee to California of 4.4 million acre-feet of Colorado River water annually was written into the draft legislation. This proposed legislation recognizes the validity and the integrity of California's claim. It provides that if there is insufficient Colorado River water to supply 7.5 million acre-feet of consumptive use, divergence to the central Arizona project shall be reduced to the extent necessary to supply 4.4 million acre-feet of existing uses and decreased rights in California and to supply similar existing uses and rights in Arizona and Nevada as well. It further provides that this protection shall remain in force until the President proclaims that additional public works carry into the river, from an outside source, 2.5 million acre-feet of supplemental water.

Thus, this proposal gives to California a guarantee against new water demands which the central Arizona project will create. And when finally surplus waters in the north are transported thousands of miles into the Colorado River main stream, by a new repayable multibillion-dollar Federal undertaking, California's future requirements, far in excess of 4.4, will be met by the Colorado River and by the supplemental waters which will be poured into this selfsame stream.

On February 8, I introduced this legislation for myself and Senator MURPHY. It was subsequently introduced by all 3 Arizona Representatives and by 33 of California's 38 Representatives. The two Governors have publicly endorsed it. Senator HAYDEN has stated that he will support it as has Senator FANNIN as well. They have not, however, placed their names on the bill as co-authors, though as I say their Governor has endorsed it, and their Arizona colleagues have all introduced the same bill.

A few days ago Senator HAYDEN Governor Goddard and I met with President Johnson. The President indicated an interest in approving my bill. He instructed his staff to confer with the Budget Bureau and the Secretary of the Interior to discuss the economics of the legislation, relative to the Bureau's report which must be made. I venture to hope that the executive branch will sanction this undertaking. If that is done, I think the Representatives in the Congress of all the Basin States may well give their approval. We will need all the help we can get.

The construction of the central Arizona project will be the first in a series of authorizations which finally will bring new water into the mainstream of the lower basin. Scarcity would be avoided and the apprehensions of the Upper Basin States would be allayed. Our obligation to Mexico would be fulfilled, and all the States along the river could far better plan for their future water needs.

I think the agreement of our two States is a happy and auspicious development. We can now work together for the good of both. All the imprecations and bitterness of bygone years may now be swept away. As good neighbors, Arizona and California can work for the development and progress of both our people, and a brighter light will shine upon our future. We may look forward with considerable assurance to an increasing, rather than a dwindling, water supply. The magnet which has drawn, and is drawing, millions of people to this corner of the continent, does not seem to be losing its power. If we can solve the problem of an adequate water supply, then the 40 million Californians, who will call this State their home in the year 2000, will fulfill the hopes and dreams we proudly and fondly have for the future of our State.

NEGOTIATIONS TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL, JUST, AND HONORABLE SETTLEMENT IN VIETNAM

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, few Senators, and few people of the United States have as full an understanding of foreign affairs and how to get along with the people of other countries as has the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER]. Therefore, I believe it is particularly appropriate at this time to have printed in the Record an editorial which was published in the Gleaner-Journal, of Henderson, Ky., on Friday, April 9, 1965. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SENATOR COOPER'S TIMELY ADDRESS

On March 25, Kentucky's JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, in a speech before the Senate, asked President Johnson to make it clear that our Government was willing to enter into negotiations to bring about a peaceful, just, and honorable settlement in Vietnam.

On April 7, a little more than 2 weeks later, President Johnson has followed up on Senator Cooper's request. The President said in a televised speech Wednesday night that the United States is ready to begin, without prior conditions, diplomatic discussions to end the war in Vietnam.

Though the President said that our Government has been willing to conduct such negotiations before, he has never said this publicly.

Previously, as Senator Cooper pointed out, the United States has imposed certain conditions before any negotiations could be started. The Communist Chinese and the North Vietnamese said that the United States would have to pull out of Vietnam before negotiations could begin. Quite naturally, our Government cannot agree to any such notion. But the United States imposed its own condition, namely, that the intervention and aggression of North Vietnam must cease before negotiations start.

Senator Cooper noted that in this atmosphere, both sides were seeking "a kind of unconditional surrender. I believe it more reasonable to say that we are prepared to enter into true negotiations."

Recalling events leading up to the ceasefire in Korea, Cooper noted that neither side in that conflict imposed previous conditions prior to the negotiations.

"Through negotiations, the effort was made to attain the objectives that we still seek today," said Cooper.

Every American ought to realize that the United States can never accept the conditions now imposed by the Communists . . . and it is reasonable to say that they will not accept ours. There is no evidence that the Communists are willing to negotiate at all or that they will agree to any settlement which would end their support of the so-called war of national liberation which they have initiated," said Cooper.

But a formal announcement by the President that the United States is willing to negotiate without prior conditions would clear the air. President Johnson has now made such an announcement.

The Gleaner-Journal commends Senator Cooper for his very timely speech in the Senate. There is no doubt that the speech had a beneficial effect on U.S. policy.

Kentuckians can be grateful that Senator Cooper is on the alert in following foreign relations policy. His remarks triggered wide comment. The fact that our Government has altered its course is indicative of the importance of Cooper's speech.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S RECENT VISIT TO MIDWEST HEARTENED CITIZENS OF OHIO

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, on April 14 President Johnson personally visited the tornado-ravaged sections of Ohio and neighboring States. Our President again demonstrated his deep concern over the problems faced by citizens in distress. It was not satisfactory to Lyndon Johnson to receive factual reports of the sad loss of life and of damage caused by this disaster. He had to see firsthand the havoc and misery resulting from this tragedy.

Almost immediately help was forthcoming from many agencies of the Federal Government. The Farmers Home Administration made available loans for farmers in this area unable to obtain assistance from other sources. Officials of the Small Business Administration set up disaster loan offices for businessmen and homeowners in all of the stricken areas. Officials of the Office of Emergency Planning established a disaster field office to facilitate that agency's role in supplementing State and local emergency efforts. The President's visit did much to hearten and encourage families who suffered great hardship as a result of the tornado.

Mr. President, upon his arrival at Toledo on April 14 and before his departure from that city on the same day, President Johnson made two brief speeches. They both express clearly our President's real and sincere concern in the welfare of all Americans. I ask unanimous consent that his remarks be printed at this point in the RECORD as part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT ON ARRIVAL AT TOLEDO, OHIO

I am delighted to be here this afternoon with Governor Rhodes, Congressmen ASHLEY, SWEENEY, FEIGHAN, VANIK, LOVE, BOW, and MOSHER.

I have visited today in three States. I have flown across and observed from the air six States. All these States were struck by the tragedies of this past weekend.

I have come here this afternoon to Toledo to see firsthand, to look for myself at the extensive damages caused and to meet with your public officials to plan with them the support and the action that the Federal Government can take in assisting your city and your citizens to meet the challenge which has been inflicted so cruelly and so unexpectedly.

No words of ours would be adequate to express the sympathy and compassion of the entire Nation for those who have suffered the loss of loved ones or injuries to members of their families. So I want each of you to know that we share with you the heavy-heartedness that I know weighs upon you now.

It is an American characteristic to be concerned not about self alone but about the fate and the fortune of your neighbors and your friends under circumstances such as these. It is also an American characteristic for those who have suffered hardship and tragedies to turn quickly and hopefully to the task of reconstruction.

Wherever we have gone throughout this long, long day I have seen that spirit and I have seen it in Americans and it is strong and it is sure.

I would like to express to you my personal

concern as evidenced by my presence here and my condolences. I would also, as your President, like to pledge to you the full cooperation and support of your Government in working with your State and with your local officials to help overcome the losses that so many of you have suffered.

Governor Rhodes was in contact with us yesterday. We told him then that the full facilities and power of the Federal Government were at your disposal. We will be here today to take a firsthand look. We hope by the time we get back to Washington tonight we can have plans in the offing to relieve as much misery as possible and to begin our task of rebuilding.

Unfortunately throughout the years we suffer from these disasters, and we can't help that, but once we have them we can do something about it. That is what I have come here to do.

Thank you very much.

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT ON DEPARTURE FROM TOLEDO, OHIO

Governor Rhodes, Members of Congress, public officials, my dear friends in Ohio, for many years I have been coming to this wonderful State and meeting its fine citizens. I always enjoy learning that I am scheduled to be here, and I always hate to leave. But for myself and all the people that traveled with me from Washington, this has been a day of both heartsickness and hopefulness.

We have much to be thankful for. Each of us don't know how lucky we are until we see what has happened to our neighbors through no fault of their own.

From the air and on the ground today we have seen destruction and desolation the kind of which I have never seen before in all of my life. It is of the very worst degree. When you think of the lives that are lost, the lives that have been changed, the lives which will forever bear the memory of this sad Sunday, when you look at the little boys with the holes in the top of their head, the mothers' homes that were there yesterday and now are gone they know not where, it is enough to bring tears to the eyes of anyone.

Yet, we have seen very few tears in these six States that we have visited today. At the very worst of the stricken neighborhoods we have seen the young, we have seen the old standing there shoulder-to-shoulder planning hopefully for tomorrow.

Well, that is the purpose of our mission—to come here to personally extend our sympathy and our condolence, to try to learn and understand about what has happened, and then try to do something.

There are talkers and there are doers, and there are people who believe in action, and there are people who put it on the back burner. But we want to be certain that everything is done as rapidly and as effectively as it can be done. We want to rebuild for tomorrow.

In a situation such as this, it is the role of the Federal Government to assist the States; for the President to work with the Governor; for the Governor to work with the mayors, and all of us to work together. While there are limits to what we can do, I want to pledge this afternoon to every citizen, to every community afflicted by the tornadoes or the floods, that your Government, and your President, will do everything conceivably possible to be of assistance under our laws.

Before I leave, I want to congratulate especially the Governors, the mayors, and the local officials that we have talked to in these areas. Each of them are tremendously concerned and want to do all they can. You have one of the finest delegations in the Congress, and each of those men are here with me today and are going back to roll up their sleeves and try to redo what was undone only yesterday and the day before.

I am pleased by the ready, willing understanding, and the cooperation which exists

between the Federal Government and the State of Ohio, between the Federal Government and the local governments. Everywhere I have gone I have heard the very highest praise for the performance of the National Guard, and the highway patrol, the State police, the local law-enforcement officers, as well as the Red Cross. I want to express my personal appreciation to each citizen who is giving much of himself to be helpful and useful to his neighbors and his community in these times of need. This is really America at its finest and at its best.

I remember back when I was a youngster growing up. When adversity would overtake my family we would all pull a little bit closer together and try to be sorry for the things we said just the day before about each other—our brothers and our sisters, and maybe our fathers and our mothers. So, in this hour of adversity we are not concerned with titles or positions, we are not concerned with parties or politics. We are concerned with the country that we all love so much.

As I speak here men are manning their stations 10,000 miles from here in order to protect the freedom that we enjoy here. And I hope that when we get ready to turn out the light tonight each of us will say a prayer for them, and also for these poor people who have suffered these great losses, suffered them with their chins up and their chests out, and who are ready to roll up their sleeves tomorrow when we build what has been taken from them.

This has been a sad experience for me today. It has been a long one that began at 5:30 this morning. I am due to report to 33 Senators at 6 o'clock in Washington this evening. And I am going to report to them on what is happening in Vietnam and what is happening out here in the heartland of America. I am so proud that I am privileged to live in a country and to lead a country like the United States, and one of the really best parts of that country is the State of Ohio and you people that live here.

Thank you so much.

AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO THE SUCCESSION OF THE PRESIDENCY AND VICE PRESIDENCY

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I ask that the Chair lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives amending Senate Joint Resolution 1, proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to the succession of the Presidency and Vice Presidency and to cases where the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the amendment of the House of Representatives to the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 1) proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency and Vice Presidency and to cases where the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office which was, to strike out all after the resolving clause and insert:

That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:

"ARTICLE —

"SECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President will become President.

April 22, 1966.

"Sec. 2. Wherever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

"Sec. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.

"Sec. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments, or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

"Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments, or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within two days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within ten days after the receipt of the written declaration of the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments, or such other body as Congress may by law provide, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office."

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, on April 13, 1965, the House of Representatives passed the above-mentioned joint resolution with amendments. Because of the substantial changes made, I move that the Senate disagree to the amendments of the House of Representatives, that a conference be requested, and that the Chair appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. BAYH, Mr. EASTLAND, Mr. ERVIN, Mr. DIRKSEN, and Mr. HRUSKA conferees on the part of the Senate.

RESOLUTION OF THE DALLAS GUN CLUB CONCERNING PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL FIREARMS ACT

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the board of directors of the Dallas Gun Club recently adopted a resolution concerning proposed amendments to the Federal Firearms Act. In order that other Senators may share the views of this distinguished club, I ask that the resolution be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Whereas Senate bill 1592 has been presented to Congress containing proposed amendments to the Federal Firearms Act; and

Whereas Senate bill 1592 can in no way accomplish its purpose of the suppression of crime in the United States, but contains provisions which will abridge and encumber the right of law-abiding free people to own and bear arms; and

Whereas such attempted legislation can lead to a further attempt to disarm the law-abiding gun-owning public and hamper their ability of self protection: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Dallas Gun Club be recorded as opposed to the passage of Senate bill 1592 and be further recorded as demanding a public hearing on said bill.

RESOLUTION OF THE SAN ANTONIO HOMEBUILDERS ASSOCIATION CONCERNING H.R. 6363

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the San Antonio Homebuilders Association recently passed a strong and thoughtful resolution concerning H.R. 6363. I commend to the Senate the views of the association upon the most pressing matter involved in this bill, and I ask that the association's resolution be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Whereas the board of directors of the San Antonio Homebuilders Association supports the principal purpose of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, namely, to foster peaceful relationships between labor and management throughout the Nation, including the homebuilding and construction industry; and

Whereas legislation (H.R. 6363) has been introduced for consideration by the 89th Congress which would change this law to permit a union within the industry to apply coercive picket and strike pressures against neutral employees and employers performing work at a construction site where such union has a primary labor dispute with another employer; and

Whereas secondary strike or boycott pressure against neutral and innocent employees and employers by such unions in the industry was outlawed by the Congress under this law in 1947, and reaffirmed in 1959 by passage of the Landrum-Griffin labor reform law, to protect and insulate such neutral parties from being injured through irresponsible and damaging acts of such unions; and

Whereas picketing and strike coercion by construction unions against such neutral and innocent employees and employers not involved in the primary labor disputes will result in loss of employment by such employees and direct harm to the business of the neutral employer and cause increased home building and construction costs to the American home buyer and the Federal Government; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the board of directors of the San Antonio Homebuilders Association urges Hon. RALPH W. YARBOROUGH and Hon. JOHN TOWER, U.S. Senators, and Hon. HENRY B. GONZALEZ, House of Representatives, 20th District, Texas, to oppose vigorously H.R. 6363 and similar bills which would make any change in the National Labor Relations Act's ban against secondary boycott strike and picketing by unions in the construction industry as destructive to the basic purpose of this law, contrary to the general public welfare and as harmful special interest legislation.

Adopted this 6th day of April 1965, by the

board of directors of the San Antonio Homebuilders Association.

LLOYD W. BOOTH,
President.

Attest:

CARL E. NIEMEYER,
Secretary.

RESOLUTION OF RETIREES OF THE MONSANTO CO. CONCERNING MEDICAL CARE LEGISLATION

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, retirees of the Monsanto Co. at Texas City, Tex., recently unanimously adopted a succinct and thoughtful resolution concerning medical care legislation. In order that other Senators may share the convictions of these Monsanto Texas City alumni, I ask that the resolution be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Be it resolved, That we, the retirees of Monsanto Co. at Texas City, Tex., are unalterably opposed to the medicare bill as presently written or any other bill that provides for:

1. Financing through increased social security tax of a compulsory nature.
2. Benefits limited primarily to hospital costs to the exclusion of other major medical expenses, such as—doctor's fees, drug fees (outside of hospitals), etc.
3. Coverage of everyone 65 and over regardless of their financial status.

Furthermore, that Texas Congressmen be urgently requested to vote against the medicare bill or any other bills which includes the provisions of this resolution.

Respectfully submitted.

M. D. VARNADORE,
President,
Monsanto Texas City Alumni.

TEXAS CITY, TEX.

RESOLUTION OF THE McLENNAN COUNTY, TEX., CENTRAL LABOR COUNCIL CONCERNING VOTING RIGHTS

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the McLennan County, Tex., Central Labor Council recently passed a most succinct and thoughtful resolution concerning the protection of voting rights. I support the council's determination that no American be denied the right to vote because of discrimination, and I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be printed at this point in the Record so that other Senators may review it.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

RESOLUTION TO PROTECT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Whereas organized labor's struggle for freedom was much like the present day struggle of Negroes for freedom; and

Whereas by the events these past few days we have seen a basic freedom denied; and

Whereas if the right to vote can be denied, the right to picket an employer while on strike can also be denied; and

Whereas the President of the United States made a speech Monday night and introduced legislation that would protect the right to register to vote: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the McLennan County COPE, AFL-CIO, let it be known that we favor legislation that would protect this freedom; and be it further

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esolved, That we favor quick passage of legislation.
Passed Wednesday night, March 17, 1965.)

THE CRISIS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, every day celebrates the crisis in South Vietnam. The problems that confront the President are indeed difficult of solution. The vice that he is receiving from various sources is conflicting.

We must all give the President our support in the most difficult decisions which confront him. My personal view in accord with that expressed by my distinguished colleague and seatmate, the senior Senator from Idaho [Mr. HURCH].

I ask unanimous consent that a closely reasoned and extremely able article entitled "We Should Negotiate a Settlement in Vietnam," written by Senator CHURCH, and published in the April 24 issue of the Saturday Evening Post, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WE SHOULD NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT IN VIETNAM

(By Senator FRANK CHURCH)

Our struggle in South Vietnam has reached a point where neither side can achieve a conclusive military decision, and the only visible prospect for a solution is to be found at the conference table. But there is so much Washington talk about stepping up the war that it threatens to engulf all rational discussion of the crisis we face—as if peace was something to be avoided.

The war hawks are putting on the heat. Anyone who disagrees with them is accused of "running up a white flag." Debate is discouraged; dissent is condemned as endangering the country. Any talk of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam is equated with Munich; any prospect of an eventual American withdrawal is likened to Dunkirk.

Yet everyone senses that peace in Vietnam can only be restored through a political settlement, and that the United States neither wishes nor expects to keep a foothold in southeast Asia. Accordingly, I believe we should try to break the diplomatic deadlock ("First you withdraw, then we will talk") that finds both sides, in effect, demanding the surrender of the other as the price for negotiations. I disagree with the prevailing doctrine that now is not the time to parley. The longer we wait, the harder it will become to achieve a satisfactory solution.

Opposing any negotiations, the war hawks contend that we Americans must first have it out with the Communists in Vietnam. They see the struggle there, which has thus far been mostly confined to the Vietnamese, as one of suddenly portentous importance. Hanson Baldwin, military editor for the New York Times, declares that we should ready ourselves to send a million Americans into battle. He writes: "We must fight a war to prevent an irreparable defeat. Vietnam is a nasty place to fight. But there is no good place to die. And it is far better to fight in Vietnam—on China's doorstep—than fight some years hence in Hawaii, on our own frontiers."

Such trumpetings substitute sound for sanity. We may have invested prestige in Vietnam, but by no stretch of imagination does this struggle threaten the life of our country.

We conquered the Pacific in the Second World War. It is our moat, the broadest on earth, from the Golden Gate to the very

shores of China. With unchallenged naval and aerial supremacy we dominate it, patrol it, and defend it. There is no way for the landlocked forces of Asia to drive us from the Pacific. The elephant cannot drive the whale from the sea, nor the eagle from the sky. Our presence in the Far East is not anchored to Vietnam.

I believe that the containment of a hostile China is a proper goal for American policy. To avoid Chinese conquest of her neighbors, we fought in Korea, and we have solemnly pledged ourselves to defend Taiwan. The weakness of the Chinese-expansion argument, as it relates to Vietnam, is that China has thus far displayed no wish to invade southeast Asia. To date, Chinese troops have not been fighting in Vietnam. Moreover, China hasn't yet moved a cadre of "advisers" into North Vietnam that begins to compare, in numbers of men or in the amount of aid given, to the American presence in the south. The best way to keep China out of Vietnam is to settle the war there. An escalation of the war northward, if it continues unabated, is the most likely way to draw Chinese armies down, thus creating the very calamity our policy should be designed to avert.

However, a new definition of containment has emerged to justify the deepening involvement of the United States in the fighting in southeast Asia. Our presence there, it is said, is not to furnish a shield against an anticipated Chinese invasion, but rather to counteract the spread of Chinese influence. If this is our purpose, it is a vain one indeed.

China is the giant of Asia, unshackled and determined to reclaim her prerogatives as the dominant power of the mainland. In the natural course of events, we can no more expect to deny China her influence in southeast Asia, the region immediately beneath her, than China could expect to deny the United States our influence in Central America.

No outpost bristling with bayonets—least of all one held in South Vietnam by American occupation forces—is going to stem the spread of Chinese influence in Asia. If we cannot live in a world where the Chinese exert influence in Indochina, then we had better forget Vietnam and commence now to destroy and dismember China, something no other nation in history has ever managed to do.

But since the conquest of China is not an American ambition, we should stop fooling ourselves with talk that our involvement in Vietnam can somehow bring an end to the spread of Chinese influence in Asia. In fact, the evidence is just the other way around. Because of the extent of our intervention in South Vietnam, the Peiping Government is able to pose as the champion of Asia for the Asians, defying the United States in the name of resisting the return of Western imperialism. Chou En-lai had reason to rub his hands with glee when he said recently to a foreign visitor: "Once we worried about southeast Asia. We don't anymore. The Americans are rapidly solving our problems for us."

Although we cannot immunize southeast Asia from Chinese influence, the restoration of peace to this war-weary region offers the little countries of Indochina their best hope for remaining independent. They would, of necessity, establish friendly ties with China, staying scrupulously neutral and unaligned, but they need not become the vassal states that a spreading war, drawing Chinese armies in, would surely make them. This even applies to North Vietnam, where nationalist feeling against China is deep, and where Ho Chi Minh does not yet take his orders from Peiping. Clearly, if we seek to restrict Chinese hegemony in southeast Asia, a settlement in Vietnam is essential.

Those who urge the contrary course—a

Korean-type war in Indochina—often argue that South Vietnam has become the testing ground of a new and vicious form of Communist aggression, the guerrilla war. They contend that the Vietcong rebels, though perhaps not the pawns of Peiping, are at least the agents of Hanoi; that indirect aggression by infiltration is being practiced by the North against the South; and that we Americans must see to it that the guerrillas are driven out, or such wars of subversion will spread.

I grant this seems a compelling argument, but it won't stand up under close analysis. Communist guerrilla wars didn't begin in Vietnam and won't end there, regardless of the outcome of this particular struggle. American muscle, sufficiently used, may hold the 17th parallel against infiltrators from the North, but our bayonets will not stop—they could even spread—Communist agitation within other Asian countries. A government may be checked by force, but not an idea. There is no way to fence off an ideology.

Indeed, Communist-inspired guerrilla wars have always jumped over boundary lines. They have erupted in scattered, far-flung places around the globe, wherever adverse conditions within a given country permit Communist subversion to take root. The threatened governments put down such guerrilla uprisings in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, and Greece. The decision for Saigon hangs in the balance.

This is a time of ferment. Some of these guerrilla revolts will succeed; others will fail. The outcome, in each case, will depend upon the character of the government challenged, and the willingness of the people to rally behind it. That some governments won't prove equal to the test is no reason for us to panic. The other governments in southeast Asia are not so many dominoes in a row. They differ, one from another, in popular support and in capacity to resist Communist subversion. We all hope Saigon will prevail, but the argument that "as goes South Vietnam, so goes all of southeast Asia," is predicated more upon fear than fact. Communism isn't going to take over the world; it is much too poor a system for that.

Whether Saigon can meet the test remains to be seen. Until now, it has been losing its war, not for lack of arms, but for lack of internal cohesion. The Vietcong grow stronger, not because they are better supplied but because they are united in their will to fight. This spirit cannot be imported from without. The weakness in South Vietnam emanates from Saigon itself, where we, as foreigners, are powerless to pacify the spoiling factions. Only the Vietnamese can furnish a solution.

This brings us back to the central question: Why did we intervene in South Vietnam? President Eisenhower, who committed us there, expressed the reason, and his successors, Kennedy and Johnson, have faithfully repeated it. We went in, upon the invitation of Saigon (10 governments ago), to give aid and advice to the Vietnamese who were fighting the Vietcong rebels. We can give arms, money, food, training, and equipment, which is all we committed ourselves to do, but we cannot, as a foreign nation, win the war. Ultimately, a civil war has to be decided by the people of the country concerned.

We only deceive ourselves when we pretend that the struggle in Vietnam is not a civil war. The two parts of Vietnam don't represent two different peoples, with separate identities. Vietnam is a partitioned country in the grip of a continuing revolution. That the Government of North Vietnam has deeply involved itself in support, or even direction, of the rebellion in the south doesn't make the war any less a civil war. The fighting is still between Vietnamese. The issue is still that of determining what

groups of Vietnamese shall govern the country.

It is true, of course, that foreign powers are interested in the outcome of this struggle, China favoring Hanoi, the United States backing Saigon. But, again, the involvement of outside countries, even when it takes the form of limited intervention, doesn't change the essential character of the war.

With the war in Vietnam at a point where neither side can achieve a conclusive military decision, some kind of political settlement has to be worked out. I cannot furnish a precise blueprint for a peaceful settlement. No one can at this point. But I can indicate, in general terms, a form of settlement that lies in that middle ground that both sides must seek out if a negotiated settlement is to be reached. The timing of any settlement must, of course, be left to the President. He alone can know whether or when Hanoi appears willing to bargain.

As for the United States, we can always deal at the conference table from a strength that rests not upon the softness of Saigon but upon our own possession of the sea and air. Therefore I believe we must demonstrate that we cannot be driven out of Indochina, and that we won't bow to a Communist-dictated peace. Our recent bombings should make it clear to Hanoi that we will not quit under fire, or withdraw or submit to coercion.

At the same time we should make it equally clear that we are prepared to negotiate on honorable terms. The judicious use of both the arrows and the olive branch, clutched by the American eagle in the Presidential seal, represents our best hope for avoiding a Korean-type war on the Asian mainland. We should indicate our willingness to interpose a neutral buffer zone in Indochina, consisting of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. Such a zone need not create a power vacuum for Chinese armies to fill. This is a more likely result, in the absence of such an agreement, of an expanded war. The integrity of the neutralized region against invasion from without could be guaranteed by the signatories to the agreement. Thus the military might of the United States would remain a deterrent to Chinese encroachment from the north, which is—or ought to be—our primary purpose in southeast Asia anyway. During its transitional phase such an agreement could be policed by special forces of an international commission, set up to preside over a cease-fire while political arrangements are worked out by the people of each country.

Admittedly, this involves the unavoidable risk that pro-Communist elements may come to prevail, but the war itself—which sees Western forces increasingly pitted against Asians—has become the breeding ground of steadily growing political support for the Communist cause. As Prince Sihanouk, Cambodia's royalist ruler, has pointed out, the risk of Communist ascendancy after a settlement grows larger every day the war is prolonged. If this estimate is correct, and there is mounting evidence to support it, then the time to negotiate is now, while the anti-Communist elements in Indochina still possess authority.

Now is the time, while the jungles and rice fields still belong to the Vietnamese, to strive for an end to the war. Hanoi has reason to bargain, for she covets her independence and has cause to fear China. The same holds true for Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. Even the Soviet Union has incentive to work for a settlement that will foreclose a Chinese occupation of southeast Asia. These propitious conditions, all of which work in our favor, are likely to be the first casualties of a widening war.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I find myself also in agreement with the over-

all strategic position with respect to our foreign policy that is outlined from time to time by the distinguished columnist, Walter Lippmann.

I ask unanimous consent that a column printed this morning in the Washington Post entitled "The Falling Dominoes," and an excellent article published in the April 26 issue of Newsweek magazine, entitled "The Test in Vietnam," both articles being by Mr. Lippmann, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Apr. 22, 1965]

THE FALLING DOMINOES
(By Walter Lippmann)

Why is it, it is time to ask, that our position in Asia has declined so sharply though we are widening and intensifying the war in Vietnam?

According to the so-called domino theory, the United States would lose the respect and support of the peoples of Asia if, in confronting Chinese communism, it showed itself to be a paper tiger and refrained from military action. For 3 months, since February, we have applied this theory ever more vigorously. And what are the results? Quite contrary to what was predicted: Today the United States is not only isolated but increasingly opposed by every major power in Asia.

With the exception of Japan, which has a government but not a people who support our policy, all the Asian powers are against us on this issue, not only China and Indonesia, but the Soviet Union, India, and Pakistan. The crucial fact is that although the Asian powers are by no means at peace with one another, what they do have in common is an increasingly vociferous opposition to the escalated war we have been waging since February. India and Pakistan, India and China, China and the Soviet Union are quarreling to the point of war with one another. But they are united in condemning our February war.

The administration should put this fact in its pipe and smoke it. It should ponder the fact that there exists such general Asian opposition to our war in Asia. The President's advisers can take some comfort, but mighty little, from the fact that allied with us is the Thailand Government in Bangkok, which is independent though weak, the government in Seoul, which we subsidize, the government in Taipei, which we protect, the government in Saigon, which governs something less than half of South Vietnam. Pondering the matter, we must, alas, put into the other scale the ominous, rising anti-Americanism in the Philippines.

The dominoes are indeed falling, and they are falling away from us.

What is the root of all this swelling anti-Americanism among the Asians? It is that they regard our war in Vietnam as a war by a rich, powerful, white, Western nation against a weak and poor Asian nation, a war by white men from the West against nonwhite men in Asia. We can talk until the cows come home about how we are fighting for the freedom of the South Vietnamese. But to the Asian peoples it is obviously and primarily an American war against an Asian people.

In my view the President is in grave trouble. He is in grave trouble because he has not taken to heart the historic fact that the role of the Western white man as a ruler in Asia was ended forever in the Second World War. Against the Japanese the Western white powers were unable to defend their colonies and protectorates in Asia. That put an end to the white man's domination

in Asia which had begun in the 15th century.

Since, then, despite our ultimate victory over the Japanese Empire, the paramount rule has been that Asians will have to be ruled by Asians, and that the Western powers can never work out a new relationship with the Asian peoples except as it finds a basis of political equality and an intervention on which economic and cultural exchanges can develop.

This great historic fact is an exceedingly difficult one for many Westerners to digest and accept. It is as hard for them to accept this new relationship with Asia as it is many a southerner in this country to accept the desegregation of schools and public accommodations. The Asia hands who instinctively think of Asia in prewar terms are haunted by Rudyard Kipling and the white man's burden and the assumption that east of Suez are the lesser breeds without the law.

Until we purge ourselves of these old preconceptions and prejudices, we shall not be able to deal with Asian problems, and we shall find ourselves, as we are today in Vietnam, in what the German poet described as the unending pursuit of the ever-fleeting object of desire. We shall find ourselves widely rejected by the very people we are professing to save.

Until this purge takes place, we shall go on drifting into trouble. For us the problem in Asia is primarily a problem in our understanding of historic reality. In our view of Asia there will have to be a fundamental change akin to the illumination which has come so recently here at home, that the American Negro must become a full, not a second-class citizen.

The day will come when the same kind of illumination of the facts of life is granted to the makers of our policy in Asia.

[From Newsweek magazine, Apr. 26, 1965]

THE TEST IN VIETNAM

(By Walter Lippmann)

The President's Baltimore address on Vietnam marked a certain change in our official policy. For the first time he offered to engage in discussions with Hanoi without reserving the right to refuse discussions unless certain conditions (which were not specifically stated) were met first.

Although this opened the door a little for discussions, there is no reason to expect a diplomatic settlement of the Vietnamese war in the near future. For the time being the outcome in Vietnam is being determined by the course of the war itself, and there is no disposition as yet on either side to avoid a military showdown.

The scene of the showdown has been and, it seems certain, will continue to be in South Vietnam. It will be a showdown between the government in Saigon which we are supporting and the Vietcong which Hanoi is supporting. The issue hangs in whether there can be a government in Saigon which is able to subdue the Vietcong rebellion, pacify the countryside, and get itself accepted by the preponderant mass of the people in the greater part of South Vietnam. There is now no such government in Saigon. As a matter of fact, the Saigon government is in a critical position, having lost control of a large part of the countryside by day, of an even larger part at night.

The United States has been committed, and never more strongly than by the President at Baltimore, to reversing the military trend in South Vietnam. The President has undertaken to make the Saigon government, which is near to defeat and collapse, into the victor in the civil war. This will take a lot of doing, but the administration has decided that it will be possible to defeat the Vietcong in South Vietnam if it is deprived, as the President put it, "of the trained men and

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supplies, orders and arms," which flow in a constant stream from north to south. This support is the heartbeat of the war."

THE OFFICIAL THEORY

This is the basis of the policy adopted in early February, of putting increasing pressure on North Vietnam by bombings which creep nearer and nearer to the highly populated and industrialized centers around Hanoi and Haiphong. The official theory is that by these bombings we can deter Hanoi from supporting the civil war in the south and even force Hanoi to force the Vietcong to ask for peace, especially since we are offering an attractive economic future if they do this. We hope also that the bombings in the north will inspire and enable the Saigon government to rally the people and to win the war.

We are now embarked on a crucial test of this theory. Can the Saigon government win the civil war while we attack the Hanoi government? The outcome of this test depends in the first place on whether the government in Saigon can acquire the military morale and muster the national support to put down the rebellion. It depends in the second place on whether our bombing can hurt or frighten the North Vietnamese sufficiently to cause them to stop supporting the Vietcong rebellion and, indeed, to tell the Vietcong to desist. The official policy assumes that they will do that when they are hurt more than they can endure. Looking at it in a coldblooded way, this is a test of a military theory. For my part, I am inclined to think that Hanoi will endure all the punishment that we dare to inflict.

BOMBING CAN'T WIN

I am assuming that we dare not and will not devastate the cities of North Vietnam and kill great masses of their people. I am assuming that we shall not do this because we are too civilized, and also because the reaction to such cruelty would be incalculable in every continent.

The relatively moderate punishment we are inflicting we shall probably continue to inflict. I believe it will not force the North Vietnamese to their knees. They are, we must remember, a country of peasants. Their industries are comparatively primitive, and their capacity to do without the products of their industries is quite different from that, let us say, of a well-to-do, middle-class American community in an affluent suburb. Provided they get some food, which they can from China, they are not likely to quit and to do what we might want because their powerplants and bridges and factories are demolished. What they are likely to do if we make the north increasingly uninhabitable is to go south into South Vietnam.

So, experience may show that our official theory of the war is unworkable. If it does, we shall have to do what we have already done several times in the course of our entanglement in southeast Asia. We shall have to change our minds. This is always a painful process, especially in a big, proud country. But it may have to be done, and it will be done best if we keep the problem open to free and resolute public debate.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that another closely reasoned article which appeared in the New York Times Magazine of April 18, 1965, by the distinguished political scientist, Hans J. Morgenthau, entitled "We Are Deluding Ourselves in Vietnam," be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WE ARE DELUDING OURSELVES IN VIETNAM
(By Hans J. Morgenthau)

The address which President Johnson delivered on April 7 at Johns Hopkins University is important for two reasons. On the one hand, the President has shown for the first time a way out of the impasse in which we find ourselves in Vietnam. By agreeing to negotiations without preconditions he has opened the door to negotiations which those preconditions had made impossible from the outset.

By proposing a project for the economic development of southeast Asia—with North Vietnam a beneficiary and the Soviet Union a supporter—he has implicitly recognized the variety of national interests in the Communist world and the need for varied American responses tailored to those interests. By asking "that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way," he has left all possibilities open for the future evolution of relations between North and South Vietnam.

On the other hand, the President reiterated the intellectual assumptions and policy proposals which brought us to an impasse and which make it impossible to extricate ourselves. The President has linked our involvement in Vietnam with our war of independence and has proclaimed the freedom of all nations as the goal of our foreign policy. He has started from the assumption that there are two Vietnamese nations, one of which has attacked the other, and he sees that attack as an integral part of unlimited Chinese aggression. Consistent with this assumption, the President is willing to negotiate with China and North Vietnam but not with the Vietcong.

Yet we cannot have it both ways. We cannot at the same time embrace these false assumptions and pursue new sound policies. Thus we are faced with a real dilemma. This dilemma is by no means of the President's making.

We are militarily engaged in Vietnam by virtue of a basic principle of our foreign policy that was implicit in the Truman doctrine of 1947 and was put into practice by John Foster Dulles from 1954 onward. This principle is the military containment of communism. Containment had its origins in Europe; Dulles applied it to the Middle East and Asia through a series of bilateral and multilateral alliances. Yet what was an outstanding success in Europe turned out to be a dismal failure elsewhere. The reasons for that failure are twofold.

First, the threat that faced the nations of Western Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War was primarily military. It was the threat of the Red army marching westward. Behind the line of military demarcation of 1945 which the policy of containment declared to be the westernmost limit of the Soviet Empire, there was an ancient civilization, only temporarily weak and able to maintain itself against the threat of Communist subversion.

The situation is different in the Middle East and Asia. The threat there is not primarily military but political in nature. Weak governments and societies provide opportunities for Communist subversion. Military containment is irrelevant to that threat and may even be counterproductive. Thus the Baghdad Pact did not protect Egypt from Soviet influence and SEATO has had no bearing on Chinese influence in Indonesia and Pakistan.

Second, and more important, even if China were threatening her neighbors primarily by military means, it would be impossible to contain her by erecting a military wall at the periphery of her empire. For China is, even in her present underdeveloped state, the

dominant power in Asia. She is this by virtue of the quality and quantity of her population, her geographic position, her civilization, her past power remembered, and her future power anticipated. Anybody who has traveled in Asia with his eyes and ears open must have been impressed by the enormous impact which the resurgence of China has made upon all manner of men, regardless of class and political conviction, from Japan to Pakistan.

The issue China poses is political and cultural predominance. The United States can no more contain Chinese influence in Asia by arming South Vietnam and Thailand than China could contain American influence in the Western Hemisphere by arming, say, Nicaragua and Costa Rica.

If we are convinced that we cannot live with a China predominant on the mainland of Asia, then we must strike at the heart of Chinese power—that is, rather than try to contain the power of China, we must try to destroy that power itself. Thus there is logic on the side of that small group of Americans who are convinced that war between the United States and China is inevitable and that the earlier that war comes the better will be the chances for the United States to win it.

Yet, while logic is on their side, practical judgment is against them. For while China is obviously no match for the United States in overall power, China is largely immune to the specific types of power in which the superiority of the United States consists—that is, nuclear, air and naval power. Certainly, the United States has the power to destroy the nuclear installations and the major industrial and population centers of China, but this destruction would not defeat China; it would only set her development back. To be defeated, China has to be conquered.

Physical conquest would require the deployment of millions of American soldiers on the mainland of Asia. No American military leader has ever advocated a course of action so fraught with incalculable risks, so uncertain of outcome, requiring sacrifices so out of proportion to the interests at stake and the benefits to be expected. President Eisenhower declared on February 10, 1954, that he "could conceive of no greater tragedy than for the United States to become involved in an all-out war in Indochina." General MacArthur, in the congressional hearings concerning his dismissal and in personal conversation with President Kennedy, emphatically warned against sending American foot soldiers to the Asian mainland to fight China.

If we do not want to set ourselves goals which cannot be attained with the means we are willing to employ, we must learn to accommodate ourselves to the predominance of China on the Asian mainland. It is instructive to note that those Asian nations which have done so—such as Burma and Cambodia—live peacefully in the shadow of the Chinese giant.

This modus vivendi, composed of legal independence and various degrees of actual dependence, has indeed been for more than a millennium the persistent pattern of Chinese predominance on the mainland of Asia. The military conquest of Tibet is the sole exception to that pattern. The military operations at the Indian border do not diverge from it, since their purpose was the establishment of a frontier disputed by both sides.

On the other hand, those Asian nations which have allowed themselves to be transformed into outposts of American military power—such as Laos a few years ago, South Vietnam and Thailand—have become the actual or prospective victims of Communist

aggression and subversion. Thus it appears that peripheral military containment is counterproductive. Challenged at its periphery by American military power at its weakest—that is, by the proxy of client-states—China or its proxies respond with locally superior military and political power.

In specific terms, accommodation means four things: (1) recognition of the political and cultural predominance of China on the mainland of Asia as a fact of life; (2) liquidation of the peripheral military containment of China; (3) strengthening of the uncommitted nations of Asia by nonmilitary means; (4) assessment of Communist governments in Asia in terms not of Communist doctrine but of their relation to the interests and power of the United States.

In the light of these principles, the alternative to our present policies in Vietnam would be this: a face-saving agreement which would allow us to disengage ourselves militarily in stages spaced in time; restoration of the status quo of the Geneva Agreement of 1954, with special emphasis upon all-Vietnamese elections; cooperation with the Soviet Union in support of a Titoist all-Vietnamese Government, which would be likely to emerge from such elections.

This last point is crucial, for our present policies not only drive Hanoi into the waiting arms of Peiping, but also make it very difficult for Moscow to pursue an independent policy. Our interests in southeast Asia are identical with those of the Soviet Union: to prevent the expansion of the military power of China. But while our present policies invite that expansion, so do they make it impossible for the Soviet Union to join us in preventing it. If we were to reconcile ourselves to the establishment of a Titoist government in all of Vietnam, the Soviet Union could successfully compete with China in claiming credit for it and surreptitiously cooperate with us in maintaining it.

Testing the President's proposals by these standards, one realizes how far they go in meeting them. These proposals do not preclude a return to the Geneva Agreement and even assume the existence of a Titoist government in North Vietnam. Nor do they preclude the establishment of a Titoist government for all of Vietnam, provided the people of South Vietnam have freely agreed to it. They also envision the active participation of the Soviet Union in establishing and maintaining a new balance of power in southeast Asia. On the other hand, the President has flatly rejected a withdrawal "under the cloak of a meaningless agreement." The controlling word is obviously "meaningless," and only the future can tell whether we shall consider any face-saving agreement as "meaningless" regardless of its political context.

However, we are under a psychological compulsion to continue our military presence in South Vietnam as part of the peripheral military containment of China. We have been emboldened in this course of action by the identification of the enemy as "Communist," seeing in every Communist Party and regime an extension of hostile Russian or Chinese power. This identification was justified 20 or 15 years ago when communism still had a monolithic character. Here, as elsewhere, our modes of thought and action have been rendered obsolete by new developments.

It is ironic that this simple juxtaposition of "communism" and "free world" was erected by John Foster Dulles' crusading moralism into the guiding principle of American foreign policy at a time when the national communism of Yugoslavia, the neutralism of the third world and the incipient split between the Soviet Union and China were rendering that juxtaposition invalid.

Today, it is laboring the obvious to say that we are faced not with one monolithic

communism whose uniform hostility must be countered with equally uniform hostility, but with a number of different communisms whose hostilities, determined by different national interests, vary. In fact, the United States encounters today less hostility from Tito, who is a Communist, than from De Gaulle, who is not.

We can today distinguish four different types of communism in view of the kind and degree of hostility to the United States they represent: a communism identified with the Soviet Union—e.g., Poland; a communism identified with China—e.g., Albania; a communism that straddles the fence between the Soviet Union and China—e.g., Rumania, and independent communism—e.g., Yugoslavia. Each of these communisms must be dealt with in terms of the bearing its foreign policy has upon the interests of the United States in a concrete instance.

It would, of course, be absurd to suggest that the officials responsible for the conduct of American foreign policy are unaware of these distinctions and of the demands they make for discriminating subtlety. Yet it is an obvious fact of experience that these officials are incapable of living up to these demands when they deal with Vietnam.

Thus they maneuver themselves into a position which is antirevolutionary per se and which requires military opposition to revolution wherever it is found in Asia, regardless of how it affects the interests—and how susceptible it is to the power—of the United States. There is a historic precedent for this kind of policy: Metternich's military opposition to liberalism after the Napoleonic wars, which collapsed in 1848. For better or for worse, we live again in an age of revolution. It is the task of statesmanship not to oppose what cannot be opposed with a chance of success, but to bend it to one's own interests. This is what the President is trying to do with his proposal for the economic development of southeast Asia.

Why do we support the Saigon Government in the civil war against the Vietcong? Because the Saigon Government is free and the Vietcong are Communist. By containing Vietnamese communism, we assume that we are really containing the communism of China.

Yet this assumption is at odds with the historic experience of a millennium and is unsupported by contemporary evidence. China is the hereditary enemy of Vietnam, and Ho Chi Minh will become the leader of a Chinese satellite only if the United States forces him to become one.

Furthermore, Ho Chi Minh, like Tito and unlike the Communist governments of the other states of Eastern Europe, came to power not by courtesy of another Communist nation's victorious army but at the head of a victorious army of his own. He is, then, a natural candidate to become an Asian Tito, and the question we must answer is: How adversely would a Titoist Ho Chi Minh, governing all of Vietnam, affect the interests of the United States? The answer can only be: not at all. One can even maintain the proposition that, far from affecting adversely the interests of the United States, it would be in the interest of the United States if the western periphery of China were ringed by a chain of independent states, though they would, of course, in their policies take due account of the predominance of their powerful neighbor.

The roots of the Vietnamese civil war go back to the very beginning of South Vietnam as an independent state. When President Ngo Dinh Diem took office in 1954, he presided not over a state but over one-half of a country arbitrarily and, in the intentions of all concerned, temporarily severed from the other half. He was generally regarded as a caretaker who would establish the rudiments of an administration until the country was

united by nationwide elections to be held in 1956 in accordance with the Geneva accords.

Diem was confronted at home with a number of private armies which were politically, religiously or criminally oriented. To his general surprise, he subdued one after another and created what looked like a viable government. Yet in the process of creating it, he also laid the foundations for the present civil war. He ruthlessly suppressed all opposition, established concentration camps, organized a brutal secret police, closed newspapers and rigged elections. These policies inevitably led to a polarization of the politics of South Vietnam—on one side, Diem's family, surrounded by a praetorian guard; on the other, the Vietnamese people, backed by the Communists, declaring themselves liberators from foreign domination and internal oppression.

Thus, the possibility of civil war was inherent in the very nature of the Diem regime. It became inevitable after Diem refused to agree to all-Vietnamese elections and, in the face of mounting popular alienation, accentuated the tyrannical aspects of his regime. The South Vietnamese who cherished freedom could not help but oppose him. Threatened by the secret police, they went either abroad or underground where the Communists were waiting for them.

Until the end of last February, the Government of the United States started from the assumption that the war in South Vietnam was a civil war, aided and abetted—but not created—from abroad, and spokesmen for the Government have made time and again the point that the key to winning the war was political and not military and was to be found in South Vietnam itself. It was supposed to lie in transforming the indifference or hostility of the great mass of the South Vietnamese people into positive loyalty to the Government.

To that end, a new theory of warfare called counterinsurgency was put into practice. Strategic hamlets were established, massive propaganda campaigns were embarked upon, social and economic measures were at least sporadically taken. But all was to no avail. The mass of the population remained indifferent, if not hostile, and large units of the army ran away or went over to the enemy.

The reasons for this failure are of general significance, for they stem from a deeply ingrained habit of the American mind. We like to think of social problems as technically self-sufficient and susceptible of simple, clear-cut solutions. We tend to think of foreign aid as a kind of self-sufficient, technical economic enterprise subject to the laws of economics and divorced from politics, and of war as a similarly self-sufficient, technical enterprise, to be won as quickly, as cheaply, as thoroughly as possible and divorced from the foreign policy that preceded and is to follow it. Thus our military theoreticians and practitioners conceive of counterinsurgency as though it were just another branch of warfare like artillery or chemical warfare, to be taught in special schools and applied with technical proficiency wherever the occasion arises.

This view derives of course from a complete misconception of the nature of civil war. People fight and die in civil wars because they have a faith which appears to them worth fighting and dying for, and they can be opposed with a chance of success only by people who have at least as strong a faith.

Magsaysay could subdue the Huk rebellion in the Philippines because his charisma, proven in action, aroused a faith superior to that of his opponents. In South Vietnam there is nothing to oppose the faith of the Vietcong and, in consequence, the Saigon government and we are losing the civil war.

A guerrilla war cannot be won without the active support of the indigenous population, short of the physical extermination of that

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population. Germany was at least consistent when, during the Second World War, faced with unmanageable guerrilla warfare throughout occupied Europe, she tried to master the situation through a deliberate policy of extermination. The French tried counterinsurgency in Algeria and failed; 400,000 French troops fought the guerrillas in Indochina for 9 years and failed.

The United States has recognized that it is failing in South Vietnam. But it has drawn from this recognition of failure a most astounding conclusion.

The United States has decided to change the character of the war by unilateral declaration from a South Vietnamese civil war to a war of foreign aggression. "Aggression From the North: The Record of North Vietnam's Campaign To Conquer South Vietnam" is the title of a white paper published by the Department of State on the last day of February 1965. While normally foreign and military policy is based upon intelligence—that is, the objective assessment of facts—the process is here reversed: a new policy has been decided upon, and intelligence must provide the facts to justify it.

The United States, stymied in South Vietnam and on the verge of defeat, decided to carry the war to North Vietnam not so much in order to retrieve the fortunes of war as to lay the groundwork for "negotiations from strength." In order to justify that new policy, it was necessary to prove that North Vietnam is the real enemy. It is the white paper's purpose to present that proof.

Let it be said right away that the white paper is a dismal failure. The discrepancy between its assertions and the factual evidence adduced to support them borders on the grotesque. It does nothing to disprove, and tends even to confirm, what until the end of February had been official American doctrine: that the main body of the Vietcong is composed of South Vietnamese and that 80 percent to 90 percent of their weapons are of American origin.

This document is most disturbing in that it provides a particularly glaring instance of the tendency to conduct foreign and military policy not on their own merits, but as exercises in public relations. The Government fashions an imaginary world that pleases it, and then comes to believe in the reality of that world and acts as though it were real.

It is for this reason that public officials are so resentful of the reporters assigned to Vietnam and have tried to shut them off from the sources of news and even to silence them. They resent the confrontation of their policies with the facts. Yet the facts are what they are, and they take terrible vengeance on those who disregard them.

However, the white paper is but the latest instance of a delusory tendency which has led American policy in Vietnam astray in other respects. We call the American troops in Vietnam advisers and have assigned them by and large to advisory functions, and we have limited the activities of the marines who have now landed in Vietnam to guarding American installations. We have done this for reasons of public relations, in order to spare ourselves the odium of open belligerency.

There is an ominous similarity between this technique and that applied to the expedition in the Bay of Pigs. We wanted to overthrow Castro, but for reasons of public relations we did not want to do it ourselves. So it was not done at all, and our prestige was damaged far beyond what it would have suffered had we worked openly and single-mindedly for the goal we had set ourselves.

Our very presence in Vietnam is in a sense dictated by considerations of public relations; we are afraid lest our prestige would suffer were we to retreat from an untenable position.

One may ask whether we have gained prestige by being involved in a civil war on

the mainland of Asia and by being unable to win it. Would we gain more by being unable to extricate ourselves from it, and by expanding it unilaterally into an international war? Is French prestige lower today than it was 11 years ago when France was fighting in Indochina, or 5 years ago when she was fighting in Algeria? Does not a great power gain prestige by mustering the wisdom and courage necessary to liquidate a losing enterprise? In other words, is it not the mark of greatness, in circumstances such as these, to be able to afford to be indifferent to one's prestige?

The peripheral military containment of China, the indiscriminate crusade against communism, counterinsurgency as a technically self-sufficient new branch of warfare, the conception of foreign and military policy as a branch of public relations—they are all misconceptions that conjure up terrible dangers for those who base their policies on them.

One can only hope and pray that the vaunted pragmatism and commonsense of the American mind—of which the President's new proposals may well be a manifestation—will act as a corrective upon those misconceptions before they lead us from the blind alley in which we find ourselves today to the rim of the abyss. Beyond the present crisis, however, one must hope that the confrontation between these misconceptions and reality will teach us a long-overdue lesson—to rid ourselves of these misconceptions altogether.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I find these articles far more persuasive than those by certain other columnists such as Marguerite Higgins and William S. White, who take what is to my point of view an unduly emotional and quite unsound position.

I hope that the articles introduced today will have some bearing on the final judgments made in the White House.

SAVE AND STRENGTHEN THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a statement adopted by the National Executive Council of the United World Federalists, on March 7, 1965, at New York City, entitled "Save and Strengthen the United Nations" be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the brochure was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SAVE AND STRENGTHEN THE UNITED NATIONS: A DECLARATION

In 1961 the General Assembly of the United Nations designated 1965 as International Cooperation Year, to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations.

It was a good purpose but International Cooperation Year could turn out to be a grim, cynical joke unless certain present trends are soon reversed. The year 1965 may mark not only the 20th anniversary of the founding of the U.N. but also the beginning of its destruction. Either the nations and peoples of the world will revive the United Nations in 1965—or they will bury it, and with it the best hopes of humanity for survival in the nuclear age. And if the U.N. is allowed to die, mankind will have to create another world organization to take its place.

The U.N. is in peril for one single, tragic reason: it was not made strong enough at San Francisco in 1945, nor has this been done in the intervening years.

The United Nations can live only if it is granted independent life—only if it is en-

dowed in its own right with the necessary capacity to establish and preserve the peace. The U.N. does not now have that strength. It is allowed to act only with the consent of the nations affected by its actions.

The peoples of the world deserve something better than to live in constant dread of world war III. With the development of mainland China's nuclear device, the people of the world can only hope that the necessity for universal, enforceable world law will become too plain to be disregarded. They can only hope that the recent spectacle of the United Nations, unable to collect its dues, to decide its issues, indeed to vote at all on any question, will so shock the conscience of the member nations that they will at last act to strengthen the U.N. The people of the world can only hope that this is the darkest hour just before the dawn.

Yet hope is not enough.

Twenty years ago mankind wrote its hope for peace into the United Nations. That was before the first atomic bomb exploded on Hiroshima. After that event, mankind's hope for peace—and for survival itself—has rested primarily in the United Nations despite its weaknesses.

Today—20 years later and in the midst of International Cooperation Year—those weaknesses have been revealed by the General Assembly's recent display of impotence. Either the United Nations will be strengthened or it will wither away.

The hour is at hand for a true world statesman to arise and speak for man, to say that his nation is ready to vest in the United Nations sufficient peacekeeping power to prevent the existing world situation from plunging mankind into the disaster of world war III. It is time for a world statesman to challenge all nations to propose the kind of United Nations that could effectively police peace and render justice.

Now is the time for some nation to define the terms under which the United Nations could survive and develop.

As Americans, we cherish such a role of world statesmanship for the President of the United States. Presented with what may well be the ultimate challenge of the ages of man, he would speak not only for his nation but would voice the hope of all mankind.

Adopted by National Executive Council, United World Federalists, March 7, 1965, New York City.

REMARKS OF VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY BEFORE THE PACEM IN TERRIS CONFERENCE

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the comments made by Vice President HUBERT H. HUMPHREY before the Pacem in Terris Conference in New York City on February 17, 1965, entitled "Peace on Earth," be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PEACE ON EARTH

(Remarks of Vice President HUBERT H. HUMPHREY before the Pacem in Terris Conference, New York City, February 17, 1965)

The Scripture tells us to "pursue peace"—and mankind has since the beginning of time condemned the horrors of war. If discord and strife, wars and the threat of wars have persisted throughout history, it is perhaps as St. Augustine says: "that men make war not because they love peace the less, but rather because they love their own kind of peace the more." Yet men of peace of every kind and every land remember well the year 1963. For in that fateful year a venerable apostle of peace left our world, leaving behind a legacy which will endure for years to

come. Generations of men—young and old alike—will remember the final testament of that gentle peasant Pope, Pope John XXIII, the encyclical "Pacem in Terris," in which he left to men of all faiths, to men holding many concepts of peace, an outline for peace in our world which can be accepted by all men of good will.

And if our generation can heed the parting plea of the man whose work we honor at this Conference, generations yet to come may hope to live in a world where in the words of the late President Kennedy "the strong are just, the weak secure, and the peace preserved."

It is a privilege and an honor to participate in this Conference dedicated to exploring the meaning and the messages of "Pacem in Terris." It is particularly fitting that this convocation meet at the beginning of International Cooperation Year. I am confident that your deliberations here will advance our world along the road to "peace on earth" as described by Pope John.

The encyclical John XXIII presented to the world was a public philosophy for a nuclear era. Comprehensive in scope, his message expounded a political philosophy governing relations between the individual and the state, relations between states, and relations between an individual state and the world organizations.

"Pacem in Terris" continues and completes the social philosophy which the Pope had begun a year earlier in his encyclical "Mater et Magistra," in which he elaborated the principles of social justice which should guide the social order. In "Pacem in Terris" he extended this philosophy to the world, concentrating now on relations between states and the role of the world community.

This encyclical represents not a utopian blueprint for world peace, presupposing a sudden change in the nature of men. Rather, it represents a call to action to leaders of nations, presupposing only a gradual change in human institutions. It is not confined to elaborating the abstract virtues of peace but looks to the building of a world community governed by institutions capable of preserving peace.

The Pope outlined principles which can guide the actions of men—all men regardless of color, creed or political affiliation—but it is up to statesmen to decide how these principles are to be applied. The challenge to this conference is to provide statesmen with further guidelines for applying the philosophy of "Pacem in Terris" to the problems confronting our world in 1965.

I would like to direct my remarks principally to the questions of relations between states and to that of a world community. Pope John's preoccupation—and our preoccupation today—is with an amelioration of international relations in the light of the dangers to mankind posed by the existence of modern nuclear weapons. The leaders of the world must understand—as he understood—that since that day at Alamogordo when man acquired the power to obliterate himself from the face of the earth, war has worn a new face. And the vision of it has sobered all men and demanded of them a keener perception of mutual interests and a higher order of responsibility. Under these conditions mankind must concentrate on the problems that unite us rather than on those which divide us.

Pope John proclaimed that the issues of war and peace are the concern of all. Statesmen—who bear a heavier responsibility than others—cannot ignore the implications for the survival of mankind of new discoveries in technology, biology, nuclear physics, and space. In this nuclear age the deliberate initiation of full-scale war as an instrument of national policy has become folly.

Originally a means to protect national interests, war today can assure the death of a nation, the decimation of a continent.

Nuclear power has placed into the hands of men the power to destroy all that man has created. Only responsible statesmen—who perceive that perseverance in the pursuit of peace is not cowardice, but courage, that restraint in the use of forces is not weakness, but wisdom—can prevent present international rivalries from leading to an incinerated world.

The confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over Cuba in the autumn of 1962 undoubtedly weighed heavily in the Pope's thinking and lent urgency to his concern to halt the nuclear arms race. Addressing the leaders of the world, he stated: "Justice, right, reason, and humanity urgently demand that the arms race should cease; that the stockpiles which exist in various countries should be reduced equally and simultaneously by the parties concerned; that nuclear weapons should be banned; and that a general agreement should eventually be reached about progressive disarmament and an effective method of control."

This plea had special pertinence for the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, the principal nuclear powers.

A few months later, President Kennedy demonstrated the U.S. commitment to the goal of peace. In a speech at American University in June of 1963, he called for renewed efforts toward a "more practical, more attainable peace—based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions—on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all concerned."

The leaders of the Soviet Union responded favorably. In October 1963, the United States and Soviet Governments signed a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. This treaty won respect throughout the world for the United States and the Soviet Union—indeed for all nations who signed it. It has inspired hope for the future of mankind on this planet. And members of this audience will recall that the man who first proposed a test ban treaty way back in 1956—and who shares in the credit for its accomplishment—is the U.S. representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson.

The nuclear test ban was the first step in the path toward a more enduring peace. "The longest journey begins with a single step," President Johnson has said—and that single step has been taken.

Other steps have followed.

We have resolved not to station weapons of mass destruction in space. A United Nations resolution, jointly sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, called on all countries to refrain from such action. It was adopted by acclamation—without a single dissenting vote.

This was a vital step toward preventing the extension of the arms race into outer space.

This year the United States is cutting back on the production of fissionable materials. Great Britain and the Soviet Union have announced cutbacks in their planned production of fissionable materials for use in weapons. As President Johnson has stated, the race for large nuclear stockpiles can be provocative as well as wasteful.

The need for instant communication between the United States and the Soviet Union—to avoid the miscalculation which might lead to nuclear war—was proven during the Cuban missile crisis. Since that time, we have established a hotline between Washington and Moscow to avoid such miscalculation.

The agenda for the future remains long. Among the measures needed to limit the dangers of the nuclear age are measures designed to prevent war by miscalculation or accident.

We must seek agreements to obtain safeguards against surprise attacks, including a

network of selected observation points. We must seek to restrict the nuclear arms race by preventing the transfer of nuclear weapons to the control of nonnuclear nations; transferring fissionable materials from military to peaceful purposes, and by outlawing underground tests, with adequate inspection and enforcement. The United States has offered a freeze on the production of aircraft and missiles used for delivering nuclear weapons. Such a freeze might open the door to reductions in nuclear strategic delivery vehicles.

It is the intention of the U.S. Government to pursue every reasonable avenue toward agreement with the Soviet Union in limiting the nuclear arms race. And the President has made it clear that he will leave no thing undone, no mile untraveled to further the pursuit of peace.

Today in the year 1965 we must recognize that the next major step in controlling the nuclear arms race may require us to look beyond the narrow United States-Soviet competition to the past. For the explosion of a nuclear device by Communist China in 1964 has impressed upon us once again that the world of today is no longer the bipolar world of an earlier decade. Nuclear competition is no longer limited to two superpowers.

The efforts of the United States and Europe to enable the nations of Europe to have a greater share in nuclear defense policy—without encouraging the development of independent national nuclear deterrents—constitute a recognition of this.

In addition to Europe, we now have the problem of finding ways of preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons in Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East.

With the explosion of the Chinese nuclear device several months ago—and the prospect of others to follow—it may be that the most immediate next step in controlling the nuclear arms race is the prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons in Asia.

In view of the evident determination of the present Communist government of Mainland China to use its limited nuclear capability it hopes to develop for maximum political and propaganda benefit, it is not surprising that other modern Asian nations are tempted to build their own nuclear deterrent.

But the nations on the perimeter of Communist China are not alone. As President Johnson has stated, "The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it."

If the need for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is more immediate in Asia today, it is no less important in Latin America, Africa and the Near East. All of these areas are ripe for regional arms pacts which would prevent these countries from developing nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons would serve no useful purpose in preserving their security. The introduction of these weapons would provoke a rivalry that would imperil the peace of Latin America and Africa and intensify the present rivalries in the Near East. It would endanger the precarious economies of countries which already possess military forces too large for their security needs and too expensive to be maintained without outside assistance.

Such nuclear arms control agreements should naturally be initiated by the nations of the area. In Latin America, such an agreement has already been proposed. Should the nations of Latin America, of Africa and the Near East through their own institutions or through the United Nations, take the initiative in establishing nuclear free zones, they will earn the appreciation of all nations of the world. Containment in these areas would represent a major step toward world peace.

consider, and even to act upon, controversial and forward-looking bills.

Probably most important of all was the strong direction that came from the Governor's office. For the first time in the memory of many legislators the Governor not only proposed legislation, but he actively fought for it.

Governor Avery presented an ambitious program—one to which he had largely committed himself during the 1964 campaign. But he would have achieved little of it without the second step—he showed the legislature how it could be financed. And by accepting this responsibility for increased taxes instead of passing the buck to the legislators as so many previous Governors have done, Avery won their respect and gained many successes.

In addition he chose two experienced and knowledgeable men to serve as his liaison with the legislature—Odd Williams and Laurin Jones. Thus the Governor was aware at all times when one of his programs was in trouble, and he knew where the trouble lay. He spent many hours discussing differences with individual legislators, and he argued forcefully and well for the things he wanted. The result was that he got most of them.

Since education played so large a part in this session, much credit also must be given to the efforts and ability of the two men who headed the education committees—Senator Joe Harder, Republican, Moundridge, and Representative John Bowser, Republican, McLouth. Both worked long and hard and were unyielding in their determination to insure legislation that would accomplish an improved system of schooling in Kansas on all levels.

Even the voters deserve some credit. For this legislature has an unusual number of able and responsible members, both new and old, and without them, of course, the best leadership in the world could have accomplished nothing.

The United Nations and Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN SHERMAN COOPER

OF KENTUCKY

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, April 22, 1965

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the Record an editorial entitled "The U.N. and Vietnam," published in the New York Times of April 4, 1965.

I shall not comment on it because it is an eloquent expression of approval of the speeches made by the majority leader, the distinguished Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], and the distinguished senior Senator from Vermont [Mr. Aiken].

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE U.N. AND VIETNAM

The administrative attitude toward United Nations action on Vietnam seems ambivalent, to say the least. A few days ago Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland spoke favorably of United Nations aid in opening Vietnam negotiations and in policing an ultimate settlement. The next day the State Department took pains once again to deny that it was encouraging Secretary General Thant to play any role.

Washington's strange course not only makes it difficult for the United Nations to help, but downgrades the world organization. It compounds the damage the State Department inflicted on the U.N. last winter by its tactics on the Soviet debt issue. Those tactics—as Senator Aiken, dean of Senate Republicans, pointed out a few days ago—have weakened the United Nations just when its help is badly needed in southeast Asia.

"International events of recent weeks," the Vermont Senator said, "seem to have overwhelmed the capacity of this Government for affirmative action, except in the military field." His trenchant comments on the U.N.'s peacekeeping role—and on Washington's efforts to force Moscow and Paris to pay for operations of which they disapproved—received the immediate endorsement of Majority Leader MANSFIELD. They deserve serious attention.

The American attempt to force the Russians to pay up or lose their General Assembly vote under article 19 of the U.N. Charter "collapsed like a punctured balloon," Senator Aiken said—and not simply because a majority of the member nations were reluctant to go along. The main reason, in his judgment, was that the United States, after taking a tough line, "backed away" from a winning vote. It did so not only for fear of a Soviet withdrawal, but because such a vote would have set a precedent contrary to American national interests.

"The United States now recognizes," Mr. Aiken said, "that if it were in the position of the Russians or the French, it would probably react in the same way * * * (the United States) is unwilling and unable to force the United Nations to abide by article 19 * * * (because it) is not willing to have article 19 applied to itself when its vital interests are involved."

What both Senators Aiken and MANSFIELD were getting at was the explosion of new nations that has more than doubled U.N. membership to a present 114. A decisive two-thirds vote in the Assembly could now be made up of countries which possess only 10 percent of the U.N.'s population and pay less than 5 percent of its budget. As a result the United States shares the Soviet desire to increase the role of the Security Council, where the major nations possess a veto.

The real issue behind the financing of peacekeeping operations, as Senator Aiken points out, "involves the readjustment of power and influence between the greater powers and the lesser nations rather than a struggle between the Soviet bloc and the West."

There is a problem of U.N. solvency—\$110 million is needed to save the world organization from bankruptcy. And there is a need to work out new methods of authorizing and financing future peacekeeping operations. There is also a need for a Soviet financial contribution, which Moscow has acknowledged. But there is no need to force the U.S.S.R. to comply with article 19 by paying the exact sum Washington says—and Moscow denies—it owes.

As Senator Aiken observed, President Johnson now "has a magnificent opportunity to put the United States back into the lead in international diplomacy by putting the United Nations back into business." And his first move should be to "instruct his representative to the United Nations to reconcile our position with the Soviet and French position on the assessment of members for peacekeeping functions—a view which may shock some, but a position which would definitely be in our own national interest * * *. Article 19 is dead as a doornail anyway."

It is essential to move now not only in the long-term interests of the United Nations but precisely because a vigorous U.N. could play a vital role in extricating the United States and the two Vietnams from their present tragic predicament.

School Aid Bill Can Be Most Meaningful of Any

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. WILLIAM R. ANDERSON

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 22, 1965

Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, one of our Nation's truly great newspapers, the Nashville Tennessean, has carried an editorial which describes the impact that the recently enacted Elementary and Secondary Education Act will have on my home State of Tennessee and the Nation. The President and the Congress are to be commended for the reasons so well described in this excellent editorial.

The editorial follows:

[From the Nashville Tennessean, Apr. 11, 1965]

SCHOOL AID BILL CAN BE MOST MEANINGFUL OF ANY

Congress has now passed and sent to the President a \$1.3 billion blueprint for aiding the Nation's elementary and secondary schools. It was a major victory for President Johnson, and it could well be the most meaningful legislative action of this session.

Both Tennessee Senators ALBERT GORE and ROSS BASS voted for the legislation. Senator BASS was presiding officer for part of the session which produced approval of the measure.

In the House, Representatives MURRAY, BROCK, DUNCAN, and QUILLEN voted "no."

The measure passed is not perfect, and there are several areas in which refinements could doubtless be made. Neither is it a landmark in terms of policy, since the Federal Government has been aiding education since the Land Grant College Act. It is a milestone, however, since a general bill of this kind has been the subject of congressional wrangling for some 20 years.

The two major obstacles to previous legislation have been constitutional questions about providing aid to parochial schools and the issue of racial segregation in public schools. The latter issue has become all but moot. In this case the religious issue has been skirted by providing aid only through public channels. Parochial pupils may benefit by attending some classes in public institutions on a "shared time" basis and from use of school libraries, and teaching aids. But the books and aids remain public property.

The main emphasis of the school aid program is on helping students in economically burdened areas. One billion sixty million dollars will go to help school districts with projects to better educate children of poor families; \$100 million will be used to ease the widespread need for more and better school libraries. Another \$100 million will be earmarked to set up educational centers to provide specialized programs that individual schools cannot afford.

It is estimated that more than 90 percent of the Nation's 26,000 school districts would receive funds. Tennessee's share of this might well amount to \$30 to \$35 million.

The bill contains provisions throughout requiring States to submit their plans for using the new aid, but forbidding Federal officials from attempting to dictate local school policy. It also bars use of any funds for supporting religious instruction or worship.

The greatness of any nation must rest in large part on the education of its youth. Now, in the swift pace of technological

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change, this Nation cannot afford to neglect any of its children in whose hands the future must be shaped.

There was a time in the development of this Nation when brawn could find its own place in the scheme of things. That day is passing. Now it is imperative that the new generation be given full opportunity to develop its skills, talents, and creativity that will not be just desirable, but mandatory in the years ahead.

President Johnson has every basis for being pleased at passage of the bill which can be a broad step toward the victory of enlightenment over darkness.

Address by Vice President Humphrey at the Azalea Festival

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. A. WILLIS ROBERTSON

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Thursday, April 22, 1965

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, one of the most spectacular festivals annually celebrated on the east coast is the International Azalea Festival, at Norfolk, Va. Norfolk, now the largest city in the Old Dominion, and one of its most progressive, has developed an Azalea Park which rivals, if it does not excel, the famed Azalea Gardens of the historic city of Charleston. Thousands of tourists are attracted to Norfolk at this season of the year, to witness that inspiring spectacle of the rebirth of nature; and added interest will be given to this festival this year through the participation of our distinguished Vice President, Hon. HUBERT H. HUMPHREY.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD the address which Vice President HUMPHREY delivered at the Azalea Festival luncheon today, in Norfolk.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE AZALEA FESTIVAL

(Address by Vice President HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, International Azalea Festival Luncheon, Norfolk, Va., Apr. 22, 1965)

My friends, it is my honor to be invited to address this International Azalea Festival luncheon. For this great festival celebrates not only the well-being and prosperity of Virginians and Americans, but celebrates also this country's commitment to interdependence among nations.

Today I would like primarily to discuss with you our well-being at home—and then to place that domestic well-being in the context of the role we Americans play in the world.

Today, our democratic society faces great challenges. We are being challenged both at home and abroad by great political, economic, and social forces.

Will we be able to meet these challenges? Can democratic government provide for the general welfare?

Is freedom incompatible with responsibility?

Is democracy as a system able to provide rapid and just progress for the hungry and disadvantaged on our planet?

Must the fulfillment of the individual be subordinate to the welfare of the whole?

We will meet these challenges if we pre-

serve, direct, and utilize all this country's vast human resources. We will meet these challenges if we realize the full potentialities of this country and each of its citizens.

This administration and this Congress, acting out the will of the American people, are providing to the world our answers to these challenges.

We are building a solid, lasting base for American health and growth.

Health and growth built on a strong and flourishing economy—and we have just celebrated our 50th consecutive month of uninterrupted prosperity, I might add.

Health and growth which can give us the means to provide a social system with justice at its heart.

Health and growth to provide sustained American leadership in the world.

President Johnson told this Congress, on the first day of its session, that: "Our Nation was created to help strike away the chains of ignorance and misery and tyranny wherever they keep man less than God means him to be."

We are not afraid to say it: We will work until every citizen of America has equal opportunity to make a better life for himself and his children. Only when this equality of opportunity is achieved can we truly find the freedom we seek.

Today in this country we are making great strides toward achieving that goal.

There are two basic forces at the heart of our progress:

First, the vigorous leadership of Lyndon Johnson.

Second, the unprecedented peacetime unity of our Nation which now exists.

There is another word for this unity. It is consensus.

Consensus is voluntary agreement based on constructive dialog, mutual respect, and understanding. In consensus, we Americans are breaking through.

United we stand. And united we gain.

We gain together as a great national consensus says all Americans shall have equal voting rights. And that consensus today is truly national, not regional.

We gain as our Nation agrees that all Americans shall have an education which can give them the opportunity to live themselves.

We gain in agreement that all Americans shall have adequate medical care;

That we should make our cities better places in which to live and work in safety and health;

That we should preserve this Nation's beauty, history, and natural resources;

That we should give the aging hope for life and work;

That we should open our doors again to immigrants who can enrich and lend new vitality to our national life;

That we should help our urban and rural Americans alike adjust to technological revolution and social change;

That we should not drop the torch of international leadership;

That we should make whatever investment is necessary to realize our American dream.

That investment will be great. But it will be less than the cost of illiteracy—of school dropouts—of poverty—of discrimination—of disillusion and bitterness—of isolation in the world. Far less.

For example: We spend \$450 per year per child in our public schools, but we spend \$1,800 a year to keep a delinquent in a detention home, \$2,500 a year for a family on relief and \$3,500 a year for an inmate in a State prison.

We must make the investment necessary so that all in our society may be productive. Poor and uneducated people are poor consumers. They are a drain on our economy. They are wasted resources.

With continuing support of the American people, we will continue now and in the years

to come to make the basic investments necessary to answer "yes" to our future.

We will continue to forge a strong economy, unmarked by recessions. We will continue to search for and develop tools to overcome the so-called business cycle.

We will continue to explore outer space and inner mind in development of knowledge for use by all the world.

And we will continue to defend and preserve the precious peace with strength and perseverance.

We will maintain our strong and active faith in the ability of freemen—developed to their fullest—to build a better life for themselves and for others.

Now, before closing, would like to direct a few personal words to you about America and its role in the world.

For a long time we Americans have stood for the belief that the world need not destroy itself by war, and that we Americans can help others, too, find a better society.

We hear many voices these days saying that America is overextended in the world—that other people's problems needn't be our problems—that we ought to close up shop overseas and enjoy our blessings here in the good old United States of America.

My friends, when that time comes, this Nation is doomed. Who in the world will work for democracy if we do not? Who in the world can preserve the peace if we do not? Who in the world can set the example, can offer the needed hand, if we do not?

We live in a time when everything is complex, when there are no more rapid or easy answers. We live in a time when we must retain our patience as never before.

Have we the patience, for instance, to work and bleed 5,000 miles from home for months and years ahead—without any guarantee of final success? I can tell you that the forces of totalitarianism have that patience.

This is what the Great Society is all about. It is the recognition that vacations abroad, fur coats, and electric toothbrushes are not enough. It is the recognition that we stand for something not seen before in the world.

We stand for the dignity and fulfillment of individual man and woman.

We stand for the chance for each man to make something better of himself.

We stand for free speech and government of the people.

We stand for peace without conquest.

We stand for the belief that others in less fortunate places should have opportunity for the blessings of abundance and should be free of tyranny. We stand for the pledges made by men and women who left the old ways and fought a living out of the soil of a new continent.

As President Johnson expressed it in his historical speech at Johns Hopkins University:

"We will not be defeated.

"We will not grow tired.

"We will not withdraw."

We will stand, at home and abroad, for the pledges made and efforts expended by Americans who came before. We must love freedom and justice enough to practice them.

America is still the last, best hope on earth.

A New Offer on Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. NEAL SMITH

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, April 22, 1965

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, the now famous speech by President Johnson

stating that we remain ready for "unconditional discussions" on the Vietnam situation was criticized by the Communist powers and by a few Americans prior to the time that it became apparent that it placed the United States on the diplomatic offensive; but, I have not seen many, in depth, interpretations of the situation by those who approved which weighed the various factors involved as well as did an editorial in the Des Moines Register on Friday, April 9, 1965. So that those who receive the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD will have an opportunity to read it, I am inserting it in the RECORD. It is as follows:

A NEW OFFER ON VIETNAM

In one heartfelt outpouring Wednesday night, President Johnson put together the two contrasting sides of U.S. policy in the Vietnam war. One is the determination not to accept defeat, open or disguised, and the other is willingness to make peace, today or 10 years from now, on generous terms.

The President himself called his speech a review of a position stated "over and over again 50 times and more—to friend and foe alike." Yet in impact and emphasis, and in certain details, it was new.

New was the little phrase in connection with possible peace talks: "We remain ready—with this purpose—for unconditional discussions."

Previous statements usually have given the impression that the United States had a condition—that it was not willing to start discussions until North Vietnam had given some sign it was stopping its help to the Vietcong fighters in South Vietnam.

The U.S. "purpose" in any such discussions is "an independent South Vietnam"—not the reunited Vietnam called for in the 1954 Geneva agreements. The President defined this independent South Vietnam as one "securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country." This would mean an ultimate end to U.S. intervention no less than North Vietnamese.

Another new detail in President Johnson's talk Wednesday was the way he spelled out his hopes for peaceful cooperation in economic development for the whole of southeast Asia. He referred directly to the U.N. preliminary work already going on and said the first step would be for the southeast Asian countries to get together on a plan. He hoped Secretary General U Thant would work with them to initiate the plan.

New also was the figure of \$1 billion which he said he would ask Congress to put up as the "American investment in this effort when it is underway."

Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam have been working on the preliminaries of just such a plan for 7 years now, in spite of civil wars, diplomatic breaks, coups, and foreign interventions, under United Nations auspices. North Vietnam could be brought in to the benefit of all. It would be the logical place to use some of the power generated by a dam in Laos.

Late in March, when President Johnson first held out the olive branch of cooperative peaceful development as an alternative to war and mutual destruction in Vietnam, the proposal had the weakness of seeming a thing of words, without any U.S. planning to make it a reality.

On April 7, the President remedied this weakness by announcing that Eugene Black, former president of the World Bank, will head a team to get the U.S. part of the job started—not even waiting for peace. Black is a superb choice, a man of demonstrated ability in this very difficult field of developing the underdeveloped. His appointment is

a convincing sign to other countries that the offer of economic aid is not mere propaganda.

President Johnson is sensitive to world opinion, to U.S. opinion. He knows how much alarm and disapproval has been stirred up by his bombing raids into North Vietnam. He remains convinced that the raids are a necessary part of keeping South Vietnam from collapsing.

But he understands also that war is hell—for the long-suffering Vietnamese people, the brave Vietcong fighters as well as the U.S.-backed South Vietnamese. Since February, North Vietnam, too, is suffering direct hits as well as the drain of blood and treasure from intervention in the South.

Neither side can win the way things are going. Both can win, if President Johnson's olive branch is grasped.

Proposed Reduction in Funds for Soil Conservation Service

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. WALTER F. MONDALE

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, April 22, 1965

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, recently I received a thoughtful and thought-provoking letter from the President of the Minnesota Farmers Union, Edwin M. Christianson.

Mr. Christianson's remarks pointedly and powerfully define the irrational and unfounded basis upon which the proposed reduction in funds for the Soil Conservation Service and the agricultural cost-sharing program is predicated. Furthermore, Mr. Christianson's remarks eloquently dramatize the stake which each American has in the encouragement of sound conservation practices.

Of particular salience, I think, is Mr. Christianson's recommendation that the President direct the Secretary of Agriculture to prepare and publish annually a "soil fertility balance sheet."

Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Christianson's letter be printed in its entirety in the Appendix of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MINNESOTA FARMERS UNION,
St. Paul, Minn., March 30, 1965.

HON. WALTER MONDALE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: The national inventory of soil conservation needs which was made public this week by the Department of Agriculture presents some very compelling reasons why the ACP and SCS funds should not be reduced, but why they ought to be increased.

The proposed budget reduction of \$100 million for ACP would be false economy considering the vast amount of work needed. Similarly, the proposal to charge farmers for \$20 million of the cost of SCS technical services would certainly hinder the program.

Without question, in the light of the low income prevailing on many farms, the need to absorb more of the cost of soil conserving projects would cause many farmers to delay work which is needed in the public in-

terest. If the cuts are made, reliable estimates are that ACP and other farm conservation project starts may drop by as much as 50 percent.

Much of the work done under ACP and SCS does not result in immediate cash benefits to the owner of the land. It is done to retain and improve the land capability for the future. Therefore, the public has a stake in assuring that conservation measures be undertaken by individual farmers and they ought to provide a substantial incentive for doing so.

The soil and water conservation inventory shows that nearly two-thirds of the rural land, near to 900 million acres, is in immediate need of conservation treatment. In this USDA study, you will find a projection of the trend of cropland into non-farm uses, which will, by 1975, amount to 2½ million acres in the Lake States and 20 million acres nationally. This will throw an additional burden on the remaining crop acreage.

The soil and water conservation inventory is a study of major importance in putting our conservation needs in perspective. In our opinion, however, it is not enough for such a study to be made and published once in every 5 or 10 years. We believe that the time has come for Congress to direct and authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to calculate and publish annually a national "soil fertility balance sheet" so that the people of the Nation will have the opportunity to know what progress is being made.

Soil and water conservation is vital to all of us.

Sincerely,

EDWIN CHRISTIANSON,
President.

The Republicans React in a Very Curious Way

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. RICHARD FULTON

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 22, 1965

Mr. FULTON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, President Johnson's recent Baltimore speech on Vietnam held out the promise of economic assistance to southeast Asia as a means of settling that area's problems. There has been criticisms from responsible quarters and spokesmen of this possible approach.

In an editorial published Friday, April 9, 1965, the Nashville Tennessean raises a very basic question which those who find fault with the President's offer of economic assistance as an alternative to war must answer: Are we to put a greater value on American dollars than we do on American lives?

Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent, I insert the editorial from the Nashville Tennessean at this point:

THE REPUBLICANS REACT IN A VERY CURIOUS WAY

Some of the Republican reaction to President Johnson's speech has been, to say the least, disappointing.

Senator EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN said the President "offers a billion-dollar lure as a step toward peace in Vietnam." And he asked, "Do we actually buy peace with an American aid program?"

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Aside from Mr. DIRKSEN's rather loose interpretation of the Johnson speech, can it be that the Republican Senate leader is putting a greater value on American dollars than he puts on American lives?

This Nation now is and has been expending its treasure and its blood in supporting South Vietnam. If that war should suddenly escalate into a major clash of land armies and the intervention of Red Chinese forces into Vietnam, Senator DIRKSEN can be assured that a billion dollars will be a small part of the eventual cost and that America will weep over the totals of dead.

It takes a very casual interpretation of Mr. Johnson's speech to come up with the idea that it was somehow a plea which was suing for peace, or an offer to buy peace from Hanoi at the price of a billion dollars. And it is even a stranger interpretation that glosses over the words of the President and finds a no-win policy or a trumpet sounding retreat.

For the President said: "We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of meaningless agreement. We will use our power with restraint, and with all the wisdom we can command. But we will use it."

If Senator DIRKSEN hears this as an uncertain trumpet, he is tone deaf.

If it has suddenly become a sign of weakness to urge warlike leaders to beat their swords into plowshares; if the olive branch has all at once become a symbol of retreat, then this Nation and all humanity are riding the tumble cart downhill.

President Johnson said to all southeast Asia that there is another road to the future besides that of destruction, of bombs and bullets and blood. But Senators DIRKSEN and Tower and Representative GERALD FORD leave the impression they would rather achieve peace the hard and bloody way.

Therein is illustrated the difference between the statesmanship of peace and the politics of opposition.

Castro's Real Coup in Cuba

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 15, 1965

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, a very perceptive and enlightening article on the methods Castro employed to entrench and solidify communism in Cuba is contained in the April 1965 issue of Report magazine. The article, "Castro's Real Coup in Cuba," was written by Alberto Martinez Piedra, a neighbor and friend. Mr. Piedra was formerly a professor of economics in Havana and currently teaches at Catholic University in Washington, D.C. Knowing that the analysis contained in this article would be of interest to my colleagues, I include it under unanimous consent at this point in the RECORD.

The article referred to follows:

CASTRO'S REAL COUP IN CUBA
(By Alberto Martinez Piedra)

When Fidel Castro came to power in January 1959, everybody thought his long struggle for victory had been achieved. Castro himself knew differently. For himself, and for the few others who knew he was a Communist, it was just the beginning.

Communism did not come to power when Castro emerged from the hills and seized the rule from Batista. It came to power afterward and right before everyone's eyes. The amazing story of Castro's real takeover is one of deception, division, and destruction played out in the midst of the Cubans themselves, and all too often with anti-Communists as the unwitting allies of Castro's clever game. It is a tactic which continues today in Castro's relations with the rest of the hemisphere.

According to classical Communist doctrine, a country goes over to socialism because of the inherent injustices of a capitalist society. Exploitation leads to class war; capitalism destroys itself; finally the people triumph.

In the same way that the Red Army disproved this theory in the Communist takeovers in East Europe after World War II, Castro himself demonstrated that communism triumphs because a few men who know how to play with power can deceive the people.

For over a year after gaining power the bearded hero of the hills talked about liberation, progress, truth, social justice, defense of democracy, religious freedom and the right to vote. For more than a year this rhetoric camouflaged his real objective and was made to serve his real aims: to destroy all existing values and institutions in order to achieve absolute control and build a new order, Communist style. Castro's greatest coup was not against the Batista regime; it was against the Cuban people themselves after Batista had fled.

What was the strategy? Deception coupled with the old maxim divide and conquer. Time and again, Castro would find some issue whereby he could divide various elements in the press, in industry, among business men, the church, landowners or the educational establishment, and then rally some to his side in order to undo the others in a process of undoing all.

In 1959, for instance, Castro brought a Spanish priest from Paraguay and put him on radio and TV to denounce the Franco regime in violent language. The Spanish Ambassador protested. But Castro was after bigger game. When representatives of many of the religious orders protested—some precisely on the grounds that a cleric should not mix in politics—Castro quickly labeled them opponents of his regime and subservient to a foreign Fascist power.

The bait had been taken and the campaign of vilification was one which ended in the expulsion of all Spanish priests and nuns. Castro knew that the church was his ultimate enemy: this was only the first of his many moves which has left only 120 priests on the island to take care of nearly 7 million inhabitants.

The same tactic was used to get rid of the newspaper El Mundo, owned by an Italian. The press was particularly vulnerable to this strategy that relied on the selfish idea that another man's troubles are not my troubles—and sometimes can even be to my profit.

Castro could not afford to have any group united against him and least of all in the press. When Batista's army was disbanded Castro had a force of only 1,500 men. Boy scouts were being used to direct traffic. Castro himself had to go on TV day in and day out, sometimes for hours at a time. But until he was strong enough he needed a deceived press to give him its support.

An exile, formerly connected with Bohemia magazine, says that Castro used to visit the magazine's offices three times a week, but the visits declined as the strength of the army increased. Castro knew how to play favorites so that as he moved against one publication after another, those that remained would always feel "safe."

But getting rid of the "bourgeois" press was always a piecemeal process, never a mas-

sive blow that would show his hand. And when the attack came it was rarely from Castro himself. Union toughs would smash the machinery of an afternoon paper over some minor grievance. The morning paper would find its position improved. When a foreign-owned paper would be accused of being anti-Cuban, the others would congratulate themselves on their illusory safety as nationals.

Castro's second thrust against the church was once again not on any religious issue; that would have rallied opposition. Distinguishing between good Christians and bad ones, he would praise the Sisters of Charity as good religious women following the true calling of Christ. They devoted their lives to healing the sick and helping the poor.

But by appearing religious himself in this way, he subtly advanced a purely social interpretation of religion and thus opened his attack on the Jesuits, the Augustinians, and others involved in the education of the "upper classes."

His target was the vital field of education and particularly the University of Santo Tomas de Villanueva. With Law 11, passed in January, 1959, Castro voided all degrees and credits of Villanueva granted since the University of Havana had shut down in 1956. The charge was that Villanueva had not supported Havana University's protest against Batista by closing its doors, too.

With rumors that the administration of the university had considered declaring its grounds and buildings American property, Castro had new ammunition. With a charge of "anti-Cuban" in hand, he went on to develop antagonism between clergy and laity over the question of Villanueva, duping many into supporting the regime's attack on the main nonstate university and the Augustinians who ran it.

The closing of the university in 1961 constitutes one of the saddest episodes in the early days of Castrolism. Those who had criticized the Augustinians soon found that they were following their brothers into exile, and the church's activity in higher education was stamped out.

Lay organizations were prey to manipulation by the regime in order to weaken the church. The JUC (Juventud Universitaria Catolica), for example, with prompting from the government, denied that there were any Communists in the University of Havana, actually a Communist stronghold. Their ill-considered statement only added to the confusion already felt by many Cubans.

Distinctions and divisions between "conservative" and "liberal" Catholics were pressed for all they were worth. "Progressives" were opposed to "reactionaries" and "antirevolutionaries." Those who supported the aims of the revolution were said to be in line with the true teachings of the Gospel.

Magazines like La Quincena were applauded, while any that criticized Government measures were denounced as counter-revolutionary. The distinction was only transitory, the purpose being to confuse and to divide the faithful into antagonistic groups.

All the while the regime pretended to be on the side of religion. But strange devotions were fostered in a Machiavellian manner to further confuse and mislead. The veneration of the spurious San Lazaro was encouraged and the road to his shrine was modernized, above all because he was a poor man in the Gospel parable who lived to see the condemnation of the heartless rich man. Propaganda, not religion, was the aim; but the religious spirit of the people could be used—and twisted in the process.

The final stroke was to try to create a Cuban National Church, independent from Rome and "faithful to the true teachings of Christ," which, according to the revolutionary government, the priests and religious

had forgotten to practice. The government got a few of the clergy to attend the conference for this purpose, but made the mistake of inviting Bishop Boza Masvidal, the new auxiliary bishop of Havana, a native. The bishop torpedoed the plan and so kept almost all of Cuba's priests loyal, an action that took him a step closer to exile.

Castro worked to create the same kind of divisions throughout the entire society. Since there was no "class war" in Cuba, he had to create it. Early in 1959 he passed two laws that completely disrupted real estate business and which were calculated to set the masses against the "easy living," "nonproductive" and "parasitic" rentiers. One decree simply cut all rents in half; another put an absurd ceiling price on the sale of land and then forced all owners (with a few technical exceptions) to sell on demand.

The move aroused hardly any opposition from intellectual or businessmen not directly affected. To many it appeared simply as a bungling and insane gesture by a new government of amateurs and destined soon to be repealed. The mess was indeed cleared up, but in a way they hardly expected: a year later Castro declared that rentiers were no longer owners, and all rents were to be paid to the government—toward a mythical "eventual" purchase.

In a similar way Castro made use of the agrarian reform law of May 1959, to destroy first the foreign landholders, then those who held large blocks of land and finally even small landholders. Again, he attacked one group at a time, so that others would not protest until it was too late. Now few "independent" farmers exist, and the state-owned, state-run farm has become the dominant agricultural unit.

What were the elements of Castro's success? The first and most important was deception. Castro knew what his goals were from the beginning. When he admitted in 1961 that he had been a Marxist-Leninist all along, he also declared that he deliberately avoided saying this in the beginning because he knew he wouldn't be able to generate support.

Castro knew what he intended to do; but by concealing his aims while working for them all the time, he perhaps more than any other successful Communist revolutionary—even the Red "agrarian reformers" of China—was able to take advantage of the combination of good will and selfishness that exists in every society.

A free society—and for that matter, even a Communist one—will always have a great variety of opinions, groups, divisions, and subdivisions and even antagonisms. Castro's second great tactic was to develop these into outright clashes. One by one, each of these groups could be isolated and then eliminated, while Castro was only apparently favoring the rest. The Communist doctrine of class war is pure myth, but it becomes a "reality" for purposes of destruction under the pressures of selective agitation and deception.

The tactic only works because there is enough good will in a liberal society to believe that piecemeal isolation of one "bad" element somehow marks progress. And there is always enough bad will to be found that can close its eyes to the destruction that ensues, the "good" always believing they are safe. What is not realized is that such distinctions between bad and good are not part of the Communist vocabulary. They are only means by which the Communist is able to divide and conquer.

And Castro is using these same tactics today. Now that he has secured absolute control in Cuba itself, he is sparing no effort to export the revolution to all of Latin America. Terrorism in Bolivia may seem merely destructive. But in the Communist strategy and propaganda it is aimed at pitting "the people" against their "detested fascist rul-

ers," just as arson in Puerto Rico is aimed at "foreign domination of capitalist overlords in the United States."

And of all the deceptions and divisions that are created and encouraged—rich against poor, foreigner against native, owner against worker, big business against little, right against left—those involving the church are at once the saddest and most pernicious. Castro has added a new string to Lenin's lyre in pretending to speak in the name of the Gospel, playing upon the vast variety in the church's activities and organizations. By turning religion exclusively to social concerns, its heart is cut out, true charity and the unity that goes with it is smashed.

The state of the church in Cuba today stands as witness to what communism means both in its tactics and in its goals. There is no persecution, it is claimed—as long as religion is confined to the clouds "where it belongs."

But the church is forbidden to teach; the more than 300 Catholic schools have been seized by the government; all religious programs have been banned from radio and television; and even though churches are still open in Cuba, as the propaganda takes care to assert, the number of priests has been reduced to a handful that is far too few to minister to the needs of a population that is overwhelmingly Catholic. The church in Cuba today has joined the honorable ranks of the churches of silence behind the Iron Curtain.

But the cry of the church in Cuba is not merely a lament for itself; it is the cry of witness against what communism is trying to do everywhere. For the Cuban Church to cease to occupy its honorable position, declared Bishop Boza Masvidal, "communism would have to cease being atheistic and enslaving," and both are equally impossible.

"Research: Key to Tomorrow"

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 12, 1965

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Speaker, I include as part of my remarks another chapter in the story of Pittsburgh, "Research: Key to Tomorrow":

RESEARCH MANPOWER

More than 14,000 research scientists, engineers, and technicians are employed in the Pittsburgh area. Of this total, 7,600 are professional staff members. They represent all the disciplines, ranging from the design engineer to the theoretical physicist. Almost all perform or are available for contract research.

In addition to their R. & D. activities, Pittsburgh area scientists and engineers enjoy an active professional life through the local sections of more than 60 scientific and technical societies.

Among these organizations are the American Chemical Society with seven active subgroups, the largest local section of the American Nuclear Society, and the world headquarters of the Instrument Society of America.

The societies sponsor a multitude of professional programs, many of which are joint projects. Typical activities include short courses in solid-state devices and process control by the Institute of Electrical & Electronic Engineers, PERT seminars by the American Institute of Industrial Engineers, a lecture series on space sciences by the American Institute of Aeronautics & Astro-

nautics, and a unique high school engineering physics course sponsored by six societies.

Pittsburgh also is the annual site of such highly regarded national and international conferences as the Pittsburgh Conference on Analytical Chemistry and Applied Spectroscopy, Pittsburgh Diffraction Conference, ISA Conference on Instrumentation in the Iron and Steel Industry, and the National Conference on Open Hearth and Basic Oxygen Steel.

Looking Back and Ahead in Wake of House Vote

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN D. DINGELL

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 22, 1965

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to permission granted I insert in the appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD an excellent article appearing in the Washington Report on the Medical Sciences, published by WRMS, and edited by Mr. Gerald G. Gross.

I am sure this excellent commentary on the passage of the medicare bill, H.R. 6675, merits careful consideration.

The article follows:

LOOKING BACK AND AHEAD IN WAKE OF HOUSE VOTE

It really began a quarter century ago, when organized medicine's hostility to a small medical group formed to serve some government employees on a prepaid basis led to conviction of AMA and fellow defendants on charges of violating antitrust laws. The conviction stood up clear to the U.S. Supreme Court. But AMA was now on its way to save the country from socialized medicine. Today, millions of lobbying and propaganda dollars later, the Nation is at the brink. Credit those dollars, if you will, with delaying the day; but credit them, too, with the power of backfire.

The House has passed medical eldercare under social security. Senate passage this spring—possibly as a present for AMA on the eve of its annual meeting in New York City, June 20-24—is a virtual certainty. It will be a big climax, yet it will be but the first step. In time eldercare will give way to true medicare, with no ages barred. Only this time AMA persistence in its strange opposition strategy will be an accelerant, rather than an effective obstruction tactic.

In recent years particularly, AMA has enjoyed exquisite success in antagonizing the press, alienating those in Congress who would be its friends, and picking the wrong horses. Membership dues have gone from \$0 to \$45 a year to raise a war chest that would stave off Federal intervention in providing and financing medical care. But any gains that may have accrued were offset by Dearborn Street aloofness to legitimate inquiries, occasional arrogance, designation of a pat, patronizing, palaverous doctor to be spokesman—at least temporarily—and failure to recognize that AMA's refusal to take leadership on health legislation weakened its position as a pleader for the anti-eldercare cause.

Attempting to show that organized labor was not solidly behind social security medical care, AMA engaged the president of an international union to address its banquet in Atlantic City. He said he was against Wagner-Murray-Dingell. Not long afterward he was in the penitentiary (though not because of that declaration).

April 22, 1965

On May 25, 1960, your correspondent, delivering Alpha Omega Alpha lecture at University of Nebraska College of Medicine, predicted onset of Federal subsidization of health services. Based on events and circumstances in which organized medicine was anything but a disinterested bystander, he made this prediction before 1960 and he has made it since. In Omaha, as elsewhere, audience reaction was one of a sort of resentful, if not belligerent, silence, as though the utterance mothered a wish. This is another attitude that has hastened the day.

NEXT 90 DAYS COULD BE A TIME FOR INVENTORY

In the course of lengthy House debate Wednesday and Thursday on H.R. 6675, AMA was slammed around a bit for its negativism and yet not even its severest critics employed the invective that has been heaped on King-Anderson bill and its predecessors. No one tagged AMA's motives as "a fraud and a hoax," a label once applied to President Kennedy for his sponsorship of social security eldercare—a characterization that was an important addition to the backfire arsenal. Rather, the atmosphere seemed to be one that could be summed up in the words: Cooperation of America's doctors is a must if this huge \$6 billion program is to work, so here's hoping they take a new look.

Passage of Medicare Bill Is a Legislative Milestone

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. RICHARD FULTON

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 22, 1965

Mr. FULTON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, on April 8 of this year the House of Representatives approved the historic bill to provide medical care for the elderly under social security.

On April 10, the Nashville Tennessean in an editorial, "Passage of Medicare Bill Is a Legislative Milestone," stated final approval of this bill by the Congress will signal a "historic point in social legislation."

Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent, I insert the editorial from the Nashville Tennessean at this point:

PASSAGE OF MEDICARE BILL IS A LEGISLATIVE MILESTONE

House passage of the program for medical care for the elderly under social security is a legislative milestone. If the Senate approves this measure, it will mark a historic point in social legislation.

Medical care for the aged has been one of the top priority items on President Johnson's must list. It was one of the early goals of the Kennedy-Johnson administration.

For several years, the proposal has been the center of great controversy. The American Medical Association has spent millions to bring about its defeat.

But for all the furore and outcries raised, a central fact has been that both sides have agreed that the aged needed protection against the rising costs of being sick. Several factors have given the problem increasing concern.

The number of elderly in our population is large and it is growing. As a group, it is the most economically vulnerable, and it is the most likely to sustain long and serious illnesses. There are nearly 20 million people in the United States who are 65 years or older. Many are dependent on small pen-

sions, social security, or inadequate life savings. To these older people, the costs of medical care for serious illness can be catastrophic, financially.

The measure passed by the House is a much broader one than was conceived originally. In brief, it would:

Increase social security payments to the aged by 7 percent; broaden medical assistance under existing welfare programs, and liberalize other social security benefits.

The key feature is the right of persons over 65 to a maximum of 60 days hospitalization and 20 days nursing home care. The patient would pay the first \$40, the rest would be paid for him.

Available to the elderly who want it is a supplementary and entirely voluntary program of insurance, which would defray expenses of doctors' bills and other expenses not covered by the basic plan. This supplementary insurance plan would apply only to those who want it and would be financed by a \$3 a month premium from those joining the program and by matching funds from Federal general revenue.

The bill includes a general liberalizing of other old-age, survivors, and disability benefits. Pensioners would be able to earn more and still collect a retirement check; widows could retire at an earlier age; children would be given survivors benefits until age 22 instead of the present 18.

All in all, it is a major package which is a big step forward in behalf of the older citizens of this Nation. House action by a 236-to-191 vote adds optimism that Senate passage will come by June at least.

Warsaw Ghetto Uprising

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. EDNA F. KELLY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 22, 1965

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Speaker, although the history of mankind is unfortunately liberally sprinkled with dictatorships of the right and the left, as human beings we may still take pride in the fact that there have always been men who have been willing to risk all in order to counter them.

One of the most recent tyrannies was that which existed in Germany from 1933 to 1945, when the Nazis under Adolf Hitler attempted to establish their "thousand year Reich." April 19, 1965, was the anniversary of one of the most tragic uprisings against that dictatorship: The revolt of the Warsaw ghetto in 1943, when 40,000 Jews decided to confront the German war machine. Inadequately equipped, almost completely untrained, and overwhelmingly outnumbered, their defiance of the SS and the Gestapo was in the true sense of the word a tragedy, because despite the knowledge of certain defeat, they never hesitated.

The Warsaw ghetto was officially established in November of 1940: 100 city blocks were surrounded by brick walls 10 feet high and barbed wire fences, and the Jewish population was completely cut off from the rest of the city—indeed, the world. Despite the starvation, misery and death which followed, Jewish community life continued: soup kitch-

ens, child care centers, schools, lectures, musical events, and a host of other activities were carried out. Perhaps most important for posterity, daily reports on activities, scientific papers, and complete archives were maintained. It is from these that we have our information on life in the ghetto; they provide a moving and memorable record of the courage and determination of the unfortunate people to preserve and maintain their Jewish traditions and way of life against the Nazi holocaust.

But, their actions provide us at the same time with a more meaningful and wider lesson: that no tyranny, no matter how ruthless and inhuman, is ever able to extinguish the desire of man to live in freedom. The Warsaw ghetto will forever live as an example of how guns, barbed wire, starvation, and torture are, in the long run, unable to compete with dedication and determination to the cause of liberty.

Republican Task Force on Agriculture

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. ODIN LANGEN

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 22, 1965

Mr. LANGEN. Mr. Speaker, the members of the House Republican Task Force on Agriculture have expressed grave concern over the rapid increase in U.S. farm debt. It is our feeling that the American farmer is literally being crushed under this enormous burden of debt. With farm mortgage and short-term debt increasing far out of proportion to income, the farmer's economic situation is rapidly deteriorating.

We on the task force are continuing our research into the agricultural situation for the purpose of arriving at a better understanding of what is wrong with present and past programs which have not served the best interests of the American farmer, taxpayer or consumer. Such a thorough understanding is most essential as a background for any and all considerations of the farmer's economic problems. Preliminary research into the farm debt situation has revealed some alarming facts.

Unfortunately, administration farm programs have accomplished the exact opposite of their stated objectives. Since 1961, net farm income has remained virtually at the same level, while total farm debt has increased nearly 50 percent. Total farm debt today is actually greater than the entire Federal budget in 1948.

U.S. farmers in 1961 were indebted \$1.97 for every dollar of realized net income. This year, after 4 years of current farm programs, the farmer will owe a whopping \$2.86 for every income dollar. To further illustrate what this means, in 1929, on the eve of the great depression, the farmer owed only about \$2.30 for each income dollar. The farmer's best postwar year was 1947, when the ratio